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2Summary of thesis (Abstract)
My overall aim in this thesis is to elucidate the precise nature of Russell's mature 'neutral monist'  
metaphysic.
I  show how an understanding of it  has been hampered by pervasive misunderstandings.  The 
approach I take is an historical one, and my account reveals that, after his adoption of neutral  
monism in 1918, there were no radical changes in his worldview, and certainly no lurch from a 
supposed quasi-phenomenalistic  system prior  to  1921, to  a  causal  theory of  perception after 
1927. Instead, the earlier system is not as phenomenalistic as is sometimes supposed and his later 
philosophy is a development, not a repudiation, of the themes in the earlier.
Russell sought to show how his metaphysic dovetails with the outcome of modern physics in his  
1927 book The Analysis of Matter. I seek to show how a proper understanding of modern physics 
indeed leads to Russellian conclusions. I also discuss the implications of quantum mechanics for 
metaphysics – a task which Russell could not have performed when he wrote  The Analysis of  
Matter, since QM was still very much in a state of flux.
I show how Russell moved from empiricism to a naturalistic position in the theory of knowledge, 
and  in  doing so  supplied  a  definitive  solution  to  Hume's  scepticism.  Once again,  the  usual 
perception of him as an “empiricist” fails to do justice to the complexity and subtlety of his  
philosophy.
Finally, I argue that Russell's solution to the mind-body problem is the only one with any chance 
whatsoever of being true. 
In all this I seek to show how Russell's philosophy has been unjustly neglected in contemporary 
debates and how it can provide elegant solutions to contemporary philosophical puzzles in the 
philosophy of science, epistemology and the mind-body problem.
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5Preface
The aim of this thesis is to expound and defend Russell's 'neutral monist' metaphysic. In particular, it is my  
contention  that  this  metaphysic  in  large  part  supplies  the  correct  solution  to  the  'mind-body  problem'. 
Consequently, in the first four chapters I shall be attempting to explain the precise nature of Russell’s neutral  
monism and how it solved the problem of the relation of conscious states to brain processes. Russell’s solution  
to the mind-body problem has hitherto been largely obscured by pervasive and persistent misunderstandings 
concerning  the  nature  of  his  metaphysic.  These  misunderstandings  have,  in  turn,  been  fostered  by 
misunderstandings concerning the course of Russell's philosophical development. This volume aims to put 
right this state of affairs.
In  the  last  four  chapters  of  my thesis  I  shall  be developing  and  extending  the  central  ideas  of  Russell's  
metaphysic  into  other  areas,  specifically,  the  philosophy  of  science,  the  interpretation  of  physics,  the 
philosophy  of  mind,  and  epistemology.  I  shall  show how Russell's  metaphysical  framework  and  overall  
philosophical approach is capable of providing solutions to age-old problems in each of these areas, such as the 
problem of the nature of intentionality,  and the 'problem of induction'.  In each case, the solution to these  
problems was at least  partially developed by Russell himself, though in each instance his ideas were not as  
fully developed as they were in the case of the mind-body problem. Thus the second portion of my thesis will  
be more speculative in nature than the first half.
I shall begin this second part of my thesis by examining Newman's criticism of Russell's alleged 'structuralist'  
philosophy of science, and evaluating the extent to which his criticism need undermine a Russellian account. I 
shall argue that Russell's metaphysic is entirely capable of answering Newman, though not quite in the way 
Russell  himself  supposed.  Furthermore,  the  correct  solution  to  this  puzzle  throws  further  light  on  the 
fundamental and inescapable limits of our knowledge. I shall then examine how a Russellian metaphysic can 
successfully integrate and interpret the findings of modern natural science. I shall argue that relativity can be 
easily assimilated; indeed that, properly understood, it must lead to an account similar to that of Russell's. In 
the  case  of  quantum  mechanics  I  shall  argue  that  current  understandings  of  quantum  mechanics  are 
philosophically muddled and that a perfectly straightforward realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is  
available which is wholly consistent with Russell's scientific realism. Furthermore, I argue that this realist  
interpretation is precisely the one we ought to adopt on other grounds, simply from a careful examination of  
6quantum theory itself.  I  should mention here that I  entirely reject the currently fashionable 'relative state',  
'Many Worlds' and 'Many Minds' interpretations, for reasons which I hope shall become clear in the course of  
presenting my account. And whilst I have a considerable respect for the theories of Bohm, my account does not 
presuppose their validity. Moving on to the philosophy of mind, I argue that the same general approach that  
Russell applied to conscious states can also be profitably applied to the topic of intentional states, thus yielding  
a complete theory of mind. Lastly, I shall show that Russell's approach to the theory of knowledge in his  
mature  system was  less  straightforwardly 'empiricist'  than  is  customarily  supposed,  despite  Russell's  own 
professed  allegiance  to  the  empiricist  tradition,  and  that  his  metaphysic  is  consistent  with  a  naturalistic  
approach which indeed has a lot more in common with Kant than Russell himself was prepared to admit. In 
going beyond traditional empiricism, I argue that Russell supplied a wholly original approach to the problem 
of knowledge, one which throws fresh light on the traditional problems of epistemology and offers a route to  
definitive solutions in this field, just as his metaphysic offers a definitive solution to the mind-body problem.  
In particular, I maintain that the analysis of knowledge in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits provides a 
philosophically satisfactory answer to Hume's scepticism in a manner that previous philosophical systems had  
largely failed to achieve. The empiricist answer to Hume in the twentieth century (for example in the works of  
A. J. Ayer) was simply to say that induction is the final court of appeal in evaluating factual inference, and is  
thus not itself susceptible to criticism in the light of any higher criterion. Whilst this may be correct, it cannot  
help  but  feel  like  something  of  an evasion.  I  think  that  Russell  supplies  something  better,  and  far  more  
sophisticated, an account which answers Hume in a manner that is not only completely definitive but is also  
wholly satisfying  in  a  manner  in  which  the ordinary empiricist  answer  to  Hume is  not.  In  the  course  of 
expounding his approach I also outline aspects of Russell's epistemology that have been largely ignored in the  
secondary literature, such as his strident rejection of 'induction' as a valid form of non-demonstrative inference, 
and his complete anticipation, by nearly twenty years, of Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction'.
Finally, in the conclusion to my thesis, I shall briefly return to the question of the mind-body problem, and 
argue that the Russellian solution to this problem is the only solution with any probability whatsoever of being 
true.
7Introduction
QUESTIONS
It is a curious fact that, despite the considerable material that has been written about Russell, understanding of 
his mature metaphysic is somewhat sketchy. What, precisely,  was Russell’s final view of the world? What 
relation does his final view bear towards his earlier views? Was there a radical change in his metaphysic  
involving his abandonment of phenomenalism and the adoption of a causal theory of perception alongside a 
scientific realism – a change concerning which he was strangely silent?
Part of the reason that the answers to these questions have remained unclear is,  I  think, to be found in a  
seeming lack of interest in what the answers might be. One sometimes gets the distinct impression that few 
contemporary philosophers believe that Russell  has much to teach them. Often his views are  regarded as 
merely quaint and outdated. Ray Monk, for example, in his biography of Russell, quotes Russell's argument for 
the causal theory of perception in order to ridicule it.1 He characterises Russell’s argument as ‘a strange form 
of epistemological solipsism’ which, moreover, is ‘spectacularly unconvincing’. Sadly, he does not deign to 
inform us where he thinks the argument goes astray. Other commentators, whilst displaying greater sympathy  
with Russell, frequently find themselves perplexed. Thus even so sympathetic a commentator as A. J. Ayer, in 
his little volume on  Russell,  ends up, when discussing the mature system, confessing that he is unable to 
completely make sense out of Russell’s claims.2
The precise nature of Russell’s ‘neutral monism’ is itself something of a mystery to some scholars. Some 
writers have conflated this doctrine with the ‘phenomenalism’ which Russell allegedly adopted in 1914.3 They 
have thus been led to see his espousal of a causal theory of perception in the latter half of the 1920s as  
constituting a tacit abandonment of neutral monism. This, in turn, has led them to be perplexed by Russell's  
apparent continued endorsement of neutral monism throughout the remainder of his philosophic career. Some 
1  Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell 1921-79: The Ghost of Madness, pp. 243-4. 
2  A. J. Ayer, Russell, p. 115.
3  For example, see A. J. Ayer’s account in Russell and Moore: The Analytical Hertage, p. 122, and W. T. 
Stace’s ‘Russell’s Neutral Monism’ in P. A. Schilpp (ed), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 354 and p. 
355n. Both these examples are taken from Michael Lockwood’s essay on ‘What Was Russell's Neutral 
Monism?’, pp. 143-4, in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling and Howard K. Wettstein (eds), Midwest  
Studies in Philosophy, vol. VI: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy.
8have even gone so far as to conclude that Russell must have ‘vacillated’ on the question of neutral monism and  
phenomenalism versus a causal theory of perception. Indeed, Ayer even imagines that Russell changed his 
mind within a single book (The Analysis of Matter).4 And so confusion continues, all caused by a failure to 
properly get  to  grips  with  his  mature  system.  There  is  a  real  lacuna  here  which,  if  filled,  could  help  to  
illuminate Russell’s earlier writings as well, by revealing the direction in which Russell was travelling.
The less  than  wholly satisfactory state  of  Russell  scholarship,  with  respect  to  the  metaphysics  of  neutral  
monism, is evidenced in  The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, edited by Nicholas Griffin. In his 
Introduction to this work, Griffin refers to what he calls the ‘narrow canon’ of Russell’s writings which has 
represented  ‘Russell’ for  much  of  the  twentieth  century,  and  continues  to  dominate  many  philosophers’  
perceptions of Russell’s contribution to philosophy.5 This narrow canon, Griffin explains, extends ‘from “On 
Denoting” in 1905 to “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” in 1918 – thirteen years out of a career of more 
than five decades.’6 Griffin to some extent defends this canon from a pedagogical perspective: ‘it contains  
enough elementary material for an undergraduate course, with bits of tougher material for those going on to 
graduate school...The only really difficult matter that occurred as a central part of the narrow canon was the 
Gray's Elergy argument in “On Denoting”, and this was for a long time dismissed as based on a simple misuse 
of quotation marks.  By such means, the narrow canon could be made safe for everyone.’ 7 Still,  however, 
Griffin in the end concludes that the narrow canon has had, and continues to have, a baleful influence on the  
understanding of Russell’s philosophy. Its effects, he writes, ‘can be readily observed in this volume [ The 
Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell] in the relatively sketchy treatment of his later work, despite the 
best efforts of its editor!'8
Indeed, of the various contributions to Griffin’s volume, only three chapters can really be taken as dealing with 
Russell's  mature  metaphysic.  Tully’s  essay  on  ‘Russell’s  Neutral  Monism’ aims  to  clear  up  some  of  the  
confusion surrounding this issue, but, if  I am not mistaken, serves only to muddy the waters still further. 9 
Demopoulos and Friedman are interested in Russell’s alleged ‘structural realism’ to the extent necessary to 
refute it. But they are clearly somewhat nonplussed by Russell’s reply to Newman’s criticism of his structural 
realism and can make little sense out of it. As we shall see, their difficulty arises from the fact that, having  
foisted on Russell a full-fledged ‘structuralist’ interpretation of science, they find it difficult to assimilate a 
reply to Newman which appeals to those aspects of Russell’s theory that are incompatible with this structuralist 
4  A. J. Ayer, op. cit., p. 84.
5  Nicholas Griffin (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, p.44.
6  Ibid.
7  Ibid, p. 45.
8  Ibid, p. 46.
9  See below, pp. 57-9.
9approach10. Grayling’s chapter repeats a lot of the material from his ‘popular’ book on Russell: A Very Short  
Introduction,  though it  also in  part  expands on this  material.  Like so many of his predecessors,  Grayling 
supposes that Russell tacitly changed his metaphysic at some unspecified point in the 1920s. But, as we shall  
see, Grayling goes further than his predecessors in inventing a fictitious reason for this change.11
Thus, there is ample scope for the clarification and illumination of Russell’s mature neutral monism. My own 
motivation for undertaking this task is that (like the contemporary Oxford philosopher Michael Lockwood, 
whose views I shall examine later on) I believe that Russell's metaphysic contains the clue to the definitive 
solution to the mind-body problem, or at least to one part of it, namely the problem of consciousness and its 
relation to  the brain.  The key to  this  solution lies  in  realising that  the world consists  neither  of  material  
particles nor selves but of momentary Heraclitean individuals which Russell calls ‘events’. My thesis will  
therefore be partly expository and partly a defence. But even if I do not convince the reader of the credibility of 
this metaphysical standpoint, a proper understanding Russell’s theory can still, I think, serve a useful function. 
For if we know why we reject a theory we can gain greater clarity as to the nature of our own views, and the  
assumptions on which these views are based. Besides, Russell’s metaphysic is interesting in itself.
I shall begin my account by describing, as clearly as I can, the metaphysic at which Russell finally arrived. I  
shall then set out the course of Russell’s development from about the time of his completion of  Principia  
Mathematica to the writing of The Analysis of Matter. In doing so, I shall vindicate Russell’s own belief in the 
fundamental continuity of his thinking, despite the twists and turns that inevitably occurred along the way.
If Russell is right then the difference between the mental and the physical is not metaphysically fundamental. 
The universe, for Russell, consists of an indefinite number of ‘events’ and the events that constitute the brain 
are the very same events that, when differently ordered, constitute the mind of the person whose brain it is. In  
the following chapter I shall seek to explain precisely how this works.
10  See below, pp. 67-8.
11  See below, chapter 4, section II (pp. 49-54).
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Chapter 1
Russell’s Mature View of the World
There is really no better way of presenting Russell’s mature world view than Russell’s own account in the 
chapter  entitled  ‘My Present  View of  the  World’ which  he  wrote  for  his  intellectual  autobiography  My 
Philosophical Development (1959). Since, however, despite the lucidity of this account, his final theory has 
still not been fully understood, I shall attempt here an independent exposition of his metaphysic.
Perhaps the best place to start is with his distinction between perceptual and physical space. The distinction  
which  Russell  draws  between  these  two  spaces  has  been  questioned,  but  it  seems  to  me  to  be  entirely  
defensible. Consider Macbeth’s dagger. Now there is a sense in which, when Macbeth ‘saw the dagger’ before 
him, he didn’t  ‘really see’ a dagger at all, for there was in fact no dagger for him to see. He was merely  
hallucinating. But there is clearly a sense in which he did ‘see a dagger’. A certain visual pattern occurred in 
his visual field, a pattern which we could characterise as a ‘visual dagger pattern’. Or, to take another example, 
I currently think that I see a book before me. But I would have exactly the same visual experience if my optic 
nerves were stimulated by a skilful neurologist.  In this latter case, I  would not really be  ‘seeing a book’. 
However, I would still have exactly the same quality of visual experience that I have now when I actually am 
seeing a book. There is a perfectly intelligible sense of the verb ‘to see’ in which I can say that I ‘see a book’ 
even in the case of visual illusion. For even in this case a certain visual pattern, a certain pattern of colours,  
occurs in my visual field, such as I would normally associate with a book.
The qualities of my visual experiences can occur on more than one occasion. This is true for both  ‘simple’ 
qualities, such as colours, and more complex sensory patterns, such as the precise visual pattern of a book that  
I am experiencing now. The next step is to introduce the terminology of ‘percepts’. Percepts differ from simple 
qualities and sense-patterns in that they cannot occur on more than one occasion or to more than one observer.  
Thus a percept is effectively a sense-pattern that is individuated to a given observer and a given moment. 
Hence, Russell’s talk of ‘percepts’, whatever else one might think, is at least perfectly intelligible.
The various sensory spaces, or sense-fields, within which our percepts are situated, must not be conflated with  
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physical space. In the case of Macbeth’s dagger, a visual dagger pattern occurs in Macbeth’s visual field, even 
though there  is  no corresponding  physical  object  with  a  position  in  physical  space.  The  spatial  relations  
between percepts are just those spatial relations that are perceptible, irrespective of whether there are objects 
corresponding to the percepts with corresponding spatial relations. Thus none of the ‘spaces’, or fields, of my 
diverse sense modalities are to be identified with physical space, or with any part of physical space.
However, it is precisely the identification of sensory with physical space that is made by the naïve realism of  
common sense judgement. In this, common sense commits a grave error. For naïve realism leads to physics,  
and physics undermines naïve realism by showing that our percepts are the effect of the external physical  
world on our nervous systems, and thus cannot be identified with any part of that external world itself. Naïve 
realism,  therefore,  is  self-refuting.  In  fact,  if  events  are  to  be located  via causal  considerations,  as  seems 
reasonable, then percepts should be located in some part of the brain of the percipient. Thus a percept will  
occupy some small volume in my brain and have some small extension in physical space. This extension is not  
to be conflated with its extension in its perceptual space. A minimum of six coordinates is actually necessary to 
specify the  position of  my percept:  three  coordinates to  specify its  location in  my visual  field and three 
coordinates to specify its position in physical space. Thus we should regard space as having six dimensions,  
and not just three. The whole of the space of my visual field is in my head. When I ‘see a chair’, three places 
are involved. There is the place where the chair is in physical space to which my visual percept of the chair  
‘belongs’; there is the place my chair percept is in visual space in relation to other percepts belonging to the  
same sense modality; and finally there is the place where my chair percept is in physical space, this last being a  
certain small volume in my brain. 
The next stage concerns the sort of events that occur in places where there is no living nerve tissue. Suppose I 
look out of my window and see a landscape and some clouds. When I turn away from the window, I cannot  
suppose that the precise visual scene of the landscape and the clouds which I saw when I was observing it  
persists when it ceases to be a percept, for its character whilst it was a percept was a function of my sense  
organs, nerves and brain. But I can reasonably suppose that some occurrences continue at the place from which 
I saw the landscape and clouds, corresponding to the visual pattern I would observe were I at that place.  
Obviously, I cannot know anything about the intrinsic character of these unperceived events. All I can infer  
from the percept as to the stimulus is that the latter must have at least as much structural complexity as the  
percept to which it gives rise. We can also suppose that, like percepts, unperceived events occupy small regions 
of physical space and thus that they are not a different  kind of entity to percepts, but share the same overall 
physical characteristics as percepts.
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Generalising from the above example, we can reasonably suppose that at every arbitrarily small region of 
physical space there are events occurring corresponding to everything that could be witnessed by an observer  
from the place in question or measured as occurring by an appropriate scientific instrument. A ‘place’ is to be 
considered as standing for some arbitrarily small region of space. On this view, every ‘place’ in physical space 
comprises a vast number of events corresponding to everything that could be observed or measured from that  
place.
The inference to unperceived events seems required by considerations of causal continuity. If I see a chair then 
there must be something occurring at every place (or point) between the place in physical space where the  
object is and the place in physical space where my chair-percept is. As Russell said in his ‘Reply to Critics’ 
(1944) (printed in the Schilpp volume on The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell),  ‘Mr. Stace is puzzled by my 
hypothesis of unperceived aspects. Yet the hypothesis of such aspects is inevitable if we admit – as we all do in  
fact – that (a) causation does not act at a distance, (b) we can perceive (in some sense) things from which we  
are separated by an interval which is not a plenum of souls.’1 This argument is (characteristically) terse, but it 
strikes me as persuasive.
Russell, then, envisages the world as consisting of a vast number of ‘events’. The term ‘event’ is here being 
used  in  a  technical  sense.  ‘Events’ are  the  ultimate  ‘stuff’ of  the  universe.  Each  event  is  conceived  as  
occupying some small finite continuous region of space-time. Events differ from the old-fashioned ‘matter’ of 
the nineteenth century physicist in that they are not impenetrable. On the contrary, each event is conceived as 
overlapping innumerable other events which occupy partly, but not wholly, the same region of space-time. We 
also  assume  that  events  have  intrinsic  qualities  although we do  not,  in  general,  know what  the  intrinsic 
qualities of events are, except when the events concerned are percepts. ‘Events’, then, are the  fundamental 
‘stuff’ of reality. Unlike numbers, physical objects, minds, etc. events are not set-theoretic entities, or logical 
constructions, out of more fundamental occurrences, for there are no more fundamental occurrences.
And with just this inference to unperceived events we have sufficient materials to supply an interpretation of 
physics. For instance, physics might require a smooth mathematically continuous space of ‘points’. Now it can 
be shown that the mathematician can construct ‘points’ of four-dimensional space-time out of certain groups of 
overlapping events. The details of the construction need not concern us here but are dealt with in some detail  
by Russell in The Analysis of Matter (1927). Simplifying somewhat, a ‘point’ can be defined in terms of all the 
events that we should naturally say  ‘contain’ the point in question. This, of course, is not a definition, but 
merely  an  indication  of  how the  construction  is  to  be  carried  through.  In  fact,  if  we  are  to  construct  a  
1  ‘Reply to Critics’, reprinted in Collected Papers 11, p. 39.
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mathematically continuous space, then it is necessary to suppose that each region contains an infinite number 
of events. It is not necessary, however, to suppose that every region defines an event; nor is it necessary to  
suppose that there are events below a certain minimum size. If physical space turns out not to be infinitely  
divisible then it is not necessary even to make the assumption of an infinity of events. In this case, space will  
be ‘granular’ at some microscopic level. Either way, physical space can be constructed without assuming any 
other  materials  than  events  –  both  perceived  (percepts)  and  unperceived.  It  is  thus  possible  to  vindicate 
physical realism with the utmost ontological parsimony. We know that ‘events’ do in fact exist, since percepts 
are an instance of events. What Russell pointed out is that it is not necessary to suppose that anything else 
exists in order to arrive at a realist interpretation of physics. (Of course, we need to infer the existence of 
events that are not percepts, but this does not constitute an inference to a different kind of entity.) ‘Matter’ can 
be interpreted as a certain sub-class of regions, or points, within physical space. These regions or points will be  
those around which certain events are clustered.  Statements about the behaviour of matter will  amount to 
statements about the regions which are the ‘source’, as it were, of certain other events, including such as occur 
within nerve tissue and are percepts. Hence, there is no need to credit the ‘matter’ of the physicist with any 
independent reality. This clearly results in an immense simplification of our picture of the world.
The place where an object is constitutes a certain finite volume in physical space. In nearly all cases, we cannot 
know anything about the events characterising the region where the material thing is said to be. The exception  
to this, as we shall see, is the brain. In any case, events proceed outwards from the place where a given  
material thing is at the speed of light (in the case of ‘luminous’ events, i.e. such as would be the direct causal 
antecedents of visual percepts). As the events belonging to a given object proceed outwards, they undergo two 
sorts of changes. There are first what might be called ‘regular’ changes resulting from differences of ‘point of 
view’ or ‘perspective’. Thus a piece of furniture from one point of view will look different to the way it looks 
from another point of view. These differences count as differences of ‘perspective’, and are a function of the 
location of the place at which the event occurs relative to the object. In addition to such  ‘regular’ changes, 
there are also alterations resulting from what might be called the ‘intervening medium’. Thus mist or fog will 
alter  the  appearance  of  an  object,  as  will  blue-tinted  glasses.  The  sense-organs,  nerves  and  brain  of  the  
percipient are also to be regarded as belonging to the ‘intervening medium’. When a series of events terminates 
in an appropriate event in brain tissue the resulting event is a ‘percept’. A percept is simply an event in a region 
of space where there is living nerve tissue, that is, a region comprising events that form chains exhibiting  
‘habits’ and learned responses to a very marked degree, such as are characteristic of what we call ‘mind’. The 
existence of such learned responses is what principally distinguishes ‘mind’ from non-living matter. A burnt 
child fears the fire, but a poker will not fear the fire however often one places it in the flames. Our ascription of 
‘minds’ to other beings seems to be largely a function of the degree to which we are prepared to suppose that  
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the entity in question is capable of ‘learning’. We might hesitate to ascribe even a rudimentary mind to a  
jellyfish, since we might not suppose that the jellyfish can form even the simplest conditioned (as opposed to 
instinctive) reflexes. But a dog certainly does have a mind, because it is capable of learned responses. Thus 
percepts differ from non-percepts in their causal properties, owing to the physical properties of the medium 
which they serve to constitute, but they do not differ in any fundamental sense from events elsewhere.
It  follows from the above theory that the brain actually  consists of  ‘thoughts’.  I  am here using the word 
‘thought’ in a  very wide sense,  so as to  include percepts.  It  would perhaps be more accurate to  say that  
percepts  are  a  very tiny sub-class of  the  events  comprising  the brain.  The  fact  that  the  brain  consists  of  
thoughts arises in  the following manner.  The brain consists of  neurons,  which in  turn consist  of physical 
particles. Let us, for the sake of argument, say that the physical particles are all quarks and electrons. Let us  
also say, for the sake of argument, that each of these particles is to be regarded as occupying a single point.  
Nothing substantial in our argument is affected if this is not correct. Then each material particle composing the 
brain, being a point, will be a group of overlapping events, as we discussed earlier. The events constituting a  
given particle will include all those events we should ordinarily say are  ‘at’ the point in question. Now if 
percepts are located at certain regions of the brain, then they will be members of all the points comprising  
these  regions,  including  such  as  constitute  ‘material  particles’.  Thus  percepts  will  be  among  the  events 
constituting the electrons and quarks composing the brain.
The account is somewhat complicated by the fact that it is not clear whether physics wishes to conceive of the 
ultimate units of matter as point-like particles. Nevertheless, however physics conceives of the ultimate units  
of matter, they must surely be conceived as spatio-temporally localised at least to some degree. And thus the  
ultimate material units of the brain will be some logical construction out of the events occurring in the region  
where the brain is.
Russell’s theory, as adumbrated above, is neither materialism nor idealism but what, following a suggestion by 
the logician H. M. Sheffer, Russell called  ‘neutral’ monism. The  ‘neutral stuff’ of this monism consists of 
‘events’.  ‘Minds’ and pieces of matter are classes of events grouped together in different ways. It is quite  
possible for an event to belong to both groups, and thus to be at once mental and material; indeed, this happens 
in the case of percepts. Grouped together by ‘memory chains’ backwards and forwards they form part of the 
biography of a given ‘mind’. Grouped into overlapping classes with other events they form the matter of the 
brain.
The theory is  to  be recommended on the  ground of its  ‘elegance’,  that  is,  its  theoretical  and ontological 
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parsimony. ‘Matter’, as we have seen, can be constructed out of events, and thus need not be supposed to be 
anything other than a logical fiction. The inference to unperceived events is a good deal less precarious than 
the inference to the physicist’s  ‘matter’ would be, since the former does not involve inferring to a different 
kind of entity to percepts. Indeed, it is only necessary to invoke considerations of continuity in order to justify  
our inference to unperceived events. If the only ‘real’ events were percepts, then the world would have some 
very odd characteristics indeed. Whenever a number of people were observing some pieces of furniture, for 
instance, there would be events at each of the places occupied by the observers, but not at any intermediate 
locations.  The  world  would  thus  have  a  curiously  staccato  quality.  The  inference  to  unperceived  events, 
therefore, seems reasonably secure. What Russell pointed out is that once the inference to unperceived events 
is admitted, the philosopher has sufficient materials out of which to construct the ‘space’ and ‘matter’ of the 
physicist. Thus no further inference is required. Similarly, ‘mind’ is susceptible to construction out of certain 
series of events within the brain. Hence, there is no need to regard either ‘mind’ or ‘matter’ as ontologically 
fundamental. Both can be dispensed with by an application of Ockham’s Razor.
Russell’s theory, though a form of monism, is not ‘physicalist’ since it holds that there is an aspect of events – 
namely,  their  intrinsic  nature  – which is  not  captured  by physical  description.  Physics is  confined  to  the  
description of the space-time structure of  events, since this is  all  that is  inferable  from our percepts.  The 
intrinsic character of events outside our heads must remain forever unknown. On this view, our knowledge of  
external reality is abstract and mathematical.
CONCERNING THE PLAUSIBILITY OF RUSSELL’S METAPHYSIC
The Russellian metaphysic inevitably arouses a certain degree of suspicion, simply because it is a metaphysic. 
The history of philosophy is, after all, replete with metaphysical systems, none of them any more credible than  
their predecessors. What reason is there to think that Russell’s metaphysic is any different, particularly as it 
seems quite elaborate? How could we ever know it to be true? As a matter of fact, however,  I  think the  
Russellian metaphysic is perhaps more modest in its claims than might at first be apparent. For in some ways it  
bases itself on the fact that we know very little, rather than on the supposition that we know a great deal. Once  
it is realised that it is based on an essentially sceptical outlook, its merits become much clearer.
To begin with, Russell’s metaphysic results to a large extent from the rejection of the naïve realist view that we 
have direct epistemic access to external reality. For Russell, naïve realism is self-refuting, because it leads to a 
physical science with which it is inconsistent. This argument was lucidly expounded by Russell in a passage 
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which won the admiration of Einstein:
Scientific scripture, in its most canonical form, is embodied in physics (including physiology). Physics  
assures us that the occurrences which we call ‘perceiving objects’ are at the end of a long causal chain  
which starts from the objects, and are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in certain very 
abstract ways. We all start from ‘naïve realism’, i.e., the doctrine that things are what they seem. We  
think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the  
greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness, 
and coldness that we know in our own experience, but something very different. The observer, when he 
seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of  
the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with itself: when it most means to be objective,  
it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if  
true, shows that naïve realism is false. Therefore, naïve realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. And  
therefore the behaviourist, when he thinks he is recording observations about the outer world, is really 
recording observations about what is happening in him.2
The fundamental point of Russell’s metaphysic is that we know nothing about the nature of physical reality. 
Matter is known to us essentially as whatever is the cause of our percepts. Since our immediate knowledge is 
of our own percepts, what else, indeed, could ‘matter’ refer to? But once this is realized, the gulf separating 
matter from consciousness immediately begins to seem not quite so formidable. Matter comprises regions of  
space from which ‘radiations’ proceed. These latter consist  of some kind of disturbance in the space-time 
continuum that propagates outwards until it encounters matter. If the matter it encounters includes a human 
eye, then this will cause a different sort of disturbance in an optic nerve ending in a certain region of the 
cerebral  cortex.  Since we know nothing about the nature of  any of  this  chain of  occurrences there is  no  
difficulty in principle in supposing that the disturbance in the visual cortex is the visual percept.
All the objections you might feel to this suggestion arise from the naively realistic picture of the physical  
world which physics has falsified. Thus it  might seem that the stimulation of nerve fibres in the brain is  
something quite different to the visual sensation of the person whose brain it is. But this is based on the illusion 
that the physiologist is directly acquainted with the nerve fibres. If, however, the physiologist’s account of  
perception is true, then all that he, the physiologist, can ever be directly acquainted with are events occurring in 
his own brain, not in the brain he is examining.
2  An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 15.
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There is, however, an objection to the identification of percepts with brain processes which may at first seem 
stronger. Brain processes, it might be said, have a certain highly complex structure which is not represented in 
the corresponding sensation. Therefore, the two cannot be identified. More generally, there is much more going 
on in the sensory cortices of the brain, at the microphysical level, than is ever represented at the level of  
phenomenology. Phenomenology seems ‘coarser grained’ than the physical reality on which it  supervenes. 
This objection has come to be known as the ‘grain problem’.3 In the context of Russellian metaphysics it is 
subject to a straightforward rejoinder. A physical region comprises, not a single occurrence, but a vast number 
of occurrences. Thus a percept will overlap a vast number of other events. The whole group of events will then  
be the ‘physical reality’ at the microphysical level corresponding to the neural process. The point is that the  
grain problem can be easily overcome by admitting that each tiny region of physical space comprises not one 
occurrence  but  a  vast  number.  These  occurrences  will  then  be  said  to  ‘overlap’.  The  positing  of  these 
occurrences is required precisely by the grain problem.
The outcome is an ‘identity theory’ of conscious states and brain processes, but one that is not physicalist or  
even, perhaps, materialist, at least in the traditional sense of the term. For ‘matter’ is no more fundamental than 
‘conscious states’. What is fundamental are Heraclitean ‘events’. Certain temporal series of these events will  
constitute ‘minds’; certain other groupings will constitute ‘matter’. Neither is any more ‘real’ than the other 
since both alike are logical fictions. ‘Mind and matter’, Russell once wrote, ‘were something like the lion and  
the unicorn fighting for the crown; the end of the battle is not the victory of one or the other, but the discovery 
that both are only heraldic inventions.’4 Russell’s metaphysic is thus a form of ‘identity theory’, but in its 
weakest  form – for as maintained by Russell,  it  implies mind-body  monism,  but  it  does not imply either 
physicalism or ‘materialism’. Indeed it is possible to say of Russell’s monism what John Gaskin has said of  
what he calls Epicurus’ ‘one-world realism’5: ‘the word “physical” [Gaskin writes] is wholly redundant. There 
is simply nothing else from which this world can or cannot be distinguished as “physical”. There is one world, 
this world, and all that is real is of it.’6
Russell’s metaphysic is thus both sophisticated and elegant, whatever we might conclude with respect to its 
final acceptability. Our task in the next chapter is to show how Russell arrived at this view of the world.
3  See Lockwood, Michael, ‘The Grain Problem’, in Robinson, Howard (ed.), Objections to Physicalism.
4  From ‘What Is the Soul?’, in Russell, Bertrand, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 10, p. 
204.
5  John Gaskin, The Epicurean Philosophy, p. xxvi.
6  Ibid.
18
Chapter 2
The ‘Problem of Matter’
I. THE PROBLEM OF MATTER, 1911-13
The first three chapters of  The Problems of Philosophy, written at the end of 1911 and published early the 
following year, comprise Russell’s first sustained discussion of perception; and it is clear at once that Russell is 
operating within a fairly traditional empiricist framework. He begins his account by distinguishing between the  
matter of the physicist and the immediately perceptible qualities of things. All the qualities we perceive depend 
on the conditions under which a given object is viewed and therefore cannot be regarded as belonging to the 
object itself. The real table, if it is known at all, must be known by inference from our immediate data of sense.  
Our  immediate  data  are  not  physical  objects  but  ‘such  things  as  colours,  sounds,  smells,  hardnesses, 
roughnesses, and so on.’1 These Russell terms ‘sense-data’, a term that was already in use by the end of the 
nineteenth century, and which was used by William James in his Principles of Psychology published in 1890.2 
The quotation above might make it seem that Russell is using the term  ‘sense-datum’ to stand for sensory 
qualities. However, it is clear from the discussion that follows that by a particular ‘colour’ he does not mean a 
particular shade, but rather the particular occurrence of a shade of colour on a particular occasion. Thus if the 
precise same shade were to occur to two different observers, or to the same observer at two different times, 
then this would count as two separate sense-data.
Ultimately, Russell contends, there is no logical absurdity in supposing that I myself conjure up all the objects 
I imagine I am observing and that the whole of my life is a dream. However, this hypothesis, Russell says, is ‘a 
less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common sense 
hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations. ’3 This is 
illustrated with an example of a cat. If a cat is seen first at one place, and then at another, it is natural to 
suppose that it  occupied a series of intermediate positions. But if the cat exists only as my sense-data we 
should have to believe that it ‘did not exist at all while I was not looking, but suddenly sprang into being in a 
1  The Problems of Philosophy, p. 4.
2  For the somewhat obscure origins of the term ‘sense-datum’ see Roland Hall, ‘The Term “Sense-Datum”’, 
Mind Vol. 73, No. 289 (Jan. 1964), pp. 130-1.
3  Russell, op. cit. p. 10.
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new place.’4 Without the hypothesis of a ‘real’ cat, further oddities become inevitable.
If the cat exists whether I see it or not, we can understand from our own experience how it gets hungry  
between one meal and the next; but if it does not exist when I am not seeing it, it seems odd that appetite 
should grow during non-existence as fast as during existence. And if the cat consists only of sense-data,  
it cannot be hungry, since no hunger but my own can be a sense-datum to me. Thus the behaviour of the 
sense-data which represent the cat to me, though it seems quite natural when regarded as an expression 
of hunger, becomes utterly inexplicable when regarded as mere movements and changes of patches of  
colour, which are as incapable of hunger as a triangle is of playing football.5
Thus ‘every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natural view, that there really are objects other than  
ourselves and our sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving them.’6
Whether Russell’s appeal to ‘simplicity’ will do the work required of it is debatable. He speaks of the absurdity 
of seeing the ‘cat’ at one moment and then, after an interval during which it is not observed, supposing that it  
springs into existence, when in all strictness he ought not to be speaking about ‘cats’ at all but merely feline 
sense-data. Unlike the cat, our sense-data really are discontinuous, and are acknowledged as such by Russell,  
and thus their discontinuity should not be an occasion for surprise. Thus Russell seems to trade on a naïve 
realist view of perception, which he is in fact seeking to replace, in order to establish the existence of external  
objects. In this way, he perhaps makes his inference to the continued existence of the physical cat seem more 
‘natural’ than in fact it  is.  This difficulty was really first  pointed out by Hume in his  Treatise of Human  
Nature.7 Having discovered that what he calls the ‘vulgar system’ of common sense realism is untenable, what 
the philosophers have done, according to Hume, by setting up a theory of representative realism is in effect to 
invent a duplicate world of perceptions that possess the characteristics of continuity that our actual perceptions 
lack. But this ‘philosophical system’ is a fraud, for it trades for its credibility on the vulgar system which it 
seeks to displace. Had the immediate objects of our awareness been acknowledged as discontinuous from the 
start (as is implied by the representative realist’s rejection of the vulgar system) then we should never have had 
occasion to infer the existence of a physical world of any sort from them. 
What all this shows, I think, is that the appeal to ‘simplicity’ to justify our belief in ‘matter’ requires a much 
more elaborate treatment than Russell gives it. Indeed, as we shall see, Russell himself soon began to feel that 
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid, pp. 10-11.
6  Ibid, p. 11.
7  See Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section II, ‘Of scepticism with regard to the 
senses.’, pp. 187-218.
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his justification for our belief in external objects had been too glib.
Returning to the account in The Problems of Philosophy, having established the existence of matter, at least to 
his own satisfaction, Russell goes on to consider what, if anything, we can know about its nature. The space of  
physics is not to be identified with any of the spaces of our sense modalities. However, there should be a rough  
correspondence between the position of sense-data in our private spaces and the position of physical objects in  
physical space. This correspondence enables us to determine the order or arrangement of physical objects in  
physical space, but does not permit us to know anything concerning the nature of this space, or, for that matter,  
of the objects that are ordered in this space. Russell says that we can know certain facts about the relations of 
physical objects. For example, of two distances between two pairs of objects we can know of one distance that  
it is greater than the other. It is, then, the mathematical features of reality that are knowable, not its intrinsic  
nature.
This idea was first mooted as far back as 1905, in a review of Poincaré’s  Science and Hypothesis which 
Russell wrote in that year. In this review, Russell expresses approval of Poincaré’s idea that we can only know 
about the relations of physical things, not the things themselves. But, significantly, he adds that ‘We may even 
push the theory further, and say that in general even the relations are for the most part unknown, and what is  
known are properties of the relations, such as are dealt with by mathematics.’8 Thus, in 1912, the idea that we 
can only know the abstract mathematical features of external reality was already quite an old one for Russell. It  
was to  suffer  a  temporary eclipse in  the  years  after  1912 as Russell  sought  to  define matter  in  terms of 
materials not wholly unlike sense-data, only to re-emerge in the 1920s. In its mature form, the principle states  
that physics tells us only the structure of the physical world, but can tell us nothing about its intrinsic nature, a 
view which has come to be known as ‘structural realism’.
‘Structure’, incidentally, has a precise mathematical definition. At the same time, it is possible that Russell had 
not at this stage realised the precise nature of structural  realism. For he does not refer specifically to the 
concept of ‘structure’ in his account. Russell does refer to the ‘order’ of external things as something we can 
know, and the notion of  ‘order’, or ordinal number, is an instance of the more general concept of relation 
number,  which  is  central  to  the  concept  of  structure  that  Russell  and  Whitehead  had  developed  in  their 
Principia Mathematica (1910-13). Of course, such mathematical technicalities as ‘relation number’ would no 
doubt have been out of place in a more or less popular exposition. Nevertheless, there is no indication that at 
this stage that Russell had determined that the precise concept of ‘structure’ was of central importance to his 
philosophy of physics.
8  ‘Review of Poincaré’ (1905), in Collected Papers 4, pp. 593-4.
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There were to be further interesting developments later on in 1912 that were embodied in an unpublished paper  
entitled  ‘On Matter’.9 The overall  tone of  this  paper,  as Russell  himself  realised,  is  much more sceptical  
concerning the possibility of knowledge of the physical world than his earlier writing had been. To his lover 
Lady Ottoline  Morrell,  Russell  wrote  ‘I  expect  my paper  on  matter  will  be a  model  of  cold  passionless 
analysis,  setting forth the most  painful  conclusions with utter  disregard of  human feelings.  I  haven’t  had 
enough courage hitherto about matter, I haven’t been sceptical enough. I want to write a paper which my 
enemies will call “the bankruptcy of realism”.’10 The paper opens by saying:
In what follows, I shall endeavour to maintain three theses:
(1) That all the arguments hitherto alleged by philosophers against matter are fallacious;
(2) That all the arguments hitherto alleged in favour of matter are fallacious;
(3) That, although there may perhaps be reason to suppose that there is matter, yet we can have no 
means of finding out anything whatever as to its nature.11
This opening statement represents an attractive programme. However, rather than arguing directly for these 
theses, Russell instead opts to consider what we could mean by the word ‘matter’. In connection with this he 
introduces a powerful new idea into his philosophy of physics. Instead of accepting the concept of matter as  
relatively unproblematic and asking how we can be justified in inferring it, Russell is now disposed to define  
matter as whatever it is that physics deals with. This makes it possible to identify ‘matter’ with some logical 
construction. The elements of this construction might then be arrived at as a result of an inference from sense-
data which is less problematic than a direct inference to the  ‘matter’ of the physicist  would be.  ‘Matter’, 
Russell considers, can be defined as  ‘that class of objects, if any, which are inferrible from sense-data and 
satisfy the hypotheses of physics.’12 The question now becomes whether any such class of entities are inferable 
from sense-data.
Among the arguments in favour of matter that Russell now regards as fallacious is the argument from the 
supposed simplicity of  the physical  hypothesis.  We saw how in  The Problems of  Philosophy Russell  had 
appealed to a criterion of  ‘simplicity’ to justify our belief in external objects. Now, however, he is breezily 
dismissive of such a criterion. He writes that the argument from simplicity  ‘is merely teleological, and has 
absolutely no weight whatever.’ And he continues ‘If it were known that the universe had been created for the 
9  Reproduced in Collected Papers 6, pp. 80-95.
10  Quoted in quoted in Collected Papers 6, p. 77.
11  Collected Papers 6, p. 80.
12  Ibid, p. 83.
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purpose of delighting mathematicians, there would be some reason to suppose that, of two hypotheses which 
both fit the facts, the simpler is more likely to be true. As, however, there is no evidence that this is the purpose 
of the universe, there is no reason whatever to expect the true laws of nature to be simple.’13
The question, for Russell, is one of supplying physics with a true interpretation. But there is no reason to  
assume that the  ‘simplest’ interpretation is the true one. Instead, we should opt for the interpretation which 
involves the fewest and least precarious assumptions. Ideally, it would be an interpretation in terms of sense-
data alone. However, at this stage, Russell does not think that such an interpretation is available. The science of 
dynamics requires a material world with a many-one relation to sense-data. In astronomy, for example, it is  
assumed that a celestial body has a radius vector (i.e.  a distance from the point  of observation) to which  
nothing in the astronomer’s sense-data corresponds. Therefore, the  ‘problem of matter’, i.e. the problem of 
justifying our belief in a physical world, becomes the question ‘what ground have we for supposing that the 
relation of the state of the world to our sense-data at any moment is many-one, not one-one?’14
To answer this question, Russell sets up the following thought experiment:
To clear our ideas, let us imagine an ideally simplified world, in which our only sense-data are two 
discs, one red and one yellow, which move backwards and forwards in what appears to be a straight 
line, with periodic changes of velocity. Let us suppose that when they reach the same line of sight,  
sometimes the red disc gradually disappears and reappears, and sometimes the yellow disc does so. How 
will science interpret such a series of events? One obvious interpretation will be to regard the two discs 
as the sensible representatives of two spheres, moving in ellipses about their common centre of gravity  
in the same plane with the observer. This interpretation, in common with any other that current science 
would be likely to entertain, assigns to the physical objects a property of distance to which nothing  
sensible corresponds. It may be said that the apparent size of the discs will vary with the distance. But if  
the difference between the greatest and least distances is very small compared to the mean distance, the 
difference  of  apparent  size  will  be imperceptible.  It  is  therefore  not  this  that  causes  us  to  assume 
distance: what makes us assume distance is the difference between the case when the red disc is eclipsed 
and the case when the yellow disc is eclipsed. We may suppose the sensible antecedents of the two cases  
exactly  similar,  and  yet  the  result  different.  Hence  we  infer  differing  antecedents  which  were  not  
sensible.15
13  Ibid, p. 86.
14  Ibid, p. 88.
15  Ibid, p. 90.
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The principle on which we rely in such cases is something like ‘different effects, different causes’ which is the 
corollary  of  ‘same  cause  same  effect’.  This  principle,  says  Russell  ‘is  of  fundamental  importance  in 
establishing the existence of matter’.16
At the same time, Russell says that this result is only preliminary. For a start, in the real world, as opposed to  
the ideally simplified world in our thought experiment, the total sense-data of one moment are practically  
certain to be different from the total sense-data at any subsequent moment. Hence, even assuming the truth of 
physical science, the relation of total sense-data to the world is still likely to be one-one. We need to be able to  
break up the totality of sense-data into different groups corresponding to different objects if our principle is to 
yield the results required of it.
Rather than tackle these issues, Russell decides to shelve them for another day. Instead, in the short second 
section of the paper, he sketches a radically new theory of perception. Russell has already decided that physics  
cannot be interpreted in terms of sense-data alone. But now Russell considers the possibility that  ‘qualities 
which are or resemble sense-data, or at least those of sight and touch, exist at times when they are not given in  
sense.’17 This possibility had already been very briefly alluded to in section I of the paper. The sense-data of 
one person do not supply sufficient materials wherewith to construct a stable physical world. The world that 
results merely from considering one man’s sense-data is too staccato to sustain our common sense notion of 
‘things’. If all that exists are my sense-data then the furniture of my room ceases to exist when I leave my  
room. But once we realise that the occurrences that are sense-data can exist when they cease to be data we can, 
Russell thinks, construct a stable enough world for the purposes of common sense and physics.
The theory is not phenomenalistic. The unsensed items exist just as much as sense-data. In some ways, this  
metaphysic is reminiscent of Berkeley. However, the unperceived items are in no sense mental and do not 
require an observer, either human or divine, to sustain their existence.
‘Matter’ then will consist of items not differing fundamentally from sense-data and actually including sense-
data  as  constituents.  This  view,  Russell  argues,  is  to  be  commended on  the  ground that  the  inference  to 
‘constituents of the same kind as the data of sense’ is ‘less precarious’ than the inferences that would otherwise 
be required to directly establish the existence of the physicist’s ‘matter’.18
The apparent difficulties this point of view throws up can, Russell suggests, be met by sufficient boldness.  
16  Ibid, pp. 90-91.
17  Ibid, p. 93.
18  Ibid, p. 94.
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Thus it might be supposed that if we admit that each person’s sense-data of a given part of the surface of an 
object actually belong to that object then we shall be faced with the problem of ascribing incompatible colours  
to one and the same place. With the aid of ideas derived from T. P. Nunn’s paper  ‘Are Secondary Qualities 
Independent  of  Perception?’,  to  which  Russell  refers,  Russell  now  thinks  that  there  is  no  difficulty  in 
supposing that different colours can co-exist at the same physical place.19 Russell does not develop these ideas 
any further in the paper, but in some unpublished manuscripts on ‘matter’ reproduced in Collected Papers 6 
and written over 1912 and 1913 Russell develops the notion, derived from Nunn, that instead of supposing that 
a quality is at a place simpliciter we should instead say that a quality is at a place from a place. The idea of 
their being two places associated with every sensed element is first mooted in a short manuscript entitled  
‘Matter, the Problem Stated’.20 The distinction between the  ‘place from’ and the  ‘place at’ which a given 
element is sensed was to be considerably developed before playing a key rôle in the 1914 paper ‘The Relation 
of Sense-Data to Physics’. In any case, this distinction enables us to preserve the notion that what we perceive 
are the actual qualities of physical objects. The price we pay for this, of course, is that the ‘thing’ of common 
sense is broken up into a vast number of sense-data relativised to points of view.
Summing up his discussion in  ‘On Matter’, Russell writes that the best way of avoiding scepticism about 
matter would seem to be by preserving  ‘what is most essential’ to naïve realism, namely the view that our 
sense-data do not depend for their existence on our perceiving them. He goes on to write that:
It seems possible that this view might be preserved by assuming that all that could be a sense-datum to  
any possible observer actually exists, and that collections of such actual and possible sense-data are 
bound together in ways which enable us to regard them as one ‘thing’. The ‘matter’ of the physicist and 
the ‘thing’ of common sense will then be collections of constituents of the nature of sense-data, some  
actually perceived, some not. Most of these constituents of one ‘thing’ will have a certain resemblance 
to each other, but some will be erratic; it is these erratic constituents which are perceived in dreams and 
hallucinations.21
The view expressed at the end of ‘On Matter’ is, of course, just an outline. The ideas in the paper foreshadow 
the ideas he was to develop in a more sophisticated manner later on, after a hiatus during which he worked on 
the abortive  Theory of  Knowledge.  No doubt it  was because the ideas contained in  ‘On Matter’ were in 
embryonic form that Russell felt no need to have the paper published during his lifetime. The paper is also  
somewhat rambling. Nevertheless, it contains so many novel and interesting ideas that it deserves to be more  
19  Nunn’s paper is published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 10, 1909-19, pp. 191-231.
20  Reproduced in Collected Papers 6, pp. 98-99.
21  Collected Papers 6, p. 95.
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widely read than it is.
Perhaps the most important idea in the paper is that matter should be defined as what physics deals with, rather 
than vice versa. Assuming that physics is susceptible to some true interpretation, we find out what this realist  
assumption  actually  entails  concerning  the  fundamental  ingredients  of  reality.  We then  only assume  such 
entities as are necessary to fulfil  the rôle of these ingredients, remembering that the fundamental  physical 
ingredients of reality may well turn out to be complicated logical constructions out of more primitive elements.  
In any case, whatever fulfils the required rôle can be taken as  being the  ‘matter’ of the physicist, however 
different to the traditional conception of matter it might be.
II. THE NEW IDEAS OF 1914
In 1914 Russell came up with several new ideas concerning the nature of the physical world. These ideas were 
set forth in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) and in a number of papers written at about 
the same time, namely  ‘The Relation of  Sense-Data to  Physics’ (written in  January 1914),  ‘On Scientific 
Method in Philosophy’ (written in November of 1914), and ‘The Ultimate Constituents of Matter’ (written in 
early 1915 and completed by mid-February of that year).
Most of  Our Knowledge of the External World was written in the last months of 1913. However, Kenneth 
Blackwell has persuasively argued that the account of six dimensional ‘perspective space’ towards the end of 
Lecture III was added to the book after the composition of ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’.22 This is 
corroborated by Russell’s own testimony, for in My Philosophical Development he wrote: ‘There were several 
novelties in the theory of our knowledge of the external world which burst upon me on New Year’s Day, 1914. 
The most important of these was the theory that space has six dimensions and not only three.’23 Blackwell has 
shown how Russell incorporated ideas from his paper into Lecture III of the book (which accounts for the fact 
that this lecture is significantly longer than any of the others) because he regarded the formulation of his ideas  
about space as they are  set  out  in  the paper as  in  some respects  more satisfactory than anything he had  
previously written in the book.
The three papers I referred to above were all reprinted in Russell’s 1918 collection  Mysticism and Logic. 
However,  interestingly,  the  order  of  the  papers  in  Mysticism  and  Logic does  not  follow  their  order  of 
22  See John G. Slater’s Introduction to the 1993 edition of Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External  
World.
23  My Philosophical Development, p. 105.
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composition. On the contrary, both ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’ and ‘The Ultimate Constituents of 
Matter’ are placed before ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’. In The Collected Papers 8 an explanation is 
supplied for this. The authors use a bold type ‘1’ to refer to ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ and a bold 
type ‘4’ to refer to ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’. ‘“The Ultimate Constituents of Matter” [they write] 
makes no mention of “sensibilia” which are so prominent in 1. Instead he favours “data of sense”, “sensible 
objects”, “objects of sense” and “particulars”. The language of this essay, then, resembles more closely the 
language  of  Our  Knowledge  of  the  External  World (1914)  and  its  derivative,  “On  Scientific  Method  in 
Philosophy” (4), than the language of 1. By placing it before 1 in his book Russell seems to be treating it as a 
popular introduction to the technical topics in 1.’24
This is not to downgrade the other papers written at this time. On the contrary, as is noted in the introduction to 
‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’ in the Collected Papers 8, although ‘the central methodological points 
made in the lecture [i.e.  ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’] are all  to be found in the book [i.e.  Our 
Knowledge of the External World]’ they are nevertheless ‘put into sharper focus in the lecture. His [Russell’s] 
requirement that all philosophical propositions be both general and à priori, and his claim that “philosophy is  
the science of the possible”…are two examples of points made explicit in the lecture which are implicit in the  
book.’25
The construction of physical objects expounded in  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ was to remain 
unchanged in Russell for some years. The same construction is set out in The Analysis of Mind in 1921. The 
only difference in this later work is that the terminology is slightly different. In ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to 
Physics’ Russell talks of  ‘sensibilia’ and  ‘sense-data’; in  The Analysis of Mind he talks of  ‘particulars’ and 
‘sensations’. This is essentially a change in terminology. However, there  was a change in Russell’s broader 
metaphysic  between  ‘The Relation of  Sense-Data to  Physics’ and  The Analysis  of  Mind.  In  1918 Russell 
abandoned the  ‘subject’ of experience and thus embraced  ‘neutral monism’. The change in the terminology 
that Russell used reflects this shift, since in his earlier philosophy Russell had regarded a ‘sense-datum’ as a 
constituent of a sensation, this latter comprising the subject in a relation of direct acquaintance with the sense-
datum.  Once  Russell  abandoned  the  subject,  the  distinction  between  the  sense-datum  and  the  sensation 
evaporated and there was no longer any need for the more technical term ‘sense-datum’. Effectively, however, 
the  ‘sensation’ had now become what had formerly been referred to as the  ‘sense-datum’, though this latter 
was no longer conceived as the ‘object’ of a psychological ‘act’.
I shall now briefly set out the construction of the physical world as it was elaborated by Russell in the period  
24  Collected Papers 8, p. 74.
25  Ibid, p. 56.
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from 1914 to 1921, concentrating in particular on the exposition in ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ but 
also taking note of Our Knowledge of the External World and The Analysis of Mind.
‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ is a masterpiece of lucid exposition. In contrast to  ‘On Matter’ one 
feels that Russell has arrived at much more definite views on the philosophy of perception. The metaphysic set  
out in the paper is somewhat similar to Leibniz’s monadology to which, indeed, Russell compares it. To begin 
with, each observer views the world from a certain point of view. The ‘spaces’ belonging to my various sense 
modalities have no place in common with the spaces of the sense modalities belonging to other observers. On 
this ground they can be termed  ‘private spaces’. A private space contains  ‘appearances’ belonging to every 
object that is perceptible from the place where the observer is. Besides the appearances that things present in 
private spaces that are observed, it is reasonable, Russell thinks, to suppose that things present appearances at  
places  where  there  are  no  percipients.  He  writes,  ‘If  a  man  were  to  sit  down  between  two  others,  the 
appearances which the room would present to him would be intermediate between the appearances which it  
presents to the two others; and although this appearance would not exist as it is without the sense organs,  
nerves and brain, of the newly arrived spectator, still it is not unnatural to suppose that, from the position 
which he now occupies,  some appearance of the room existed before his arrival.’26 Russell coins the term 
‘sensibilia’ (singular ‘sensibile’) to denote the ‘appearances’ of things, whether they are data for some observer 
or not. This is in order to obviate the suggestion of the word ‘appearance’ that the appearance must ‘appear to’ 
some observer.
‘Sensibilia’, it should be noted, are not at all like Mill’s ‘permanent possibilities of sensation’; they are actual 
existents whether they are observed or not. When they are observed they are ‘sense-data’. To this extent they 
can be described as ‘possible sense-data’, but only in the sense that a ‘man’ can be described as a  ‘possible 
father’. No one thinks that a man who becomes a father springs into existence at the moment he becomes a  
father but previously only existed in a shadowy limbo as a ‘possible father’. The same considerations go for 
the relation of ‘sensibilia’ to ‘sense-data’. Russell’s own example is the relation of the term ‘man’ to the term 
‘husband’. He writes that ‘the relation of a sensibile to a sense-datum is like that of a man to a husband: a man 
becomes a husband by entering into the relation of marriage, and similarly a sensibile becomes a sense-datum 
by entering into the relation of acquaintance. It is important to have both terms; for we wish to discuss whether 
an object which is at one time a sense-datum can still exist at a time when it is not a sense-datum. We cannot 
ask “Can sense-data exist without being given?” for that is like asking “Can husbands exist without being 
married?” We must ask “Can sensibilia exist without being given?” and also “Can a particular sensibile be at 
one time a sense-datum, and at another not?” Unless we have the word sensibile as well as the word “sense-
26  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics, in Collected Papers 8, pp. 10-11.
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datum”, such questions are apt to entangle us in trivial logical puzzles.’27
Drawing  on  ideas  which,  as  we  have  seen,  he  developed  between  1912 and  1914,  Russell  introduces  a  
distinction between two places, the ‘place at’ which a given sense-datum appears, and the ‘place from’ which it 
appears. The  ‘places’ concerned are not places within sensible space itself, but are instead places in a space 
resulting from the ordering of the  ‘points of view’ or  ‘perspectives’ within which the sense-data occur. A 
‘perspective’, in this context, can be regarded as comprising all the private spaces observable at a given place.
In order to work out the details of this ordering of perspectives in ‘perspective space’ Russell uses an example 
of a penny seen from different points of view. From some perspectives, the penny will appear circular, in  
others elliptical. Beginning with all those perspectives from which the penny looks circular, we order them in a 
series according to how large the penny looks from each of these perspectives. This series, then, forms a line in 
our perspective space. The perspectives in which the penny appears completely edge on all lie in a plane. In 
this instance there will be many perspectives from which the penny appears the same size. These groups will  
form concentric circles around the penny ordered as before by the apparent size of the penny. By such means  
every perspective from which the penny appears can be located in a three dimensional space. In each series in 
which the apparent size of the penny grows larger, there will be a limit due to the fact that were the penny any  
nearer to the eye it could no longer be seen. However, by imagining each of the series indefinitely prolonged 
so as to  form lines continuing  ‘beyond’ the last  point  from whence the penny can be seen,  they will  all 
converge at a certain perspective. This will be ‘the place where the penny is’ in perspective space. By locating 
physical objects, such as the penny, in perspective space, Russell identifies physical space with perspective 
space.  Physical  space,  then,  is  a  space  of  six  dimensions,  being  a  three  dimensional  ordering  of  three 
dimensional perspectives.
The ‘place from’ which the penny appears will be the perspective at which a sensibile belonging to the penny 
occurs; the  ‘place at’ which it occurs will be the perspective where the penny is in the above construction. 
There is also a third ‘place’ associated with every sensibile, namely the place which the sensibile occupies in  
its ‘private space’ or perspective in relation to other sensibilia comprising the same perspective. Thus there are  
three places associated with every sensibile alongside a distinction between two sorts of space – the  private 
space, or spaces, of each perspective and the ‘perspective space’ resulting from the ordering of perspectives in 
relation to each other. One interesting consequence of this construction is that the whole of the contents of my 
‘private world’ will have an actual location in physical space. Indeed, all my sense-data will be ‘in my head’.
27  Ibid, p. 7.
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Furthermore, ‘Since our mind is correlated with the perspective to which our sense-data belong, we may regard 
this perspective as being the position of  our mind in perspective space.’28 Consequently,  ‘there is  a good 
meaning for the statement that the mind is in the head.’29 This idea is not perhaps entirely new to Russell, but is 
a revival or restatement of a position Russell had held much farther back. For, in 1902, Russell had written a  
paper (which remained unpublished) entitled  ‘Do Psychical States Have Position in Space?’30 in which he 
answered this question in the affirmative. The arguments in this paper do not strike me as entirely convincing.  
None of them are conclusive, although they raise a number of interesting issues, such as how it is possible that  
indexicals such as ‘here’ can have significance. In an interesting anticipation of ideas to which he would return 
much later on in his career, Russell rejects the notion of a permanent ego underlying experience, declaring that 
the soul ‘seems to be a mere delusion’, and continuing ‘for my part, I should regard personality as a term not 
capable of precision, but compounded of a mixture of memory with sameness of body.’31 The question is thus, 
not  whether  ‘I’ have a  position in  space,  but  whether separate  ‘thoughts’ have a  spatial  position and the 
conclusion of this short paper is that thoughts are in our heads. In 1914, then, this notion was revived as a 
result of his placing sense-data in physical space.
In any case, on the basis of the above construction Russell goes on to say that there are two ways of collecting 
sensibilia into bundles. One can collect together all the sensibilia that are appearances of a given object from 
diverse perspectives, or one can collect together all the sensibilia that are appearances of diverse objects from a 
given perspective. In the second way one has a collection of interest to psychology; in the first the class can be  
identified with the ‘physical object’. Thus a physical object will simply be a collection of all the sensibilia that  
we should normally regard as being appearances, or effects, ‘of’ the object in question.
The question remains how we are to assign appearances to distinct physical objects. Neither resemblance nor  
continuity are sufficient criteria, since (for example) one can pass continuously from a drop of water in the 
ocean to another drop in the ocean, and yet the two portions of water can be regarded as materially separate.  
What we need in addition to continuity is something like conformity with physical law.
These considerations lead Russell in  Our Knowledge of the External World to define a physical  ‘thing’ as 
‘those series of aspects which obey the laws of physics.’32 Of course, strictly speaking, it is not the common 
sense  ‘thing’ that  conforms to physical  laws,  but  rather  ‘matter’.  The  ‘matter’ of  the physicist  requires a 
somewhat  elaborate  treatment  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  appearances  of  objects  are  distorted  by  the  
28  Ibid, p. 16.
29  Ibid.
30  Reproduced in Collected Papers 3, pp. 544-9.
31  Collected Papers 3, p. 545.
32  Our Knowledge of the External World, pp. 115-6.
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‘intervening medium’ between the place where they occur and the place where the object is to which they 
belong. In general, as we move closer to the object, the distortion due to the intervening medium grows less.  
Consequently,  in  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ Russell supplies a preliminary definition of the 
‘matter’ of a given object as the limit of the sensibilia belonging to the object as their distance from the object 
diminishes, though, as we shall see, Russell regards this definition as ‘not quite satisfactory’33 and attempts to 
refine his definition in The Analysis of Mind (about which more later).34
Nevertheless, the definition of matter allows Russell in  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ to give the 
slightly sharper definition of  ‘physical things’.  ‘Physical things  [he writes]  are those series of appearances  
whose matter obeys the laws of physics’ adding ‘That such series exist is an empirical fact, which constitutes 
the verifiability of physics.’35
The idea that ‘matter’ should be identified with groups of ‘sensibilia’ might be thought to be a concession to 
idealism. This, however, would not be Russell’s view, since Russell holds that sensibilia are physical, and not 
mental,  elements.  The reasons for  this  view are set  out  in  Section IV of  ‘The Relation of  Sense-Data to 
Physics’ entitled  ‘Sense-Data are Physical’. Russell admits that it is unlikely that any sense-datum persists 
unchanged after ceasing to be a datum, since the way things appear depends on the state of our physiology. But  
this is a dependence on something physical (our bodies) not on something  ‘mental’. The physiology of an 
observer can thus be regarded as part of the  ‘intervening medium’ of observation. We cannot know what 
sensibilia are like where there are no sense-organs, nerves and brain, for we carry these around with us.
In 1915, not only are sense-data physical, but also they are definitely not mental. In a report to The Athenaeum 
concerning a discussion of phenomenalism at which Russell was present, the author says that according to 
Russell  ‘the sense-datum is mental’.36 This led Russell to fire off a letter to a journal in which the report  
appeared in which he said ‘I did not see the Athenaeum, and do not remember what I said, but it can not have 
been what I am reported as having said, for I strongly hold that the sense-datum is  not mental – indeed my 
whole philosophy of physics rests upon the view that the sense-datum is purely physical.’37 Russell says that he 
does not know how he would define the word  ‘mental’ but suggests that it is applicable to  facts rather than 
particulars of any sort, i.e. my being acquainted with a particular shade of blue would be  ‘mental’, since it 
involves acquaintance, but the shade of blue would not. Thus a mental fact can include as a constituent an  
object or entity that is not mental. Thus, Russell’s considered opinion after writing  ‘The Relation of Sense-
33  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’, reprinted in Collected Papers 8, p. 17.
34  See below, Chapter 3, section II, ‘The definition of matter’ (pp. 44-6).
35  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’, reprinted in Collected Papers 8, p. 22.
36  Reprinted in Collected Papers 8, p. 311.
37  Reprinted in Collected Papers 8, p. 88.
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Data to Physics’ was that nothing mental was physical or vice versa, but that a mental fact could include 
something non-mental (and physical) as a constituent.
Russell’s ground was to shift somewhat when he wrote  The Analysis of Mind due to his adoption of neutral 
monism. As a result of his identification of the sensation with the sense-datum sensations are now regarded as 
physical as well as mental occurrences. On the other hand, there are still particulars that are purely physical 
(the unsensed ‘appearances’ of things). Furthermore, there are particulars, such as mental images, that do not 
enter into the construction of physical objects, but do enter into the construction of minds. These elements are  
purely mental. The ‘neutral stuff’ of The Analysis of Mind consists of ‘happenings’ that are deemed ‘mental’ or 
‘physical’ by their membership of  ‘mental’ or  ‘physical’ groups. Sensations represent the  ‘intersection’ of 
mind  and  matter.  But  in  themselves,  the  elements  of  minds  and  pieces  of  matter  are  neither  mental  nor 
physical.
We  have  said  something  about  Russell’s  construction  of  physical  space  and  matter.  Next,  we  shall  say 
something about time. In this earlier phase of his thought, Russell regards the  ‘one all-embracing time’ of 
physics as just as much a construction as physical space. Between two perspectives belonging to the history, or 
‘biography’, of a given observer there will be a direct time relation of before and after. This suggests a way of 
defining local times without introducing anything ‘mental’. ‘We may define a “biography”’, Russell writes, ‘as 
everything that is (directly) earlier or later than, or simultaneous with, a given “sensibile”.’38 Consequently, 
there will be  ‘biographies’ that do not belong to any  ‘mind’.  ‘By this means’, Russell goes on to say,  ‘the 
history  of  the  world  is  divided  into  a  number  of  mutually  exclusive  biographies. ’39 The  reference  to 
biographies being  ‘mutually exclusive’ is interesting. It  shows, I think, that at this stage Russell does not 
conceive of any biography as having any ingredient in common with any other biography. Thus biographies,  
and by implication perspectives, do not ‘intersect’.
This is confirmed by his discussion of the definition of ‘place’ or ‘perspective’ in The Analysis of Mind. Here 
he writes that we may define a ‘perspective’ to which a given sensation belongs as ‘the set of particulars that 
are simultaneous with this sensation.’40 One perspective will comprise all my sensations and images at one 
moment, a group that Russell was later to call my ‘total momentary experience’. Consequently, every member 
of this perspective will be simultaneous with every other member. Now notice that this consequence does not  
follow from the definition of perspective as the set of particulars simultaneous with a given sensation, unless  
we suppose simultaneity to be a transitive relation; for otherwise, a sensation could be simultaneous with two 
38  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’, in Collected Papers 8, p. 18.
39  Ibid.
40  The Analysis of Mind, p. 128.
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particulars that are not simultaneous with each other, and this would mean that the set would not comprise 
solely the contents of one perspective. Two particulars that were not simultaneous with each other would 
belong to different perspectives and any sensation that was simultaneous with both of them would belong to 
both of these diverse perspectives. In this circumstance, perspectives could have members in common, and  
‘intersect’. Russell’s definition of perspective, however, implies that this is not possible. Perspectives have no 
members in common and thus, in practice, ‘simultaneity’ is a transitive relation.
In  Russell’s  later  metaphysic,  ‘compresence’ replaces  ‘simultaneity’ and  ‘complete  complexes  of 
compresence’ come to replace ‘perspectives’. ‘Compresence’ is just like simultaneity, except that it is a non-
transitive relation. A complete complex of compresence, which includes my ‘total momentary experience’ as 
an instance, is defined as a class of items, or ‘events’, all of which are compresent with each other and which is 
such that nothing outside the group is compresent with every member of it. It follows that an event can be a 
member of two such complexes; that is, an event could be compresent with events that are not compresent with  
each other.
This  may seem a somewhat  theoretical  discussion,  but  it  brings  out  an important  difference  between the 
‘particulars’, or ‘sensibilia’, of Russell’s earlier philosophy, and the ‘events’ of his later. A perspective counts 
as a ‘point’ in physical space. Particulars are elements of only one perspective. They exist, therefore, at only 
one  point  in  space.  Thus,  particulars  are  extended in  time,  but  not  in  space.  Their  relations  of  temporal 
overlapping can be used to define  ‘instants’ in the biography to which they belong. But although a given 
particular can exist at a number of instants belonging to one biography, it cannot belong to more than one point  
of space at any one moment. If a particular is simultaneous with two particulars that are not simultaneous with 
each  other  than  one  of  these  particulars  precedes  the  other  in  time,  and  this  time-relation  is  direct,  not 
constructed.
In the later metaphysic,  ‘point-instants’ are  ‘complete complexes of compresence’ and an  ‘event’ can be at 
more than one such complex. The events with which a given event is compresent, if they are not compresent 
with each other, need not be before or after each other. This means that  ‘events’ occupy a finite continuous 
region of space. They have acquired a ‘thickness’ in space-time. Indeed, every event in the universe is linked 
to every other event by a chain of ‘overlapping’ or ‘compresence’. Thus, in his 1928 letter to Newman, Russell 
writes that  ‘I had assumed that there might be co-punctuality [i.e. overlapping] between percepts and non-
percepts, and even that one could pass by a finite number of steps from one event to another compresent with  
it, from one end of the universe to the other.’41
41  Reproduced in Autobiography, p. 413.
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Similarly, in the later philosophy there are direct (as opposed to constructed) time relations between any two 
events where one has a ‘time-like’ interval to the other, but this is not the case in the earlier metaphysic. In The 
Analysis of Mind, for example, Russell writes that ‘Such time relations as can be constructed between events in 
different biographies…are not experienced, and are merely logical, being designed to afford convenient ways 
of stating correlations between different biographies.’42
Thus the switch from ‘particulars’ in The Analysis of Mind to ‘events’ in The Analysis of Matter is not merely a 
change of terminology, but is a modification, or addition, to the physical properties of Russell’s fundamental  
ingredients,  his  ‘neutral  stuff’.  Essentially,  whereas  ‘particulars’ were  extended  in  time  but  not  (at  least  
explicitly) in space, the ‘events’ of Russell’s mature philosophy are extended in space as well as in time. This  
is something which I don’t believe has been noticed before. Its importance lies in the fact that it reveals that  
Russell did make significant tacit modifications to his metaphysic, which perhaps justifies the broad division 
of his philosophical development after 1914 into two periods – that culminating in  The Analysis of Mind, 
published in 1921, and a later period culminating in An Outline of Philosophy and The Analysis of Matter, both 
published in 1927. However, it is important to be clear about the somewhat technical nature of the change that 
occurred  in  the  second  period.  In  particular,  it  is  a  myth  to  suppose  that  Russell  lurched  from  a 
straightforwardly phenomenalist point of view to an equally uncompromising scientific realism. In the next  
chapter, I shall deal with the earlier phase of Russell’s thought, and in particular tackle the vexed question of  
Russell’s alleged ‘phenomenalism’.
42  The Analysis of Mind, pp. 128-9.
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Chapter 3
Russell and Phenomenalism
I. WAS RUSSELL EVER A PHENOMENALIST?
It is often maintained that Russell’s earlier construction was either phenomenalistic, or at least ‘more or less’ 
phenomenalistic. We have already seen that ‘sensibilia’ are not to be construed as ‘possibilities of sensation’. If 
this is the ground on which Russell’s metaphysic is treated as phenomenalistic then it is definitely incorrect. 
However, the matter is not quite so simple, since it is not immediately clear how important a part of Russell’s 
final metaphysic ‘unsensed sensibilia’ are. There is a suggestion in many of the works during the earlier period 
that  they  need  not  be  regarded  as  actually  existing,  but  are  introduced  simply  to  assist  with  the  initial 
construction of matter. Furthermore, it is suggested that it might be possible to construct the physical world out 
of actual sense-data alone, and dispense with unsensed sensibilia. If Russell held the view that physics could  
ultimately be interpreted in terms of actual sense-data alone then I think his view could justly be regarded as  
phenomenalistic. On the other hand there is (as we shall see) the evidence of Russell’s repeated denials over 
this period that his view was a form of phenomenalism. I think we can sort out this tangle by taking a careful  
examination of the evidence.
On the face of it, the stance taken in Our Knowledge of the External World does seem to warrant the notion 
that, at the time when he wrote this book (towards the end of 1913) Russell’s philosophy of physics was indeed 
a form of phenomenalism. In Chapter III he says that  ‘in so far as physics or common sense is verifiable, it 
must be capable on interpretation in terms of actual sense-data alone. The reason for this is simple. Verification 
consists always in the occurrence of an expected sense-datum. Astronomers tell us there will be an eclipse of  
the moon: we look at the moon, and find the earth’s shadow biting into it, that is to say, we see an appearance 
quite different from that of the usual full moon. Now if an expected sense-datum constitutes a verification, 
what was asserted must have been about sense-data; or at any rate, if part of what was asserted was not about 
sense-data, then only the other part has been verified.’1 In Chapter IV Russell writes that  ‘If physics is to 
consist  wholly of  propositions  known to  be true,  or  at  least  capable  of  being  proved or  disproved’ then 
1  Our Knowledge of the External World, pp. 88-9.
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unperceived appearances ‘must all be capable of being exhibited as logical functions of sense-data.’2 ‘Thus’, 
he goes on to say, ‘it is unnecessary, for the enunciation of the laws of physics, to assign any reality to ideal 
[i.e. unperceived] elements: it is enough to accept them as logical constructions, provided we have means of  
knowing  how  to  determine  when  they  become  actual.  This,  in  fact,  we  have  with  some  degree  of 
approximation; the starry heaven, for instance, becomes actual whenever I choose to look at it. It is open to us  
to believe that the ideal elements exist, and there can be no reason for disbelieving this; but unless in virtue of 
some a priori law we cannot know it, for empirical knowledge is confined to what we actually observe.’3 When 
Russell wrote Lecture IV of  Our Knowledge of the External World, then, he was persuaded that ultimately 
physics could be reformulated in phenomenalist terms. At the same time, in the section of the book added after 
the New Year of 1914, Russell says that we can  ‘reasonably suppose’ that some aspect of the universe is 
presented at places where there are no percipients,4 and in ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ he says that 
the inference to unperceived appearances is ‘not unnatural’.5
These  passages  are  not  necessarily  incompatible.  One could  hold  that  the  belief  in  the  real  existence  of  
unperceived appearances is ‘reasonable’ or ‘natural’ but also hold that physics is confined to what is strictly 
verifiable and must therefore construe unperceived appearances as a roundabout way of talking about actual  
appearances. By the time he wrote ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ he had come to view the task of 
reducing physics wholly to actual sense-data as, at best, a long and difficult one. For instance, he writes that ‘A 
complete application of the method which substitutes constructions for inferences would exhibit matter wholly 
in terms of sense-data, and even, we may add, of the sense-data of a single person, since the sense-data of  
others cannot be known without some element of inference’, but he immediately adds that  ‘This, however, 
must remain for the present an ideal, to be approached as nearly as possible, but to be reached, if at all, only  
after a long preliminary labour of which as yet we can only see the very beginning.’6 Notice here the clause ‘if 
at all’, introducing a certain degree of uncertainty concerning the phenomenalist project.
This uncertainty is illustrated with respect to unsensed sensibilia. In the passage alluded to above when Russell 
says that it is ‘not unnatural’ to suppose that things continue to present appearances at places that are no longer 
occupied  by an  observer,  he  immediately comments  that  he  should  ‘regard  these  supposed  [unperceived] 
appearances only in the light of a hypothetical scaffolding, to be used while the edifice of physics is being  
raised, though possibly capable of being removed as soon as the edifice is completed. These “sensibilia” which 
are not data to anyone are therefore to be taken rather as an illustrative hypothesis and as an aid in preliminary 
2  Ibid, p. 116.
3  Ibid, p. 117.
4  Ibid, p. 95.
5  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics, in Collected Papers 8, p. 10.
6  Ibid, p. 12.
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statement than as a dogmatic part of the philosophy of physics in its final form.’7 Again the word ‘possibly’ in 
the first sentence indicates that Russell does not want to commit himself concerning the ultimate feasibility of  
the phenomenalist project.
The final statement in this paper on the issue of whether unsensed sensibilia are eliminable occurs at the end of 
the  paper  where  Russell  writes  that  ‘I  should  hope  that,  with  further  elaboration,  the  part  played  by 
unperceived “sensibilia” could be indefinitely diminished, probably by invoking the history of a “thing” to eke 
out the inferences derivable from its momentary appearance.’8
I think that his considered position can be summarised in the following propositions (i) although the inference  
to  unsensed  sensibilia  seems  reasonable  and  natural,  nevertheless  he  would  like to  exhibit  physics  as 
susceptible to interpretation in terms of sense-data alone (ii) he is nevertheless not willing to definitely assert  
that physics can do without unsensed sensibilia in addition to sense-data (iii) nor is he willing to assert, at this  
stage, that physics requires unsensed sensibilia in addition to sense-data (iv) until it can definitely be shown 
that physics can be interpreted in terms of sense-data alone, it is good to make explicit the inferences that one 
is allowing. Russell allows himself inferences to (a) the sense-data of others and (b) unsensed sensibilia. This 
point is paralleled by Russell’s work in mathematics, where such dubious principles as the Axiom of Infinity 
and the Axiom of Reducibility are framed clearly  as axioms,  so as to make the assumptions they involve 
completely explicit. Finally (v) the overall impression created by the paper is that Russell does think that it will 
finally be possible to dispense with these two assumptions, perhaps for the reason indicated in Lecture IV of  
Our Knowledge of the External World that only the occurrence of an expected sense-datum is ever strictly 
verified, so that physics, which claims to be an empirical science, must be susceptible to reformulation in terms 
of sense-data alone. Indeed, right at the start of the paper there is an argument which exactly parallels the  
argument for phenomenalism in the book. He writes:
We may succeed in actually defining the objects of physics as functions of sense-data. Just in so far as 
physics leads to expectations, this must be possible, since we can only expect what can be experienced. 
And in so far as the physical state of affairs is inferred from sense-data, it must be capable of expression  
as a function of sense-data.9
I  think  that  Russell’s  position  in  ‘The  Relation  of  Sense-Data  to  Physics’ can be  called  ‘phenomenalist’ 
provided this epithet is used in a guarded fashion. For it is clear that Russell’s ambition is to exhibit physics as 
7  Ibid, p. 13.
8  Ibid, p. 26.
9  Ibid, p. 5.
37
amenable to interpretation in terms of actual sense-data alone. At the same time I think it can be seen why 
Russell, throughout this early period, is not willing to call himself a  ‘phenomenalist’. For, despite the above 
quoted argument, Russell was not prepared to assert that the phenomenalist project was  definitely possible. 
Indeed, his position at this time is characterised by a lack of dogmatism. More work, he thinks, is required to  
discover what are the minimum of assumptions necessary to get physics off the ground.
The picture that emerges is that, when Russell wrote the first draft of Our Knowledge of the External World, he 
was inclined to phenomenalism on the ground that if physics is to be a strictly empirical science, as it claims to  
be, then it must be susceptible to interpretation in terms of actual sense-data alone. By the time he wrote the 
paper  he  still  believed,  as  we  saw  above,  that  a  ‘complete  application  of  the  method  which  substitutes 
constructions  for  inferences’ would  reduce  matter  to  actual  sense-data.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  every 
diminution of  assumptions reduces the risk of  error.  However,  he is  no longer sure that  this  task can be  
fulfilled, though neither is he sure that it cannot. To the extent that it cannot physics will cease to be a wholly  
empirical science. The phenomenalist programme has become a  task, not something that has actually been 
carried through, or whose successful completion is necessarily guaranteed. For the moment, Russell is willing 
to grant the thesis of unsensed sensibilia, though he is not prepared to assert that they could not be eliminated  
in a completed interpretation of physics.
It  might  be  asked  whether  Russell,  who  so  disliked  ‘idealist’ doctrines,  would  really  be  happy  with  a 
philosophy that dispensed with everything outside of sense-data. Certainly, Russell would never have become 
a solipsist, even if he had achieved his ambition of exhibiting physics as susceptible to interpretation in terms  
of  the  actual  sense-data  of  a  single  person.  Nevertheless,  I  think  he  believed  that  every  diminution  of  
inferences reduced the risk of error and thus increased the security of the branch of knowledge concerned.  
Furthermore, I think Russell was interested in what might be termed the  ‘mathematical’ aspects of logical 
construction, the ingenuity involved in the construction itself. He regarded this as delightful and the smaller the 
hat out of which one could pull the rabbit, as it were, the more delightful it was. With regard to unsensed  
sensibilia there is not the same degree of emotional commitment as there is in the case of the existence of other  
minds. If he could have shown that physics could get along without the assumption of unsensed elements this 
may very well have weakened his confidence in their existence, however ‘natural’ the inference seemed. Even 
so,  he need not have completely abandoned belief  in  their  existence,  even had he  shown that  they were 
dispensable for physics.
The account of Russell’s somewhat complex relationship to phenomenalism is, I believe, corroborated by all 
the remaining evidence concerning Russell’s attitude during this early period. In  ‘On Scientific Method In 
38
Philosophy’ the existence of unperceived appearances is regarded as probable, though not as certain. Russell 
writes that ‘The view which I should wish to advocate is that objects of perception do not persist unchanged at 
times when they are not perceived, although probably objects more or less resembling them do exist at such 
times’.10 In a letter written in June 1917 to a philosophic journal, Russell writes that ‘A particular which is a 
datum does…appear to be causally dependent upon sense-organs and nerves and brain. Since we carry those 
about with us, we can not discover what sensibilia, if any, belong to perspectives from places where there is no 
brain’ and ‘we can not know the nature of those perspectives (if any) which belong to places where there are 
no minds.’11 Russell always qualifies his statements about unperceived aspects so as not to definitely assert that  
such aspects exist.
There is a very interesting paper in Appendix I of  Collected Papers 8  which is a report published in  The 
Athenaeum in April 1915 concerning a paper on  ‘Phenomenalism’ by C. D. Broad which he read out to a 
meeting at which Russell was present. We have already had occasion to refer to this report above.12 According 
to the report,  Broad characterised Russell’s philosophy as more or less phenomenalistic but also criticised 
Russell for the assumption of unsensed ‘sensibilia’ which by their very nature were not observable. What is 
interesting is Russell’s response:
Mr. Bertrand Russell, replying in the discussion, said that ‘phenomenalism’ was not the term he himself 
used to denote his theory. His own view was not dogmatic phenomenalism; he had suggested merely a 
preliminary method. There are two different problems: (1) How much of ordinary physics can be stated 
in phenomenalistic terms? and (2) If physics cannot be stated in such terms, what conceivable principles 
can be discovered by which we may find ground for belief in them? The second problem cannot be 
tackled until the first is solved…
     With regard to his own theory, it was only intended to be rough and preliminary, not to be put 
forth as a finished thing. He had no definite result. His aim was to see how much could be done with the  
smallest amount of material; and if the material be inadequate, to find out where it is inadequate…
He had nothing particular to say about sensibilia, and wanted to get physics stated without 
assuming them…His real interest was the method.13
The undogmatic character of Russell’s attitude is very evident in this report. Russell cannot be unequivocally 
characterised as ‘phenomenalist’ since he does not state that the phenomenalist reduction is definitely possible. 
10  ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’, reprinted in Collected Papers 8, p. 72.
11  Reprinted in Collected Papers 8, p. 88.
12  See above, pp. 30-1. 
13  Reprinted in Collected Papers 8, pp. 310-11.
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Nor will he rule out phenomenalism as a final philosophy. His attitude is one of genuine uncertainty.
Further fascinating evidence concerning Russell’s attitude to phenomenalism is found in a review of Broad’s 
Perception, Physics, and Reality written and published in 1918. Discussing a statement on the part of Broad 
that physics cannot be established on a phenomenalist basis, Russell writes that:
This certainly seems true; but is it? I am troubled by an argument which needs to be tested by practice, 
but which meanwhile I will advance with due hesitation. My problem is: How can we ever obtain any 
evidence for a causal law except through perception? And, that being so, must not the unperceived 
elements in such a law be definable as functions of the perceived elements? And, in that case, do these 
functions serve any vital purpose except as functions of perceived elements, and is there any reason to 
suppose  that  they  represent  independent  reals?…The  assumption  that  the  ideal  [i.e.  unperceived] 
elements  ‘exist’ is, it seems to me, theoretically otiose, and merely convenient as affording resting-
places for our feeble logical imagination. I grant at once that undiluted phenomenalism cannot yield as  
well-filled a science of physics as we are accustomed to, but I contend that what would have to be 
omitted represents mere prejudice or guess-work, for which there is no shred of empirical evidence…I 
do not say this is certainly the case; I merely think it may be, and Mr. Broad has not shown that it is  
not.14
Here the argument in favour of phenomenalism is essentially the same as that used in Our Knowledge of the  
External World. Since verification consists in the occurrence of an expected sense-datum, the only part of a 
physical theory that is verified is that part asserting the existence of the sense-datum. Reference to unsensed 
elements must theoretically be capable of interpretation in terms of actual sense-data. But this argument is not 
put forward as definitely sound. Russell confesses that he is  ‘troubled’ by the argument. It is an argument 
which  ‘needs  to  be  tested  by  practice’,  presumably  by  seeing  how  much  of  physics  can  actually  be 
reformulated in phenomenalistic terms. It shows why Russell always held on for so many years to the idea that 
a phenomenalistic physics might be possible. But it also shows that Russell, though troubled by this argument,  
wasn’t totally convinced by it.
The uncertainty over unperceived appearances was to persist for many years. As late as The Analysis of Mind 
he was to write ‘Instead of supposing that there is some unknown cause, the “real” table, behind the different  
sensations of those who are said to be looking at the table, we may take the whole set of these sensations  
(together  possibly  with  certain  other  particulars)  as  actually  being the  table.’15 The  word  ‘possibly’ in 
14  Ibid, pp. 128-9.
15  The Analysis of Mind, p. 98.
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connection  with  the  ‘certain  other  [i.e.  unsensed]  particulars’ indicates  that  Russell  was  still  not  totally 
committed  to  definitely asserting  their  existence,  although in  the  remainder  of  The Analysis  of  Mind the 
existence of unsensed particulars is more or less taken for granted.
There are various references to  phenomenalism after 1921. Thus in an essay on  ‘Physics and Perception’ 
written in 1922 and published in  Mind. Russell replies to a claim made by C. A. Strong that  ‘Mr. Russell 
accepts the phenomenalist principle’.16 In response Russell writes:
I have never called myself a phenomenalist, but I have no doubt sometimes expressed myself as though 
this were my view. In fact, however, I am not a phenomenalist. For practical purposes, I accept the truth 
of physics,  and depart  from phenomenalism so far as  may be necessary for  upholding the truth of  
physics…Having accepted the truth of physics, I try to discover the minimum of assumptions required 
for its  truth,  and to come as near to phenomenalism as I can. But I  do not in the least accept the  
phenomenalist philosophy as necessarily right, nor do I think that its supporters always realize what a  
radical destruction of ordinary beliefs it involves.17
This passage confirms what we have said above concerning Russell’s attitude to phenomenalism. However, the 
stridency of the last clause of the last sentence sounds a more definite note than has hitherto been the case.  
Later in this essay Russell writes that ‘the world is full of particulars of the sort dealt with by physics’18 only 
some of which are experienced. In other words, Russell now seems to be much more definitely rejecting the 
notion that phenomenalism could be an adequate philosophy of physics. Indeed, 1922 is actually the beginning 
of the second phase of Russell’s thought, culminating in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy 
(both 1927). By 1925 Russell is more emphatic in his rejection of phenomenalism. In an unpublished paper  
written in that year, Russell writes that:
There  is  a  philosophy called  ‘phenomenalism’ which  is  attractive,  but  to  my mind  not  practically 
feasible. This would base physics on phenomena alone. I think those who advocate this philosophy have 
hardly realized its implications. Phenomena are disjointed, and are always necessarily coloured by our 
sense-organs. The propagation of light, for example, cannot possibly be stated in phenomenalist terms, 
because it is concerned with what happens where there is no eye. Again, there are limits to the smallness 
of what we can see, but we do not regard these as limits to the smallness of what can be involved in  
physics. Continuity is incompatible with phenomenalism. Physics absolutely requires the possibility of 
16  Quoted in ‘Physics and Perception’, Mind, 31, Oct 1922, reprinted in Collected Papers 9, p. 127.
17  ‘Physics and Perception’, Mind, 31, Oct 1922, reprinted in Collected Papers 9, p. 128.
18  Ibid, p. 131.
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inferring unobserved occurrences in places where there are no sense-organs…For my part,  I  regard 
phenomenalism as an ideal, which a prudent man will approach as nearly as he can without rejecting 
physics. Perhaps a phenomenalist physics may prove possible ultimately, but for the present it  only 
seems possible through not realizing its implications.19
The notion that phenomenalism is unacceptable because it violates causal continuity is also present in  The 
Analysis  of  Matter and  made  the  basis  for  Russell’s  rejection  of  this  philosophy.  Russell  outlines  a 
phenomenalist  metaphysic  in  which  unsensed  elements  would  be  regarded  as  purely  ‘ideal’;  that  is,  as 
functions of actual elements. But the staccato world of phenomenalism would violate the physical principle 
that there is no ‘action at a distance’. Thus, Russell concludes, ‘although it is logically possible to interpret the 
physical world in terms of ideal elements [i.e. elements reducible to actually sensed elements], I conclude that  
this interpretation is unplausible, and that it has no positive grounds in its favour.’20
There is also an interesting passage in Russell’s ‘Reply To Critics’ in the Schilpp volume of The Philosophy of  
Bertrand Russell. Commenting on phenomenalism, he says ‘There are some who would deny that physics need 
say anything about what cannot be observed; at times I have been one of them. But I have become persuaded  
that such an interpretation of physics is at best an intellectual game, and that an honest acceptance of physics  
demands  recognition  of  unobserved  occurrences.’21 This  is  a  curious  passage.  Russell  says  that  ‘at  best’ 
phenomenalism is an ‘intellectual game’. This seems to suggest that even though phenomenalism might be a 
possible interpretation of physics, it is still an inadequate one. It does seem that Russell came to the view that, 
though it is possible to interpret physics in terms of sense-data alone, the resultant picture of the world would 
be too scanty too answer to our conception of physical reality, and too staccato to be plausible. The first part of  
the  passage  just  quoted  confirms  that  for  some  years  Russell  did,  at  least  on  occasion,  think  that  the  
phenomenalist programme could be carried through.
This idea, that Russell abandoned his hopes for phenomenalism because, even if the programme were tenable,  
the resulting picture would still not be satisfactory, is borne out by another passage in his ‘Reply to Critics’. 
Again commenting on Stace – this time on Stace’s claim that Russell believed that it is possible to construct 
physics out of ‘verifiables’ alone –Russell writes:
The question arises: What is meant by ‘verifiables’? If it means ‘things that I experience’, or ‘things that 
human beings experience’, then, I will admit, I do not see how to construct out of such materials alone a 
19  ‘The Philosophical Analysis of Matter’ (1925), reprinted in Collected Papers 9, p. 281.
20  The Analysis of Matter, p. 214.
21  ‘Reply To Critics’ (1944), reprinted in Collected Papers 11, p. 33.
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world that we can soberly believe to be complete. I will also admit that, at times, I have hoped to find  
such materials sufficient. I still hold that they are sufficient for everything that is empirically verifiable.  
But I  have found that  no one, not  even the most  emphatic empiricist,  is  content  with what can be 
empirically verified. It has gradually become clear to me that empiricists (including, at times, my former 
self) allow a great many shaky inferences, and shrink from much valid analysis, in order to reconcile 
their faith in empiricism with every-day beliefs which they are not prepared to abandon. We all believe  
in other people, cats and dogs, chairs and tables, and even the other side of the moon. My real problem  
is: What are the minimum of assumptions which will justify such beliefs?22
This passage is very illuminating. It suggests that in 1944, when he wrote his ‘Reply to Critics’, Russell had 
persuaded himself of the soundness of the argument for the phenomenalist programme being possible that he 
had first set out in Our Knowledge of the External World. Phenomenalism might be an adequate analysis ‘for 
everything  that  is  empirically  verifiable’ in  physics.  However,  this  is  no longer  a  vital  consideration,  for 
phenomenalism is still an inadequate interpretation of physics. The reason for this is that, in practice, even 
phenomenalists make inferences that cannot be justified by a strict empiricism. Thus there is no reason why the 
physicist should not be permitted the inferences that supply him with a fuller picture of the world, particularly 
if, as Russell believed, it was possible to exhibit these inferences as inferences to the same kind of entity as 
sensed elements themselves.
The above quoted passage from the Schilpp volume also reveals the transition in Russell’s epistemological 
concerns. He is no longer so concerned with exhibiting matter in terms of sense-data (as in ‘The Relation of 
Sense-Data to Physics’). Having accepted that this is not a desirable goal, even if it is possible, he has now 
switched to the question of what are the assumptions involved in physics in virtue of which it (and common 
sense insofar as this is compatible with physics) is able to justify its beliefs. Russell ’s answer to this question 
was to lead to his uncovering various ‘postulates of scientific inference’ in his Human Knowledge (1948).
Russell’s account of his own development in My Philosophical Development (1959) in the main corroborates 
the account we have given. He writes that ‘In my first enthusiasm on abandoning the “matter” of the physicist, 
I had hoped to be able to exhibit the hypothetical entities that a given percipient does not perceive as structures  
composed entirely of elements that he does perceive. This was suggested as a possibility in my first exposition  
of the theory that I advanced in the Lowell Lectures. The first exposition was in a paper called “The Relation 
of Sense-Data to Physics”’.23 However, he goes on to say, ‘I soon…became persuaded that this is an impossible 
programme  and  that  physical  objects  cannot  be  interpreted  as  structures  composed  of  elements  actually 
22  Ibid, p. 38.
23  My Philosophical Development, p. 104.
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experienced.’24 Consequently, Russell writes, he contented himself  ‘with a picture of the world which fitted 
physics and perception harmoniously into a single whole.’25 In fact we have seen that for many years he was 
not entirely sure whether phenomenalism was ‘an impossible programme’ or not, and preferred not to commit 
himself publicly either way. What  is the case is that he quickly became persuaded that he needed, at least 
provisionally, to allow inferences to unsensed sensibilia as well as to the minds of others, but he hoped for  
some years that it might ultimately prove possible to dispense with these inferences.  
I think it can fairly be said, however, that Russell’s settled view throughout the first phase of his development 
(from about 1914 to 1921) was never wholeheartedly phenomenalistic. Instead, he vacillated on the issue of 
whether phenomenalism was possible and regarded the task of reducing physics to sense-data as, at best, a long 
and difficult one.
In  the  second  phase  of  his  thought,  beginning  in  1922,  he  was  to  become  much  more  sceptical  about  
phenomenalism.  Interestingly,  he  was  inclined  to  accept  that  a  phenomenalist  reduction  was possible  for 
everything that was strictly empirically verifiable in physics, but that such a programme was nevertheless an  
irrelevance since the world that would result would be too scanty to adequately answer to our conception of the 
physical  world.  The  physicist  was  after  all  permitted  his  own  inferences;  for  even  strict  phenomenalists  
allowed inferences to things that they could not directly verify, such as the past and the minds of others. And if  
they were allowed their inferences, why should the physicist not be allowed his, particularly if it could be  
shown (as Russell believed) that the entities presupposed by physical theory could be exhibited as logical 
constructions out of entities that are of the same kind as the data of sense from which they are inferred?
Russell’s attitude to phenomenalism, therefore, was somewhat more complex than is usually made out. If we 
ask, ‘was Russell ever a phenomenalist?’ we must first be clear what we mean by phenomenalism. If to be a  
phenomenalist is to definitely subscribe to the notion that it is possible to reduce statements about physical 
objects to statements about sense-data, then Russell subscribed to this doctrine towards the second half of 1913 
(when he wrote  Our Knowledge of the External World) and at the beginning of 1914 (when he wrote ‘The 
Relation of Sense-data to Physics’). After this point, he became doubtful as to whether the phenomenalist  
reduction could be carried through, but was haunted by the argument he had used in 1913, and still hoped  
phenomenalism might be tenable. By the time he decided that it  was possible to analyse physics in terms of 
sense-data (or percepts) alone, he had ceased to believe that this would constitute an acceptable interpretation 
of physics. Hence, strictly speaking, Russell was only a phenomenalist for a few months from the end of 1913  
to the beginning of 1914.
24  Ibid, p. 105.
25  Ibid.
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II. THE DEFINITION OF MATTER
We have seen that any claim that Russell was a phenomenalist from 1914 to 1921 is one that can only be made 
with severe qualification. In the sense in which his philosophy was ‘phenomenalistic’ during this period it was 
compatible with a sophisticated version of scientific realism and, indeed, a causal theory of perception. The  
‘scientific realism’ is simply a consequence of the view that ‘unsensed sensibilia’ are usually regarded as real 
existents. By the time he wrote The Analysis of Mind, though he does not rule out complete phenomenalism, 
the overall theory that is presented in the work accepts the existence of unperceived particulars. Of course, the 
‘realism’ is a realism of momentary Heraclitean ‘particulars’ rather than physical objects.
The causal  theory of perception derives from Russell’s  distinction,  in  The Analysis of  Mind,  between the 
‘regular’ appearances of an object and its ‘irregular’ appearances. The ‘regular’ appearances of a given thing 
are those presented where there is no distortion due to the ‘intervening medium’ between the place where the 
appearance occurs and the place where the thing is of which it is an appearance. Thus the regular appearance is  
a function solely of the object and the location of the perspective at which it occurs relative to the object. An  
appearance which is distorted due to the ‘intervening medium’ is an ‘irregular’ appearance. A physical object is 
then defined as the set of all its ‘regular’ appearances. Taking as his example a star seen on a cloudless night he 
writes that ‘Every regular appearance is an actual member of the system which is the star, and its causation is 
entirely internal to that system. We may express this by saying that a regular appearance is due to the star  
alone, and is actually part of the star, in the sense in which a man is part of the human race. ’26 But Russell also 
thinks that the only regular appearances of the star are those which it presents in the vacuum of space. When 
the light from the star reaches our atmosphere it begins to be distorted. Finally, the causal chain ends in a 
visual sensation. The point is that all sensations are ‘irregular’ appearances, since their character is determined 
in part by the sense-organs, nerves and brain of the percipient. Such irregular appearances are not members of  
the system of particulars that is the physical object. Nevertheless, they are caused by the regular appearances. 
When the character of the irregular appearance can be calculated from the regular appearances by means of  
laws expressing the distorting influence of the medium then  ‘the particular in question may be regarded as 
caused by the regular appearances, and therefore by the object itself, together with the modifications resulting 
from the medium.’27 Thus, alongside a scientific realism of physical ‘particulars’ there is also a version of the 
causal theory of perception whereby perceptions are caused by the objects which they are perceptions of.
26  The Analysis of Mind, p. 134.
27  Ibid, p. 136.
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As a definition of matter, the above account may not seem entirely satisfactory due to the fact that there may 
be objects that do not present any ‘regular’ appearances at all. Russell himself recognises this. Consequently, in 
The Analysis of Mind Russell proposes a very sophisticated definition of the ‘matter’ of an object. He writes:
Given any appearance of an object, we can construct hypothetically a certain system of appearances to  
which the appearance in question would belong if the laws of perspective alone were concerned. If we  
construct this hypothetical system for each appearance of the object in turn, the system corresponding to 
a given appearance x will be independent of any distortion due to the medium beyond x, and will only 
embody such distortion as is due to the medium between x and the object. Thus, as the appearance by 
which our hypothetical system is defined is moved nearer and nearer to the object, the hypothetical  
system of appearances defined by its means embodies less and less of the effect of the medium.  The 
different sets of appearances resulting from moving x nearer and nearer to the object will approach to a 
limiting set, and this limiting set will be that system of appearances which the object would present if  
the  laws  of  perspective  alone  were  operative  and  the  medium exercised  no  disturbing  effect.  This 
limiting set of appearances may be defined, for purposes of physics, as the piece of matter concerned.28
Incidentally,  in  his  essay  on  ‘Physics  and  Perception’ (1922)  which  we  referred  to  earlier29 Russell 
acknowledges  the  problem  that  some  objects  may  present  no  ‘regular’ appearances  at  all.  He  quotes 
A. C. Strong’s criticism that ‘the object, as physical science conceives it, is not correctly defined as the system 
of all the perspectives (even of the  ‘regular’ ones, i.e. those undistorted by the intervening medium), but is 
rather  their  mathematical  limit.’30 (Presumably  here  Strong  meant  ‘appearances’ or  ‘aspects’ rather  than 
‘perspectives’.) Russell responds to this by saying ‘I myself suggested this view in my book on the External  
World, but rejected it for the reason that there is no limit to which the appearances approach. For this reason, in  
The Analysis of Mind (pp. 106-7), I  defined a piece of matter as that set of appearances to which the set 
approximates which consists of a given appearance together with all those others which would exist if the 
given appearance were regular…The device is essentially the same as that of defining an irrational number as a  
certain class of rationals.’31 Now in fact there is no such suggestion at all in Our Knowledge of the External  
World of matter being defined as a limit of appearances. However, there is such a suggestion in ‘The Relation 
of Sense-Data to Physics’, which reads as follows:
It is obvious that from the point of view of physics the appearances of a thing close to ‘count’ more than 
28  Ibid, pp. 106-7.
29  See above, p. 40.
30  Quoted in ‘Physics and Perception’, Mind, 31, Oct 1922, reprinted in Collected Papers 9, p. 133.
31  ‘Physics and Perception’, Mind, 31, Oct 1922, reprinted in Collected Papers 9, p. 133.
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the appearances far off. We may therefore set up the following tentative definition:
   The  matter of a given thing is the limit  of its appearances as their distance from the thing 
diminishes.
  It  seems probable that  there  is  something in  this  definition,  but  it  is  not  quite  satisfactory, 
because empirically there is no such limit to be obtained from sense-data.32
This reinforces Kenneth Blackwell’s  contention that  Russell  was prone to  mix up  Our Knowledge of  the  
External  World with  ‘The  Relation  of  Sense-Data  to  Physics’.  In  the  passage  quoted  from  ‘Physics  and 
Perception’ above Russell himself compares the definition in  The Analysis of Mind to the definition of an 
irrational number in terms of a certain class of rationals. It might be useful to draw out the mathematical  
analogy. The method of constructing irrational numbers from sets of rationals involves something called a 
‘Dedekind cut’. We divide all the rational numbers into two sets L and R such that every member of L is less 
than every member of R. In this manner we can form sets of rationals that define irrational numbers. Thus √2 
will divide the rationals into two sets, L and R, such that the square of every member of L is less than 2, and 
the square of every member of R is greater than 2. In Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica a real 
number is identified with the Dedekind L class and all mathematical statements about √2 can be reformulated 
so as to  be about  L.33 The point  of this  analogy is that  it  is unnecessary to  suppose that  the limiting set  
constituting the ‘matter’ of an object actually exists. Just as everything that is said about irrational numbers can 
be rephrased so as to be about classes of rationals, so every statement about matter can be reformulated in  
terms of series of actual appearances (including unsensed ‘appearances’, i.e. unsensed sensibilia).
Precisely how this is accomplished is not clearly stated in essays such as  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to 
Physics’. But then, these early essays present the task of construction as a work in progress, not as something 
completed, so it is perhaps legitimate for Russell to be sketchy concerning the details. If matter is defined as a  
certain region of space about which sensibilia cluster, as it were, then obviously to talk about matter will  
ultimately be a roundabout way of talking about sensibilia. This is the direction in which Russell was to go  
when he came to defining matter in The Analysis of Matter. By this time, of course, just as the terminology of 
‘sensibilia’ had been dispensed with in favour of ‘particulars’, so ‘particulars’ were dispensed with in favour of 
‘events’. I argued earlier on that this latter change represented more than merely a change in terminology.34 But 
to what extent is it indicative of a radical discontinuity in Russell’s view of the world? This question will 
occupy us in the next chapter.
32  ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’, reprinted in Collected Papers 8, p. 17.
33  See Jeffreys & Jeffreys, Methods of Mathematical Physics, pp. 6-8.
34  See above, p. 33 
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Chapter 4
The Continuity of Russell’s Philosophy
I. INTRODUCTION
The standard account of Russell’s philosophical development would have us suppose that he adopted a more or 
less phenomenalistic theory of perception in 1914 from which he ‘reverted’ sometime in the mid-1920s to a 
causal theory of perception similar to that which he had held before 1914 and which he had expounded in The 
Problems of Philosophy (1912). The mature causal  theory,  so it  is alleged, had its first exposition in  The 
Analysis of Matter (1927). In my opinion this viewpoint, which is sufficiently widespread to count as the  
orthodox interpretation, is mistaken, and is caused by a failure to understand Russell’s metaphysic as it was  
developed in the years from 1914 onwards.
What is perhaps most surprising is that the orthodox interpretation has gone virtually unchallenged for so long, 
for there is a considerable amount of evidence against it. To begin with, it is obvious that Russell himself did 
not regard the ideas he developed in the 1920s and which were embodied in The Analysis of Matter as in any 
way overthrowing his earlier metaphysic. Indeed, Russell never gives any indication that his ideas underwent 
any radical alteration at all between 1921 and 1927. It was not as though Russell was shy of advertising his  
changes of mind. On the contrary, more often than not he was at pains to draw attention to them and was fond  
of presenting his own philosophic development as being constituted by a series of dramatic epiphanies. As it is,  
Russell was to describe  The Analysis of Matter as ‘in some sense a companion volume’ to  The Analysis of  
Mind1, which would have been an odd description had the two books contained radically opposed metaphysics. 
Furthermore, in My Philosophical Development, his intellectual autobiography, Russell does not mention any 
change occurring to his view of perception or the philosophy of physics in the 1920s. On the contrary, the 
chapter on ‘The External World’ makes it abundantly clear that he still endorses the ideas that occurred to him 
in 1914, including the idea of two kinds of spaces and three places associated with every sensed element. In 
1964, Russell was to say to Elizabeth Eames ‘I am conscious of no major change in my opinions since the  
adoption of neutral monism.’2 (Russell’s adoption of neutral monism dates to 1918.)
1  Autobiography, p. 387.
2  Elizabeth Eames, Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 108.
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Thus Russell’s  own testimony constitutes powerful  evidence for continuity and equally powerful evidence 
against  the orthodox interpretation.  The second piece of evidence in  favour of  continuity is  derived from 
Russell’s works themselves. I think that a careful examination of Russell’s writings from 1912 onwards fully 
bears out Russell’s own insistence on the continuity of his thought.
The belief that Russell radically changed his metaphysic across this time period has been fostered by a number  
of unfortunate misinterpretations. For instance,  The Analysis of Matter clearly contains a form of scientific 
realism. If the earlier philosophy is construed as ‘phenomenalistic’ then it is obvious that his ground has shifted 
a great deal. But we have already found reason to reject the notion that his earlier philosophy was a form of 
phenomenalism.  Similarly,  it  is  sometimes supposed that  ‘neutral  monism’ is  incompatible  with scientific  
realism, and consequently that The Analysis of Mind must have represented the high water mark of a neutral 
monism that he abandoned by the time he wrote The Analysis of Matter. But there is no evidence that Russell 
thought  that  neutral  monism was  incompatible  with  scientific  realism.  Russell’s  scientific  realism was  a  
realism of ‘particulars’, and later ‘events’, which are not intrinsically either ‘mental’ or ‘physical’ but can be 
regarded as one or the other in virtue of their being members of ‘mental’ or ‘physical’ sets (i.e. minds or pieces 
of matter). In An Outline of Philosophy, published in the same year as The Analysis of Matter, and in which 
Russell expounds in less technical terms the scientific realism of The Analysis of Matter, Russell writes that ‘It 
will be seen that the view which I am advocating is neither materialism nor mentalism, but what (following a 
suggestion of Dr. H. M. Sheffer) we call “neutral monism”.’3
There is another interesting piece of evidence. In 1926 Russell revised Our Knowledge of the External World 
for reprinting and made some minor modifications to bring the doctrine set out in the book up to date with his  
most recent thinking. However, very little ‘revision’ was required. Essentially, as Robert E. Tully has pointed  
out the revision amounted to little more than the alteration of a single paragraph.4 The alteration consisted in a 
statement that he no longer considers that there is any difference between the sensation and the ‘sense-datum’. 
However, besides this alteration there was one important addition to the text. An entire paragraph is added to 
Lecture IV that does not occur in the first edition of the book (I have verified this myself by comparing a copy  
of the book printed before 1926 with one printed after). The new paragraph begins as follows:
The space-time of physics has not a very close relation to the space and time of the world of one 
3  An Outline of Philosophy, p. 293.
4  See ‘Russell’s Neutral Monism’, reprinted in Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments III, p. 269, It should 
be noted that I dissent from Tully’s overall interpretation of Russell’s ‘neutral monism’, on which point see 
below pp. 55-6.
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person’s experience. Everything that occurs in one person’s experience must, from the standpoint of  
physics, be located within that person’s body; this is evident from considerations of causal continuity. 
What occurs when I see a star occurs as the result of light-waves impinging on the retina, and causing a  
process in the optic nerve and brain; therefore the occurrence called ‘seeing a star’ must be in the brain. 
If we define a piece of matter as a set of events (as was suggested above), the sensation of seeing a star 
will be one of the events which are the brain of the percipient at the time of the perception. Thus every 
event that I experience will be one of the events which constitute some part of my body. The space of 
(say) my visual perceptions is only correlated with physical space, more or less approximately; from the 
physical point of view, whatever I see is inside my head. I do not see physical objects; I see effects 
which they produce in the region where my brain is.5
Both the language and the theses in this paragraph are characteristic of Russell’s later thought, including the 
emphasis on the causal theory of perception and the notion that not only are thoughts ‘in our heads’ (as was the  
case in the earlier philosophy) but that the brain actually consists of ‘thoughts’ such as my ‘seeing the star’. 
This is a quite new doctrine; and not only is it new but, arguably, it is incompatible with what is said in the  
remainder of Lecture IV. For the view developed there is that physical objects are to be construed in terms of  
their ‘appearances’ in places where they are not, not in terms of the occurrences at the place where the physical  
object actually is. However, Russell clearly does not notice this inconsistency. The point is that, by inserting 
this paragraph into Lecture IV of Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell shows that he does not regard 
the ideas contained in it - ideas characteristic of his later metaphysic - as incompatible with the metaphysic he  
set out  in  this  earlier  book. He might have been wrong in thinking this,  but  this is  undoubtedly what he  
thought.
II. GRAYLING’S MUDDLE
In saying this, I am opposing those commentators who have stated, or insinuated, that Russell radically revised 
his metaphysic at some unspecified point in the 1920s. Foremost among such commentators in modern times is  
A. C. Grayling who has provided a  chapter  on Russell’s  metaphysic  entitled ‘Russell,  Experience and the  
Roots of Science’ for The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell.6
Like many commentators, Grayling shares the view that Russell radically altered his views between 1921 and  
1927. After describing the metaphysic of ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’, Grayling writes ‘Instead of  
5  Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 129.
6  Ed. Nicholas Griffin, 2003.
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developing this distinctive theory further, Russell abandoned it. In later work…he reverted to treating physical 
objects and the space they occupy as inferred from sense-experience’.7 This statement can scarcely be accepted 
without certain qualifications. Certainly Russell did not regard himself as ‘abandoning’ his earlier metaphysic.  
In the earlier metaphysic, perspective space, which Russell identifies with physical space, is constructed out of  
perspectives, but only some of these perspectives are actually observed, the rest are inferred. (Although, as we 
have seen, Russell clung for some time to the hope that perhaps unperceived perspectives could be exhibited as 
functions of perceived perspectives.) There is, however, some ground for saying that Russell’s view of physical 
space in the later metaphysic is different to his view in the earlier theory. We have seen that, in his earlier  
theory, there are no direct (as opposed to merely constructed) time relations between particulars belonging to 
diverse  ‘biographies’.  There  are  temporal  relations  between  perspectives  belonging  to  one  and  the  same 
biography, but between (for example) my current perspective and a perspective in your biography there are no  
time relations that are not constructed.
In the later metaphysic, on the other hand, overlapping in space-time was identified with ‘compresence’ or  
(absolute) simultaneity, and this would allow items in my perspective to be compresent with items outside my 
perspective,  and  for  them to  be  compresent  with  further  items,  and  so  on,  thus  linking  items  in  diverse 
perspectives via a chain of compresence. As a consequence, every item in the universe would be related to  
every other item via a chain of overlapping, or compresence, a consequence that was confirmed by Russell  
himself  in  the  letter  to  Newman  which  we  have  already  quoted  above.8 One  result  of  this  is  that  the 
fundamental stuff of the world has acquired an extension in space as well as in time, i.e. that the fundamental  
stuff consists of ‘events’. Another is that the spatial relations between items belonging to diverse points of  
view are constructed from a real relation between these items, namely compresence. In the earlier metaphysic,  
perspectives were arranged by considerations of their ‘internal’ characteristics, e.g. the various perspectives  
containing appearances of a penny were located in space on the basis of the different characteristics of the 
sensibilia belonging to the penny. Given the sensibilia, then, the ‘space’ in which they are situated follows  
merely from a consideration of their own characteristics, and does not require the positing of a separate spatial 
relation. In the later theory, the spatial relations consist in chains of copunctuality, or compresence, and the fact  
that these relations subsist between items belonging to diverse perspectives is an inference to a matter of fact. 
There is, therefore, some ground for saying that, in the later metaphysic, space is inferred, whilst in the earlier 
theory it is constructed.
It should be noted, however, that this change does not consist in some lurch from phenomenalism to Lockean  
7  ‘Russell, Experience and the Roots of Science’ in The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, ed. 
Nicholas Griffin, p. 460.
8  See above, p.32.
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realism, but amounts to supposing that the items (‘particulars’ or ‘events’) that constitute physical reality are 
compresent with items outside their own biographies (that is, they are compresent with items that are not also 
before or after them), and consequently the items have a certain ‘width’ in space-time and are not elongated in 
only one dimension. Perhaps it would be safer to say that there is no suggestion as yet from Russell that these 
items have a ‘width’ as well as a temporal extension, and that furthermore his definition of ‘perspectives’ in  
terms of all the particulars simultaneous with a given particular seems to rule it out.
Grayling goes on to say that the change to Russell’s metaphysic was prompted by a number of considerations, 
one of which was ‘his acceptance of the standard view offered by physics and physiology that perception is 
caused by the action of the environment on our sensory surfaces.’9 This, however, cannot be a reason for the 
change in Russell’s metaphysic since, as we have seen, it is a point that is accepted in his earlier theory. Thus,  
in The Analysis of Mind, the physical object is defined in terms of its ‘regular’ appearances and our sensations 
are the result of the interaction of this system of appearances on our sense-organs. Next, Grayling offers the 
following explanation for the changes in Russell’s theory:
Another reason for Russell’s abandonment of the sensibilia theory was the sheer complexity and, as he  
came to see it, implausibility of the views he tried to formulate about private and public spaces, the  
relations between them, and the way sensibilia are supposed to occupy them. He makes passing mention  
of this cluster of problems in MPD [My Philosophical Development], before there reporting, as his main 
reason for abandoning the attempt to construct ‘matter out of experienced data alone’, that it  ‘is an 
impossible  programme…physical  objects  cannot  be interpreted  as  structures  composed  of  elements 
actually experienced’ (MPD p. 79). This last remark is not strictly consistent with Russell’s stated view 
in the original texts that sensibilia are not, and do not have to be, actually sensed; MPD gives a much 
more phenomenalistic gloss to the theory than it originally possessed. But it touches upon a serious 
problem with the theory: which is that it is at least problematic to speak of an ‘unsensed sense-datum’ 
which does not even require - as its very name seems per contra to demand - an intrinsic connection to 
perception.10
This passage is such a tangled web of muddles that it is difficult to know where to begin. Nevertheless, I shall 
attempt to unravel the strands in this web, since it is actually representative of the pervasive misinterpretations 
and interpolations that characterise much Russell scholarship.
9  ‘Russell, Experience and the Roots of Science’ in The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, ed. 
Nicholas Griffin, p. 460.
10  Ibid, pp. 460-1.
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Firstly, to say that Russell ‘abandoned’ sensibilia is not quite correct. He always believed that things presented  
aspects  or  appearances  in  places where  there  are  no living  percipients.  We have already had occasion in 
Chapter 1 to quote the passage from his ‘Reply To Critics’ written in 1944 in which Russell reaffirms this  
belief. It is worth quoting again:
Mr. Stace is puzzled by my hypothesis of unperceived aspects. Yet the hypothesis of such aspects is 
inevitable if we admit - as we all do in fact - that (a) causation does not act at a distance, (b) we can 
perceive (in some sense) things from which we are separated by an interval which is not a plenum of  
souls.11
The characteristics of these unperceived aspects or appearances changed somewhat between his earlier and his  
later philosophy to the extent that they acquired an extension in space as well as time, but these items are still  
located in ‘private spaces’ or ‘perspectives’, most of which are not observed and which are ordered in a public, 
physical space that is to be carefully distinguished from the private space or spaces within each perspective. 
For this reason, he certainly did not object to what Grayling above calls ‘the sheer complexity and, as he came 
to see it,  implausibility’ of his views concerning the distinction between public and private space. On the  
contrary, these same views are set out in My Philosophical Development (in the chapters on ‘My Present View 
of the World’ and ‘The External World’) and are ideas he thoroughly endorses.
Grayling then goes on to talk about Russell’s hope of constructing matter out of sense-data alone, i.e. his 
flirtation  with  phenomenalism.  We  have  seen  that  Russell  was  undogmatic  concerning  whether  such  a 
programme was possible. However, he thought that even if the programme were possible, a lot of work would 
be required to show how it could be carried out, and in the meantime he felt that he needed to keep unsensed  
sensibilia. Hence there is no inconsistency here with Russell’s stated view that sensibilia do not actually have  
to be sensed. When Russell explains why he came to suppose that physical objects cannot be interpreted in 
terms of elements actually experienced, by ‘elements actually experienced’ he means sense-data, not unsensed 
sensibilia. In other words, he is explaining that he came to the conclusion precisely that he needed to  keep 
unsensed sensibilia. My Philosophical Development does not give a ‘phenomenalist gloss’ to Russell’s theory, 
since he is not discussing the complete system of ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ but only the idea that 
he could abandon the two inferences that he in fact allowed himself in this paper and construct physical objects 
out of sense-data alone. It is this phenomenalist (indeed solipsist) ambition that he is rejecting as impossible, 
not the system expounded in the paper which accepts these two inferences, at least provisionally. Indeed, we 
saw earlier on that Russell’s account in My Philosophical Development if anything somewhat downplays his 
11  ‘Reply To Critics’, reprinted in Collected Papers 11, p. 39.
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phenomenalism, declaring that he ‘soon’ became persuaded that phenomenalism was impossible, whereas in 
reality he remained unsure for many years.
Finally,  Grayling says that he thinks the whole notion of ‘unsensed sense-data’ is problematic. Of course,  
Grayling is right since an ‘unsensed sense-datum’ is in fact a contradiction in terms. It is for this reason that 
Russell never uses the phrase ‘unsensed sense-data’ and why he introduces the term ‘sensibilia’ to obviate the 
difficulty of talking about ‘appearances’ which are not presented to any observer. Obviously a sense-datum 
cannot exist when it ceases to be sensed; but I see no reason why an item with all the qualities of a sensed item  
could not exist without being sensed. Indeed, this is the view of naïve realism, except that the sensed items are  
placed in a single public space rather than being located in private spaces which in turn constitute a single  
public space. Grayling returns to this issue later on in his essay. He writes:
One of the chief reasons for Russell’s reversion to a realistic, inferential view about physical things was 
the difficulty inherent in the notion of unsensed sensa or, in the later terminology, percepts…But it is  
obvious that the idea of unsensed sensa (or unperceived percepts) is, if not indeed contradictory, at least 
problematic. It makes sense - although, without a careful gloss, it is metaphysically questionable - to 
talk of the existence of  possibilities  of sensation; but to talk of the existence of  possible sensations 
arguably does not…This is just what Russell himself came to think.12
Again, it is not easy to know where to begin. ‘Unsensed sensa’ is not a phrase that occurs in Russell, any more  
than ‘possible sensations’ or (outrageously) ‘unperceived percepts’. In connection with ‘sensa’ there is a very 
interesting  discussion  by Russell  in  his  review of  C. D. Broad’s  Scientific  Thought published  in  1923.  In 
Broad’s book, Broad had criticised Russell on the ground that to call unsensed items ‘sensa’ was misleading. 
Russell replied that ‘I never have called such things “sensa”. At one time I called them “sensibilia”, for the  
special purpose of distinguishing them from sensa; then I adopted the more colourless word “particulars” in 
order to weaken still further the analogy with sensa.’13 This passage, incidentally, is illuminating in showing 
why Russell switched from the terminology of ‘sensibilia’ to ‘particulars’.
It is not clear to me what the substance of Grayling’s criticism of Russell actually is in the passage quoted 
above. He allows that we can talk of ‘possibilities’ of sensation but not of ‘possible sensations’. Of course,  
Russell’s  ‘sensibilia’ are  certainly not  ‘possibilities  of  sensation’ in  the  Millian  sense,  for  they are  actual 
existents, not merely ‘possibilities’. Perhaps what Grayling means is that it is impossible for an immediately  
12  ‘Russell, Experience and the Roots of Science’ in The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, ed. 
Nicholas Griffin, p. 466.
13  ‘Review of C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought’ (1923), reprinted in Collected Papers 9, p. 264.
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sensed item – a patch of colour in the visual field for example – to continue to exist when it is no longer  
sensed. Of course, such an item will no longer exist as a sensed item, but I see no reason to think that it could 
not continue to exist, and Grayling does not supply such a reason. Could it be, I wonder, that Grayling has  
fallen into the trap of supposing that sense-data are inherently ‘mental’? 
Grayling ascribes this muddle to Russell himself, but this is certainly incorrect. Grayling has succumbed to the 
dangers of interpolation. That is, he has ascribed to Russell his own difficulties with Russell’s metaphysic. 
There is no evidence that Russell held the same views as Grayling and no evidence that the (in my opinion  
illusory)  difficulties  with  unsensed  sensibilia  were  ‘one  of  the  chief  reasons’ for  the  supposed  change in 
Russell’s theory, as Grayling claims. In essence, then, Grayling’s account is an excursion into fiction.
Grayling  is  only  the  latest  commentator  on  Russell  to  suppose  that  his  later  metaphysic  was  a  separate 
development to his earlier philosophy. But this notion goes back some way, despite Russell’s own belief in the  
continuity of his thought abundantly evidenced by  My Philosophical Development.  Thus after expounding 
Russell’s earlier philosophy of perception, A. J. Ayer in his beautifully written little volume on Russell writes 
that  ‘Russell  himself  makes  no  attempt  to  develop  his  theory any further,  and indeed  we soon find  him  
reverting to his earlier theory, in which physical objects are postulated as external causes of percepts.’14 Now 
certainly physical objects are regarded as the external causes of percepts in Russell’s later philosophy. This is 
also,  however, true in  his earlier  philosophy, as we have seen.  Furthermore, even in  his later philosophy, 
Russell still regards physical objects as ‘logical constructions’ out of elements that do not differ fundamentally 
from percepts. The details of the construction are somewhat different in his later philosophy, as we shall see.  
But, as I hope to show, the later phase of Russell’s thought constitutes very much a development of the earlier  
phase, rather than an abandonment of it, at least in Russell’s own mind.
III. NEUTRAL MONISM
In his ‘Reply to Critics’ in the Schilpp volume mentioned above Russell is clearly somewhat exasperated that  
his critics have not taken into consideration the changes in his views since the period 1914-21. Thus he writes 
‘Mr Stace’s essay on my neutral monism is a little difficult for me to deal with, because it is concerned with  
the view I advocated in Knowledge of the External World and Analysis of Mind, with which I no longer wholly 
agree, partly for reasons analogous to those which he puts forward against them. I am rather sorry that he  
excluded The Analysis of Matter from the scope of his discussion, because, although there is some change of 
14  A. J. Ayer, Russell, p. 84.
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view in this book, in the main there is a fuller and more careful statement of theories not very different from 
those of  The Analysis of Mind.’15 This passage, it  should be noted, does not constitute any repudiation of 
‘neutral  monism’.  On  the  contrary,  immediately  following  the  above  passage  Russell  writes  ‘I  cannot  
understand why Mr. Stace holds that neutral monism must not regard physical objects as causes of sense-
data.’16 We have already seen that Russell reaffirmed his commitment to neutral monism in 1927 in his Outline  
of Philosophy. What Russell says in the above quoted passage is that The Analysis of Matter contains ‘a fuller 
and more careful’ formulation of theories ‘not very different’ from those of The Analysis of Mind. I think that 
this is amply borne out by a detailed consideration of his later metaphysic.
As we have already seen (and as Russell reaffirms in his ‘Reply to Critics’) in his final metaphysic there are  
still unperceived ‘aspects’ or ‘appearances’ of things that are ranged about the places where the things are. To 
this extent, pace Grayling, Russell never abandoned the ‘unsensed sensibilia’ of ‘The Relation of Sense-Data 
to Physics’. However, these appearances are now conceived as having a certain finite extension in physical  
space as well as being extended in time; that is, they have been transformed into ‘events’ occupying finite  
continuous regions of space-time. Each region will comprise a vast number of overlapping events. A ‘material  
region’ will consist of all the events happening to any of the points comprising the region concerned. If matter  
is conceived as ‘punctual’ (i.e. point-like), then a ‘material point’ will consist of all the events happening at the  
point concerned. An event ‘happens’ at a point if it is a member of the class of overlapping (or ‘copunctual’) 
events that is the point. Now this is certainly a different definition of matter to that suggested in The Analysis  
of Mind. Instead of matter being defined in terms of events in regions where the matter is not, it is now being 
defined in terms of the events at the place where the matter actually is. The brain will comprise all the events at  
the region where the brain is. Since physics tells us nothing concerning the intrinsic character of external 
events, there is no reason not to suppose that among these events percepts are included. Hence, the brain  
actually consists of ‘thoughts’ (in the sense of percepts) as well as a vast number of other events.
Percepts are ‘aspects’ or ‘appearances’ of things that are presented at regions where there is nerve tissue, i.e.  
matter with the peculiar property of being liable to form habits. This is what makes these appearances into 
something mental. But not every event that constitutes the brain need be an appearance of an external object.  
Mental images, for example, are not ‘aspects’ of anything external. Thus, more generally, we do not have to  
suppose that all events are ‘appearances’. This considerably augments the wealth of materials available for our  
construction. In  The Analysis of Mind, unsensed ‘particulars’ were all appearances of objects; at least, there 
was no suggestion that there were any purely physical particulars that were not appearances of objects. And  
yet, there were particulars belonging to minds that were not appearances of anything, namely mental images.  
15  ‘Reply to Critics’, reprinted in Collected Papers 11, pp. 37-8.
16  Ibid, p. 38.
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This is clearly a somewhat anomalous result, and Russell’s new theory tidies up the anomaly. Appearances are  
now only a proper subset of events and this goes for the events comprising external physical objects as much 
as for the brain. This is clearly (at least to my mind) a more satisfactory theory.
‘Overlapping’ in space-time is equivalent to what Russell now calls ‘compresence’, which is basically the  
same as ‘simultaneity’ except that, unlike simultaneity, compresence is regarded as a  non-transitive relation. 
Thus compresence is an immediately perceptible relation when it occurs between two percepts belonging to 
one observer at one time. We saw how, in Russell’s earlier formulation, particulars were assigned to just a  
single ‘perspective’. The ‘complete complexes of compresence’ that now replace perspectives are classes of  
events with the following two properties: (i) any two events that are members of the class are compresent (ii) 
nothing outside the class is compresent with every member of the class. This allows that an event can belong to 
more than one such complex. And since a complete complex of compresence is a point-instant in space-time,  
this  is  equivalent  to  saying that  an event occupies a  finite  region of  space-time. Thus,  events,  unlike the 
particulars of The Analysis of Mind, are explicitly members of more than one point, in physical space.
I think one can see how this system is very much a development and refinement of Russell’s older system. In  
other words, Russell is entirely justified, in my opinion, in thinking that his philosophical development from 
1914  to  1927  and  after  was  continuous.  The  most  important  tacit  change  is  not,  pace Grayling,  the 
abandonment  of  sensibilia,  but  rather  that  these  ‘sensibilia’,  along  with  other  events,  have  acquired  an 
extension in all four dimensions of space-time. This makes possible the definition of matter in terms of events  
comprising the region where the piece of matter is.
Russell’s mature philosophy is still a form of neutral monism. The ‘neutral stuff’ of this monism consists of  
‘events’. This is unequivocally confirmed by Russell himself in An Outline of Philosophy (1927) in which the 
system developed in The Analysis of Matter is expounded in a more widely accessible form. We have already 
quoted part of the relevant section above, but I think it is worthwhile here to quote a little more. ‘It will be 
seen’, Russell writes, ‘that the view which I am advocating is neither materialism nor mentalism, but what 
(following a suggestion of Dr. H. M. Sheffer) we call “neutral monism”. It is monism in the sense that it  
regards the world as composed of only one kind of stuff, namely events’.17 In  The Analysis of Mind, mental 
images were mental, but not physical. Now, however, images and sensations are events that happen where the 
brain is and thus serve to constitute the brain. Thus they are members of ‘physical’ sets as well as mental sets.  
In Russell’s mature system, the ‘mental’ is a proper subset of the physical. All mental events are also physical, 
but not vice versa. An event is not  intrinsically either mental or physical; it can be regarded as ‘mental’ or 
17  An Outline of Philosophy, p. 293.
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‘physical’ in virtue of its being a member of mental or physical groups (i.e. minds or pieces of matter). That is  
why events are intrinsically ‘neutral’ as between mind and matter.
Oddly, despite Russell’s clarity concerning the nature of his ‘neutral stuff’, some commentators have come up 
with theories of their own concerning what this stuff might be. Thus Robert E. Tully has rejected the idea that  
Russell’s neutral stuff consists of ‘events’.18 The ground on which he does this is that ‘the effect of any such 
interpretation would be to transform Russell’s basic stuff into something physicalistic, thereby robbing it of its 
neutrality.’19 Tully goes on to say that the view that treats Russell’s basic stuff as events is only made possible 
by ignoring Russell’s own warnings that his metaphysic is neither materialistic nor idealistic. Clearly, Tully  
thinks that taking ‘events’ as basic stuff is equivalent to ‘something physicalistic’, but it is difficult to see what  
his ground is for this attitude. It is true that Russell holds all events - or all knowable events at any rate - to be  
physical; but this is not a matter of their being  intrinsically physical, but merely in their being elements of 
physical classes. There is no difficulty with an event being at once an element of a physical class and an  
element of a mental class, and this, indeed, happens precisely in the case of percepts.
In addition, Russell’s view of ‘events’ is not physicalistic, since they have intrinsic qualities that cannot be 
known, except in the case of percepts. Physicalism maintains that the physical description of the world is 
‘complete’. Once all true propositions of physical science are stated nothing is left to be said. Russell’s view is  
that physics describes the  structure of events but says nothing about their intrinsic  quality. I confess that I 
cannot see in what way taking the basic stuff as ‘events’, as Russell undoubtedly does, renders his philosophy 
physicalistic. In some ways his views might seem materialist. As he himself says in a passage quoted by Tully  
‘when I say that my percepts are in my head, I shall be thought materialistic; when I say that my head consists  
of my percepts and other similar events, I shall be thought idealistic.’20 But this does not mean that Russell’s 
philosophy is either one or the other. For this reason I think it is Tully who has ignored Russell’s warnings and  
hopelessly misconstrued Russell’s philosophy.
Tully’s candidate for Russell’s neutral stuff is ‘sensible qualities’.21 There is absolutely nothing in Russell’s 
entire  corpus in which he says that sensible qualities are his basic stuff. It is difficult to see how, on such a 
view, Russell could have avoided a Berkeleyan idealism which he would certainly have found unpalatable. 
Tully says that Russell’s neutral monism is ‘epistemological in nature, not scientific’22 But in fact Russell’s 
18  See his essay on ‘Russell’s Neutral Monism’, in Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments III.
19  Tully, ‘Russell’s Neutral Monism’, in Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments III, ed. Andrew Irvine, p. 
271.
20  Quoted in Tully, op. cit. p. 271.
21  Tully, op. cit. p. 273.
22  Ibid.
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neutral  monism,  as  we  have  seen,  is  fundamentally  an  ontological,  or  metaphysical,  claim,  and  this  is 
something that Russell himself makes clear (for example in the passage from An Outline of Philosophy quoted 
above).
The purpose of the last four chapters has been to explain Russell's  metaphysic in outline and to trace its  
development precisely in order to counter misunderstandings such as Tully's. In pursuit of this end, I have been 
guided by two exegetical principles:  firstly,  that  the only reliable guide to  Russell's  opinions are his  own 
words, and secondly, that he is much more likely to have meant what he said than to have meant something  
else that he quite easily could have said, but in fact did not.23 I hope that the account I have unfolded will 
enable the reader to sort out fact from fiction in any piece of Russell commentary that he or she should come  
across.
In the light of this exegesis I wish to return to Ayer’s confusion over the nature of Russell’s neutral monism 
that I alluded to above.24 In his book on Russell, Ayer writes that:
The question arises whether the events which are common to mind and brain have the known qualities 
of percepts, images and feelings, or the unknown qualities of physical events, or both. The first answer 
is suggested by Russell’s saying that ‘The brain consists of thoughts – using “thought” in its widest 
sense, as it was used by Descartes’, but this is hard to reconcile with his saying that we have no good  
reason to believe that the physical events which cause our experiences, are qualitatively similar to the  
experiences which they cause. Equally, the second answer is hard to reconcile with Russell’s view that 
what I have called experiential propositions, the expressions of our judgements about the contents of our 
current  experiences,  come as  near to  being  certain  as  any empirical  propositions  can.  As for  third  
answer, I do not see how it can well be true that one and the same occurrence can both,  qua mental 
event, have the quality, say, of a mental image, and,  qua physical event, have qualities which do no 
more than structurally correspond with the qualities of anything that actually enters into an experience. I 
have to confess, therefore, that I am unable to make sense of Russell’s position on this point.25
The correct answer to Ayer’s initial query should now by pretty clear. The ‘events which are common to mind 
and brain’ are simply percepts, and have the known qualities of percepts. As for the claim that we have no  
good reason to believe that  the physical  events  that  cause our experiences are qualitatively similar to the 
23  These principles have been largely taken verbatim from Kirk and Raven. See their account of Anaxagoras 
in G. S. Kirk & J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 367.
24  See p. 7.
25  A. J. Ayer, Russell, pp. 114-5. The quotation from Russell is taken from Russell’s My Philosophical  
Development, p 25.
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experiences that they cause, this is clearly meant to apply to physical events that are  external to the human 
body. In the highly exceptional case of a physiologist observing living nerve tissue it will indeed be the case  
that the matter he is observing will consist, in part, of percepts bearing the known qualities of percepts.
Of course Ayer hopelessly misconstrues Russell’s development. Russell’s ‘neutral stuff’, according to Ayer,  
‘was thought by him to consist in percepts which entered into the constitution of both minds and bodies, 
together with images and feelings, which entered only into the constitution of minds.’26 This, of course, renders 
the earlier system completely phenomenalistic. Ayer says that we find that by the late 1920s ‘Russell gives up 
this position, which has come to be known as that of neutral monism, in favour of one in which physical  
objects are represented as inferred entities, rather than as logical constructions.’27 Hence, for Ayer, the earlier 
system alone is neutral monism (perhaps because he associates the term ‘neutral monism’ with William James’  
more subjectivist theories), and the adoption of scientific realism is held to constitute an abandonment of this  
theory. It is not surprising, then, that Ayer is perplexed by Russell’s continued adherence to neutral monism, 
and that he cannot make any sense out of his later metaphysic. I hope, however, that in this chapter I have  
succeeded in dispelling a number of myths concerning the course of Russell’s development, and in so doing 
have made the nature of his mature metaphysical system clear.
This, then, completes my survey of Russell’s neutral monist metaphysic. A great many of the criticisms of 
Russell were based on misunderstandings, and thus need not detain us. However, in 1928, the mathematician  
Maxwell Newman delivered an assault on Russell’s philosophy which cannot be so easily dismissed. As we 
shall see, consideration of Newman’s critique requires us to admit important modifications to Russell’s neutral  
monism, modifications which Russell himself did not recognise as necessary.
26  Ibid, p. 113.
27  Ibid.
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Chapter 5
Russell, Newman and the Structural Realism 
Controversy
I. NEWMAN’S CHALLENGE
One prominent feature of Russell’s philosophy is presented by his oft-repeated insistence that the only features 
of external reality that can be justifiably inferred from our percepts are structural features. This point of view, 
as we have seen, was implicit in his earlier philosophy (pre-1913) but was then forgotten until the 1920s – first 
resurfacing in a short review published in 1923.1
The ‘structuralist’ approach to physics is given particular emphasis in The Analysis of Matter. His argument is 
that we infer the structural characteristics of external events on the basis of some such maxim as ‘same cause,  
same effect’, with its corollary ‘different effects, different causes’.2 I shall argue later on that our knowledge of 
the external world is not based on an inference from effects to causes in quite the manner Russell supposes. 3 
Nevertheless, I still think that the ‘structuralist’ interpretation of physics must be correct. For, on the theory I 
shall expound in my final chapter, the justification for my belief in the physical world is that the positing of 
external physical objects is presupposed by any description of experience which enables us to anticipate the 
future course of our sense-experience. As a consequence, our knowledge of the character of physical objects is  
restricted to those properties that figure in physical theories. And I should argue that the only properties that  
have a genuine function in explanation are purely formal properties. Properties such as mass and charge are all 
‘dispositional’ properties, in the sense that such properties are not merely contingently related to the behaviour 
of the particles they characterise. Rather, to credit a physical particle with a given charge or mass logically  
entails certain statements concerning how the particle would behave under certain circumstances. Thus, these 
physical  properties  are  not  what  we might  call  ‘intrinsic’ or  ‘first-order’ properties.  We  can  ‘cash’ these 
properties in terms of the behaviour of particles, and the statements describing this behaviour will mention  
1  Bertrand Russell, ‘Science and Metaphysics’, reprinted in Collected Papers 9, pp. 238-9.
2  For example, The Analysis of Matter, p. 400.
3  See below, Chapter 8, section IV, ‘Percepts as signs’ (pp. 136-42.)
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properties of particles such as spatio-temporal location. Physical space itself is not something with which we 
are directly acquainted. Rather, whatever relation satisfies certain purely formal axioms can be taken as  being 
the ‘space’ of physics. Since nothing else is required by physics of space except that it does satisfy certain 
purely formal axioms, any further characterisation of physical space would be quite unwarranted.
Science, therefore, seems to reduce to knowledge of purely formal properties, i.e. properties of structure. And 
it is difficult to see how we could know anything more than structure. The ‘structuralism’ of The Analysis of  
Matter is, therefore, a thesis that seems to rest on solid foundations.
However, only a year after the publication of The Analysis of Matter, the structural realist thesis that Russell 
had advanced in this book was subjected to a powerful challenge by the mathematician M. H. A. Newman in a  
paper published in Mind.4 Newman’s argument has sometimes been taken as a definitive refutation of Russell’s 
position in  The Analysis of Matter5, and so it is important for us to show that it is no such thing, though it  
undoubtedly is a very important paper which requires that Russell’s metaphysic be modified in the light of the  
argument contained therein.
Newman’s  argument  in  his  1928 paper  is  both  subtle  and  brilliant.  What  Newman  pointed  out  was  that 
Russell’s own definition of structure in Principia Mathematica implied that a given aggregate possesses every 
structure compatible with its cardinality. It follows from this that to assert that a given aggregate has a certain  
structure with respect to  some  relation, without specifying what this relation is, amounts to no more than a 
trivial cardinality claim concerning the aggregate in question. However, natural science certainly tells us more  
about physical reality than simply the cardinal number of entities comprising it. Consequently, it tells us more 
about the world than simply its abstract structure, and Russell’s structural realism must be false.
In order to understand Newman’s argument, it is necessary first to be clear concerning the meanings of certain 
terms. Firstly, we must analyse the concept of ‘structure’. In Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead 
pointed out that it is not a mere aggregate, or heap, of elements that has a structure, but rather a specific  
relation. The abstract structure of a given relation was referred to by the authors as its ‘relation-number’. This 
was defined in a way that paralleled the definition of cardinal number. Just as a cardinal number was a class of 
similar classes, so a relation-number was identified with a class of similar relations. Two relations, P and Q, are 
said to be ‘similar’ if the and only if there is a relation S establishing a one-one correlation between the fields  
of P and Q such that, whenever any item has the relation P to another, the correlate of the one (by S) has the  
relation Q to the correlate of the other, and vice versa. A given relation-number is then defined as the class of  
4  M. H. A. Newman, 'Mr. Russell’s “Causal Theory of Perception”', Mind, 37 (April 1928).
5  See, for example, Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell 1921-1970: The Ghost of Madness, p. 71.
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relations similar to a given relation.
Newman’s argument also lent on Russell and Whitehead’s definition of ‘relation’. In Principia Mathematica it 
is stated that ‘A relation, as we shall use the word, will be understood in extension: it may be regarded as the 
class  of  couples (x,  y)  for  which some function ψ(x,  y)  is  true.’6 As Newman remarks  in  his  paper,  this 
definition only applies to dyadic (or ‘binary’) relations. But it is clear that Russell meant his definition to apply 
to relation generally. Thus Newman defines a relation as a class of ordered sets of the form (x1,...,xn) satisfying 
a given propositional function φ(x1,...,xn). It is important to note, as Newman insists, that a relation is not just a 
class  of  sets,  but  a class  of  ordered sets,  since not  all  relations are  symmetrical.  Thus a relation such as 
‘tallness’ is simply a class of ordered sets <Phaedo, Simmias>, <Simmias, Socrates>, etc; that is, it is the class 
of sets of the form <x, y> such that ‘x is taller than y’ is true.
From this purely ‘extensional’ definition of relation, combined with the previous definition of structure in 
terms of ‘relation-number’, it  follows that any given aggregate constitutes the field of a relation with any 
structure we please, provided that the field has a sufficient cardinality. This can best be seen using an example.  
Suppose we have four entities,  a, α, β and γ, and we wish to identify a relation between all and only the 
following ordered pairs: <a, α>, <a, β>, <a, γ>. Then we simply define a propositional function φ such that φ 
<x, y> is defined as
x=a and either y=α or y=β or y=γ.
This identifies a relation with the required structure. It is obvious that this example can be generalised, and we  
can collect together any entities we like in any combination we please, in order to identify relations with any  
relation-number, that is, structure, we desire. The only constraint in this process is that the field of the relation  
must have a sufficient number of entities.
Although both Russell and Newman take ‘structure’ to be synonymous with ‘relation-number’ it is clear that 
this cannot be taken as wholly satisfactory. For we might wish to define the structure of a set of relations on a 
given domain. To do this, we need to set up the following definitions. We say that a ‘concrete structure’ is 
simply a set of any relations (R1,...,Rn) on a given field. Two concrete structures,  P and  Q,  are said to be 
‘isomorphic’ if and only if there is a relation S establishing a one-one correlation between the field of P and the 
field of Q, and a one-one relation T between the members of P  and the members of Q (these members being 
relations remember) such that, whenever a given relation belonging to P holds between a given set of elements 
6  A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, Volume I, p. 200.
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belonging to the field of P, the correlated elements (by S) in the field of Q are related by the correlated relation 
(by T)  belonging to Q, and vice versa. An ‘abstract structure’, or ‘isomorphism class’, is then defined as the  
class of all concrete structures isomorphic to a given concrete structure.
It is obvious that this more sophisticated definition of structure does not introduce any new difficulties of  
principle into Newman’s central argument. His point remains that, for any aggregate, it is always possible to 
define some set of relations with the aggregate as field belonging to any abstract structure whatever, modulo  
cardinality constraints. Therefore, the only information contained in the assertion that a given aggregate  has 
relations with such-and-such a structure is information about its cardinality.
In his paper, Newman deals with some of the more obvious objections that one might have concerning his 
argument. For example, we might conclude that there is something suspect about the original ‘extensional’ 
definition of relation. Perhaps the structural realist could modify his account in order to distinguish between  
‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ relations. Here a ‘fictitious’ relation is one which is defined extensionally; that is, it is one 
whose sole property is that it holds between the terms between which it holds. A ‘real’ relation is thus one that 
is not fictitious. The structural realist might then assert that we know the abstract structure of a set of  real 
relations characterising the physical world, but that we know nothing concerning the intrinsic character of  
these real relations.
Newman’s response to this is to show, rather ingeniously, that whenever a ‘fictitious’ relation is characterised 
by some abstract structure it is always possible to identify a ‘real’ relation holding between precisely the same 
entities as the fictitious relation, and isomorphic with it. Let us take the above case of four entities a, α, β and γ 
as our example. If these entities are to be distinguishable from each other at all, then they must each have some  
unique property not possessed by any of the others. Newman’s own example is that a has the unique property 
‘denoted by “a”’, α has the unique property ‘denoted by “α”’, and so on. One could, if one wanted, also invoke  
a property ‘is different to α, β and γ’ as uniquely characteristic of  a, ‘is different to  a, β and γ’ as uniquely 
characteristic of α, and so on. Let ‘Ε’ stand for the property uniquely characteristic of  a, ‘A’ stand for the 
property uniquely characteristic of α, ‘Β’ stand for the property uniquely characteristic of β and ‘Γ’ stand for 
the property uniquely characteristic  of  γ.  Then we can now define a  relation  R’,  which is  defined in  the 
following way: two entities, x and y, are related by R’ if and only if
Ex and either Ay or By or Γy.
Clearly the relation this generates has the same structure as our extensional relation, R, above. And clearly also 
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this is a technique that can be applied quite generally.
It follows from this that the attempt to avoid the thrust of Newman’s critique by distinguishing between ‘real’  
and ‘fictitious’ relations fails, for the assertion that a given aggregate has real relations with a certain structure 
follows as a  matter  of  logic  from the  cardinality  of  the  aggregate,  and thus  tells  us nothing beyond this  
cardinality.
Still, it might be thought that there is something suspect about such ‘real’ relations as we constructed above.  
For instance, on Newman’s account, ‘x is red and y is white’ would describe a ‘relation’ holding ‘between’ x 
and y; and we would not normally think of this propositional function as describing a ‘relation’ at all. Newman 
considers  this  objection,  and suggests  that  we might  wish to  make a  distinction between ‘important’ and  
‘trivial’ relations. The criterion for distinguishing an important from a trivial relation is not entirely clear on 
Newman’s account, but is nevertheless not perhaps important. For Newman argues that the structural realist  
can have no ground for believing that the structure-generating relation of the physical world is ‘important’ if  
all he knows about this relation is its structure.
Newman’s point is well taken; although it perhaps requires further explanation. I think the central point is that 
such a conjunction as ‘x is red and y is white’ may have a causal efficacy which neither of the conjuncts has 
alone. Hence, a priori, we cannot rule out that it is this ‘relation’, or perhaps this complex fact, that causally 
underlies the sensible order and whose structure is identified by physics.
Thus it seems that Newman has brought a powerful challenge to bear on the structural realist interpretation of 
science that Russell espoused in 1927. Newman himself certainly thought so, and sent Russell a copy of his  
article.
II. RUSSELL’S ANSWER TO NEWMAN
Russell read Newman’s article and replied to Newman’s critique in a letter dated 24th April 1928, reprinted in 
his Autobiography. Given the importance of this letter, I think it worthwhile to quote in full:
Dear Newman
Many thanks for sending me the off-print of your article about me in Mind. I read it with great 
interest and some dismay. You make it entirely obvious that my statements to the effect that nothing is 
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known about the physical  world except its  structure are  either  false  or  trivial,  and I  am somewhat  
ashamed at not having noticed the point for myself.
It  is  obvious,  as  you  point  out,  that  the  only  effective  assertion  about  the  physical  world 
involved in saying that it is susceptible to such and such a structure is an assertion about its cardinal  
number.  (This  by the way is  not  quite  so trivial  an assertion as it  would seem to be,  if,  as  is  not 
improbable, the cardinal number involved is finite. This, however, is not a point upon which I wish to  
lay stress.) It was quite clear to me, as I read your article, that I had not really intended to say what in  
fact I did say, that nothing is known about the physical world except its structure. I had always assumed 
spacio-temporal continuity with the world of percepts, that is to say, I had assumed that there might be  
co-punctuality between percepts and non-percepts, and even that one could pass by a finite number of 
steps from one event to another compresent with it, from one end of the universe to the other. And co-
punctuality I regarded as a relation which might exist among percepts and is itself perceptible.
I  have not  yet  had the time to think out how far  the admission of  co-punctuality alone in 
addition to  structure would protect  me from your criticisms, nor yet  how far  it  would weaken the  
plausibility of my metaphysic. What I did realise was that spacio-temporal continuity of percepts and 
non-percepts was so axiomatic in my thought that I failed to notice that my statements appeared to deny  
it.
I am at the moment much too busy to give the matter proper thought, but I should be grateful if 
you could find some time to let me know whether you have any ideas on the matter which are not  
merely negative, since it does not appear from your article what your own position is. I gathered in 
talking with you that you favoured phenomenalism, but I do not know how definitely you do so.
Yours sincerely
Bertrand Russell7
Russell’s answer to Newman, then, is as follows: in fact, it is not the case that the only thing we know about 
the physical world is its structure. In addition to structure, we are also directly acquainted with one of the  
relations belonging to the structure physics describes. This relation is ‘co-punctuality’ In his letter, Russell  
tends to  conflate  co-punctuality with ‘compresence’,  sliding  between the two.  Thus  he writes  that  ‘I  had 
assumed that there might be co-punctuality between percepts and non-percepts, and even that one could pass 
by a finite number of steps from one event to another compresent with it, from one end of the universe to the  
other.’
7  Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, pp. 413-4. The eccentric spelling of ‘spacio-temporal’ is in the original.
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‘Compresence’ is the relation that two or more events have to each other when I experience them at the same 
time. This, it should be noted, is an explanation designed to draw attention to the relation being identified. The  
definition of the relation is ostensive.  There is thus no difficulty in extending it  beyond our percepts and 
supposing that it relates percepts with non-percepts. Compresence is in fact the same relation as ‘overlapping 
in space-time’. This is taken for granted throughout Russell’s mature work. Thus, for example, in The Analysis  
of Matter Russell writes:
We  assume  that  two  events  may  have  a  relation  which  I  will  call  ‘compresence’,  which  means,  
practically, that they overlap in space-time. Take, for instance, notes played by different instruments in  
orchestral music: if one is heard beginning before the other has ceased to be heard, the auditory percepts 
of the hearer have ‘compresence’. If a group of events in one biography are all compresent with each  
other, there will be some place in space-time which is occupied by all of them. This place will be a  
‘point’ if there is no event outside the group which is compresent with all of them.8
This identification of compresence with overlapping in space-time is made possible by relativity theory, which 
holds that there is no relation of absolute simultaneity between events in separate regions of space-time, but 
that two events are absolutely simultaneous only when they happen at the same place.
In  the  passage  quoted  above  the  example  Russell  chose  to  illustrate  compresence  was  that  of  one  note  
beginning before another has ceased. In this instance we are dealing with a one-dimensional time sequence. 
However, the space-time of physics has four dimensions, not one. In  The Analysis of Matter, Russell shows 
that  ‘co-punctuality’,  out  of  which  four-dimensional  space-time order  is  constructed,  must  be  taken  as  a  
relation between five events. It will be equivalent to that relation between any five events in virtue of which 
they are said to share some common region (or, if not a finite region, then at least a point – hence the term ‘co-
punctuality’).9
Nevertheless, if two events belong to a copunctual quintet then it follows logically that they overlap in space-
time and thus that they are compresent as well. Co-punctuality, therefore, always implies compresence, and  
compresence is a perceptible relation. Thus Russell is quite right in insisting that he had never meant to say  
that nothing is known about the physical world except structure.
Despite some reservations expressed in the letter above (‘I have not yet had the time to think out how far the  
8  Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter, p. 294.
9  For the reason why co-punctuality is a relation between five events when constructing a four-dimensional 
space, see below, p. 167.
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admission of co-punctuality alone in addition to structure would protect me from your criticisms, nor yet how 
far it would weaken the plausibility of my metaphysic’) Russell  did in the end regard this as constituting an 
adequate rebuttal of Newman’s argument. No further attempt was made by Russell to answer Newman, which 
he surely would have made had he thought that the answer he had originally supplied was not, after  all,  
successful. And the letter was reprinted in his Autobiography. To most readers the content of the letter would 
have been highly esoteric, if not downright unintelligible. I think the reason why it was reprinted is that Russell 
recognised that Newman’s criticism was important, and  prima facie devastating, and so wanted his specific 
answer to it to be put into the public domain. If this is so, then it indicates his confidence in the answer he 
supplied.
It has to be said that some of the commentators who raise the Newman controversy are deeply muddled over 
Russell’s response. Thus Demopoulos and Friedman, after quoting Russell’s letter, write:
To our knowledge, Russell never discusses the puzzle in any of his later work. He seems to give up the  
idea that our knowledge of the physical world is purely structural, but there is no account of how, on his  
theory of knowledge (e.g. the theory developed in  Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits [1948]), 
such non-structural knowledge can arise...in the earlier theory we could not assume acquaintance with 
(what Maxwell used to call) a cross category notion such as spatiotemporal contiguity or causality, but  
in light of the difficulties of that theory we now find that we can assume this. We are not saying that one 
cannot resolve the issue in this way. But it seems quite clear that without a considerable advance in the  
theoretical  articulation  of  this  rather  elusive  Russellian  concept,  no  such  resolution  can  be  very 
compelling.10
There are several observations to be made about the authors’ perplexity here. Firstly, as we have seen, it is not  
as though Russell actually altered his metaphysic. He simply realised that he had always assumed that we had 
some non-structural knowledge, but took this so much for granted that he did not realise that his statements,  
interpreted strictly, were inconsistent with this. I say ‘interpreted strictly’ because Russell would continue to 
insist  that  our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  is  largely structural.  Demopoulos  and  Friedman  express 
puzzlement over how, given Russell’s theory of knowledge, non-structural knowledge can arise. But it seems 
to  me  that  Russell  has  answered  that  point  in  his  letter.  Our  (non-structural)  knowledge  of  the  intrinsic  
character of ‘co-punctuality’ is obtained through direct acquaintance, since, as he puts it, ‘co-punctuality I  
regarded as a relation which might exist among percepts and is itself perceptible’. Perhaps the problem that 
10  William Demopoulos and Michael Friedman, ‘The Concept of Structure in The Analysis of Matter’, 
reprinted in A. D. Irvine (ed), Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments, Volume III: Language, Knowledge  
and the World, p. 287.
68
Demopoulos and Friedman have is that they do not see how, on Russell’s theory, a relation between percepts  
which is itself perceptible can also be supposed to hold between external events. But there certainly seems to  
me to be no logical difficulty here. One must remember that although compresence (with which co-punctuality  
is identified in practice) is a relation with which we are directly acquainted it is not defined as a relation with 
which are directly acquainted. There is nothing intrinsically ‘mental’ about compresence. Thus there is no  
reason why the relation should not be extended into the physical world. Since the relation is one with which we 
are indeed directly acquainted, I cannot see the justification for Demopoulos and Friedman’s assertion that the 
concept Russell  employs is ‘rather elusive’.  On the contrary,  the meaning of ‘compresence’ is transparent  
through attending to the relation as it figures in experience. And I do not see why such a concept cannot also  
apply to non-experienced events, except on the basis of some a priori assumption that all relations that figure 
in our experience are in some way existentially dependent on being experienced.
It does not follow from this that Russell’s answer to Newman is correct; what I am trying to show is that it is  
perfectly  intelligible,  and  that  there  is  no  ground  for  the  sort  of  perplexity  routinely  evinced  by  those  
(admittedly very few) commentators who have discussed this issue. It remains to be seen whether Russell’s  
response to Newman is in fact adequate.
III. CONCERNING RUSSELL’S ANSWER TO NEWMAN
If Russell could show that the relation of co-punctuality – or overlapping in space-time – is one with which we 
are directly acquainted (i.e. is ‘compresence’) I think that his answer to Newman would indeed be successful.  
However,  I  doubt  the  possibility  of  identifying  compresence  with  overlapping.  The  reasons  for  this  are  
somewhat technical, but I shall attempt to explain them here.
Russell  defines  the  class  comprising  all  my  current  percepts  as  what  he  calls  a  ‘complete  complex  of 
compresence’. A ‘complex of compresence’ is a set of events which are all compresent with each other. A  
complex of compresence is ‘complete’ if it is not possible to enlarge the group through the addition of fresh 
events  without  the  group  ceasing  to  be  a  complex  of  compresence;  that  is,  a  ‘complete  complex  of 
compresence’ has the following two properties: (i) every member of the complex is compresent with every 
other member of the complex, (ii) nothing outside the complex is compresent with  every member of it. Of 
course,  something  outside the  complex might  be compresent with  some of  the members of  the complex, 
without the latter ceasing to be ‘complete’, so long as it isn’t compresent with all its members. Two or more 
complete complexes of compresence can ‘intersect’, in the sense of sharing common members.
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If  a  given  complex  of  compresence  lacks  the  second  of  the  above  two  conditions  then  it  is  said  to  be 
‘incomplete’.
These  definitions  are  repeated  in  Human Knowledge:  Its  Scope and Limits,  where  Russell  re-affirms the 
identity of compresence with ‘overlapping in space-time’.11 But then, it would seem that a complete complex 
of compresence would count as a ‘point’ – or at least a spatially indivisible unit – in physical space-time.  
Technically, this might not be necessary, if ‘compresence’ is construed as a dyadic relation. For  A can be 
compresent with B,B can be compresent with C, and C can be compresent with A, without all three sharing a 
common  region.  Nevertheless,  Russell  never  invokes  this  point  to  distinguish  complete  complexes  of 
compresence  from  space-time  point-instants,  and  in  practice  treats  copunctuality  (the  hyphen  in  ‘co-
punctuality’ having been dispensed with in  Human Knowledge)  and compresence as equivalent.  Thus,  for 
example, he writes that ‘A complete complex of compresence counts as a space-time point-instant.’12
At the same time, the sum-total of my percepts at any one moment is held to constitute a complete complex of  
compresence. Once Russell had abandoned the notion of a substantive self, it was necessary to identify the 
relation holding between my momentary experiential contents in virtue of which they all  belonged to  me. 
Russell’s answer to this was simply that all  my experiences at a given moment are  simultaneous with each 
other. Hence, it is possible to define my momentary experience as a class of entities simultaneous with ‘this’ 
where ‘this’ denotes some item in my experience. As a matter of fact, this definition would not secure that my 
total  momentary  experience  constituted  a  complete  complex  of  compresence,  unless  ‘simultaneity’ were 
regarded as a transitive relation. For otherwise a given item in my experience can be simultaneous with A and 
also with B without A and B being simultaneous, and thus without A and B satisfying the first condition for  
membership of the same complete complex of compresence. This may have not been a problem for Russell at  
the time when he wrote  The Analysis of Mind, for he had written that real, as opposed to constructed, time 
relations divide the world into ‘mutually exclusive’ biographies, so in practice the possibility of an item in my 
experience being simultaneous with two items that are not simultaneous with each other would not arise.
However, when he wrote  The Analysis of Matter, it was necessary to construct space out of a manifold of 
overlapping events. If overlapping in space-time was to be identified with some experienced relation then, 
since  overlapping  in  space-time  is  non-transitive,  it  would  be  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  experienced 
relation  was  non-transitive  as  well.  This  is  why  the  replacement  of  ‘simultaneity’ by  ‘compresence’ is 
felicitous, in so far as the former seems to imply transitivity whereas the latter expression, being unfamiliar,  
11  For example, Human Knowledge, pages 314 and 321.
12  Human Knowledge, p. 322.
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does not. My total momentary experience, then, constitutes a ‘complete complex of compresence’.
The  difficulty  with  this  definition  is  that,  on  Russell’s  account  of  the  construction  of  space-time  out  of  
compresence, it would follow that my total momentary experience occupies a literal point in space-time (or, if  
‘points’ are thought to imply a mathematically continuous space for which we have no warrant, then a spatially 
indivisible unit).
Did Russell really think that the complex comprising my momentary mental contents occupied a mere point in  
physical space? I have already quoted Russell saying that a complete complex of compresence counts as a  
space-time point-instant. The astonishing thing about this quote is that, just a few lines before, on the same 
page, Russell asserts that ‘“I-now” denotes the complete complex of compresence which contains the present 
contents of my mind.’ The implication seems clear: the complex ‘I-now’ counts as a point-instant in space-
time. This seems to be confirmed at other points in Russell’s exposition. Thus, Russell writes that ‘It will be  
found that what I call a “total momentary experience” has all the formal properties required of an “instant” in 
my biography. And it will be found that, where there is only matter, the “complete complex of compresence” 
may serve to define an instant of Einsteinian local time, or to define a “point-instant” in cosmic space-time.’ 13 
Once again, the implication seems clear: an ‘instant’ in my biography is equivalent to an instant of Einsteinian 
‘local time’ – presumably the ‘local time’ of my brain – which is in turn equivalent to a ‘point-instant’ in space-
time. Again, this notion surfaces in  My Philosophical Development. In the chapter on ‘The External World’ 
Russell writes that he came to the conclusion that ‘what, in the space of physics, counts as a point, or, more  
exactly, a ‘minimal region’, is really a three-dimensional complex of which the total of one man’s percepts is  
an instance.’14 There is no suggestion that this is a view he subsequently found unsatisfactory.
The reference to ‘minimal regions’ in the above quote does nothing to modify this aspect of his metaphysic.  
Russell  takes  reference  to  ‘points’ as  implying  a  mathematically  continuous  space.  Rightly regarding  the  
existence of continuity in physical space as a doubtful empirical matter, he seeks to avoid committing himself  
by instead referring to spatially indivisible units, or ‘minimal regions’. Thus a minimal region is not a finite 
extended region of space. This is confirmed at the end of Russell’s chapter on ‘The External World’ when he 
explains that, although both he and Whitehead found ways of constructing ‘points’ out of finitely extended 
events, ‘both his method and mine will only work on certain assumptions. Without these assumptions, although 
one can arrive at very small regions, one may be unable to arrive at points. It is for this reason that in the above 
account I have spoken of “minimal regions” rather than points.’15 Obviously a ‘minimal region’ could not have 
13  Ibid, p. 317.
14  My Philosophical Development, p. 79.
15  Ibid, p. 81.
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spatial parts. If it did, then it would no longer be minimal, and it would be possible to define smaller spatial 
units after all.
So what is my difficulty with the notion that my total momentary experience occupies a minimal spatial unit in  
cosmic space-time? My chief problem is that it is inconsistent with Russell’s locating percepts at regions of the 
brain on the basis of causal considerations. For these considerations will lead us to locate percepts at diverse  
and non-overlapping regions of the brain. Visual percepts will be located in the visual cortex – the site of their 
causal provenance; auditory percepts will be located at the auditory cortex, and so on. The brain is an extended 
object, not a point,  and its route through space-time is more accurately regarded as a ‘world-tube’ than a  
‘world-line’. For this reason, I do not believe that any theory which implies that percepts all occupy a point can 
be considered sound.
It seems to me that there is a consistent Russellian metaphysic – the one outlined in the first chapter of this  
thesis – in which the cosmos comprises a vast number of overlapping events and in which the space that these  
events ‘occupy’ is itself constructed out of their relations of overlapping. There is also the characterisation of  
my total momentary experience as a ‘complete complex of compresence’, and this also seems to me to be 
sound. So far,  everything about Russell’s  metaphysic is coherent,  intelligible, even elegant.  The difficulty 
arises when one identifies overlapping in space-time with the relation of compresence.
This identity may have been suggested by relativity, where ‘absolute simultaneity’ implies spatial overlap, and  
vice versa. But then, it is not clear that ‘absolute simultaneity’ as a physical relation should be identified with 
perceived compresence – this is exactly the question at issue. Again, my brain has its own ‘local time’. But it  
does not follow that this ‘biography’ is to be identified with my ‘biography’ which comprises only my percepts, 
past, present and future. There is much more happening in the brain, on a microphysical level, than is ever  
represented in my consciousness. Therefore, the brain must comprise events that do not belong to the history of 
my consciousness but which will belong to the ‘biography’ of the piece of matter called the brain.
Incidentally, there is a passage in The Analysis of Matter, in Chapter XXXII, which seems to address the point I 
am making but, if I am not mistaken, does not quite succeed in defusing it. Earlier in the work, Russell had 
defined a ‘causal unit’ in the following manner. A group of events form a ‘causal unit’ if their joint effect is  
different to what each event would cause separately. One example of a causal unit is the totality of my percepts 
– or at least those of which I am conscious – at any one moment. Thus, I could be instructed by a psychologist  
to raise my arm if I hear both a given sound and a given visual signal, or if I perceive neither of these things, 
but not if I perceive either one or the other. The overall effect, then, of my experience, can only be calculated  
72
from considering my experience as a whole, and not by considering each part of my experience separately.  
This shows that my conscious experience forms a ‘causal unit’, in Russell’s sense. Now, in Chapter XXXII,  
explaining why all my percepts must in some sense be ‘in the same place’, Russell writes:
The whole of our perceptual world is, for physics, in our heads, since otherwise there would be a spatio-
temporal jump between stimulus and percept which would be quite unintelligible. Any two events which 
we  experience  together  –  e.g.  a  noise  and  a  colour  which  we  perceive  to  be  simultaneous  –  are  
‘compresent’.  I  should not  say,  however, that  two percepts  which are  not both ‘conscious’  must be 
compresent. Two events are compresent when they form together one causal unit or part of one – this is  
a sufficient, but perhaps not a necessary, condition. When two percepts are experienced together, they 
are thus causally conjoined; but when either is ‘unconscious’ they may not be, and therefore we cannot 
be sure that they are compresent. It is not necessary, consequently, to suppose that the mind occupies a 
mere point in physical space.16
This is a very densely written passage. Reading through it carefully, it seems to me that Russell is saying that it  
is a sufficient condition for two percepts to be compresent that they form a causal unity. That is, that whenever 
two percepts form a ‘causal unity’ they are compresent, but not necessarily vice versa. Whenever two percepts 
are  ‘experienced  together’,  i.e.  are  compresent,  they  form  a  causal  unity.  However,  if  one  percept  is 
‘unconscious’ then it need not form a causal unit with a percept of which we are conscious, and thus need not 
be compresent with it. Since Russell takes compresence and overlapping in space-time to be equivalent terms,  
this means that it is not necessary for all my percepts to overlap.
However, what Russell does not address in this passage is that it would still be necessary for all the percepts of  
which  I  was  conscious to  overlap.  Furthermore,  if  the  complex  ‘I-now’ were  a  complete  complex  of 
compresence, then it would seem that my conscious mind  would have to occupy a ‘mere point’ in physical 
space. Thus, I do not think that Russell avoids the difficulty I have indicated through this argument about  
‘unconscious’ percepts.
In any case, Russell’s argument implies that all my ‘conscious’ percepts overlap in physical space. This, on the  
face of it, does not seem compatible with the localisation of percepts to the diverse regions of the cerebral  
cortex with which they are causally associated. (And Russell is insistent that events are located in space-time 
through causal considerations.) Perhaps this conclusion could be avoided by sufficient theoretical adroitness.  
Thus, in the thought-experiment I outlined above, a subject is made to respond in a certain way if he receives  
16  The Analysis of Matter, p. 336.
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certain visual and auditory stimuli jointly, but not if he receives either stimulus without the other. This implies 
that there  is  some faculty which compares the stimuli  from different  senses, and this will  presumably be  
located at some region of the brain. Perhaps, we might allow some latitude concerning the location of percepts  
so that they extend over this region. In this case, we might be able to conclude that all our percepts did overlap  
after all. But this still would not be enough to salvage Russell’s position. For whatever region is responsible for 
collating, as it were, the inputs from the various sensory cortices, this will constitute a region and not a point.  
Consequently, on Russell’s account, there will be events of which I am not conscious that are compresent with  
all my  conscious  percepts.  But  then  this  should  be  impossible  on  Russell’s  account,  insofar  as  being  
simultaneously conscious of two events  is  equated with compresence,  and the complex ‘I-now’ denotes a  
complete complex of compresence.
The only way of avoiding this impasse is to say that being simultaneously conscious of two events (what we  
might call ‘co-consciousness’) is not the same as compresence. This, however, would involve grave difficulties 
for Russell’s neutral monism. Russell could not allow a simple relation of ‘co-consciousness’, since this is a  
‘mental’ relation, and it is essential to Russell’s position that there are no simple relations that are intrinsically 
mental. This is why it was so convenient to substitute ‘compresence’ for co-consciousness, since compresence, 
unlike co-consciousness, is not intrinsically mentalistic.
My conclusion, therefore, is that there is no ground for identifying overlapping in physical space with the  
perceptible relation of compresence, and that furthermore such an identification creates insuperable difficulties 
for a neutral monist metaphysic such as Russell’s.
IV. AN ANSWER TO NEWMAN?
If Russell’s answer to Newman fails, then does it follow that Russell’s metaphysic stands refuted? I believe  
not, for two reasons. Firstly, it might still be possible to identify time relations within our experience with some 
physical relation.17 But secondly, putting aside considerations of this kind, it is possible, I think, to defend a 
pure  structural  realism from Newman’s  challenge,  though the  defence  that  I  shall  mount  will  result  in  a  
metaphysic that has a somewhat Kantian flavour in certain respects.
My defence  runs  as  follows.  It  is  indeed  the  case  that  if  I  know  nothing about  the  relations  comprising 
‘physical reality’ then the assertion that these relations have a certain structure tells us nothing about the world 
17  See below, pp. 91-93.
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beyond  its  cardinality.  However,  what  Newman  forgets  is  that  I  do know something  about  the  concrete 
structure that is the physical world even if I don’t know its intrinsic nature: I know that it, and not some other  
concrete structure, is  causally responsible for percepts. It is the connection with percepts that Newman has 
omitted from his account – or at least so it seems to me. The point is that I can uniquely identify the concrete  
structure that is the physical world without being directly acquainted with its constituents – essentially, via a 
definite description. The concrete structure whose abstract structure is identified by physics is  that concrete  
structure (whatever the nature of its constituent relations) whose abstract structure is ‘mirrored’ by percepts. 
And  this  is  certainly sufficient  to  rescue  physics  from ‘triviality’.  For  the  fact  that  our  sense-experience  
mirrors, or supervenes on, a reality ordered in a certain way – rather than in some other way – is scarcely 
‘trivial’ knowledge. On the contrary, it is the basis for all our predictions concerning the future course of our 
sense-experience.  It  is  indeed  true  that  the  domain  of  physical  objects  will  also  comprise  the  domain  of  
concrete structures with  every abstract structure compatible with the cardinality of the domain. But this is 
irrelevant. These other concrete structures do not causally ground our sense perceptions. They have no bearing 
on our sense-experience and can be of no interest to us. Only one of these structures is of interest to us – the 
one on which percepts supervene – and this is the structure whose formal properties are described by science. 
For this reason I do not think that Newman’s objection to structural realism is decisive.
In the above argument I have referred, somewhat vaguely, to percepts ‘mirroring’ physical reality. Clearly this 
requires further explanation, although it is clear that there is some lawlike relation between the qualities and 
relations that are given to us in our percepts and the formal properties of the physical world as described by  
science. This relation might be described as an approximate isomorphism between the relations amongst our  
sense-perceptions on the one hand and the relations comprising the physical world on the other. However, I 
think that a better characterisation of this relation is that percepts mirror the physical world in the sense that  
they (causally) supervene on it, or rather on some portion of it, namely the brain. In any case, I think that my 
argument above disposes of Newman’s objection.
But now perhaps we have dismissed Newman too lightly. It might be argued that our account does indeed  
dispose of Newman, but only at a very high cost. For the fact that our percepts mirror external reality organised 
in  a  certain manner is  more a  statement  about our  percepts  than  about the  external  reality.  In  fact,  what 
substantive information concerning external  reality can we indeed deduce from the fact  that  our percepts 
supervene on a structure belonging to a certain isomorphism class? Surely the only information is information  
about the cardinality of external reality. This does not, by the way, land us where we were before. Physics still  
does not  amount  to  a  trivial  cardinality  claim,  for  it  also identifies  the formal  properties  of  the  concrete 
structure  on  which  percepts  supervene,  and  this  is  not  at  all  trivial.  However,  this,  it  might  be  said,  is 
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knowledge concerning the behaviour of percepts. It tells us nothing about the noumenal or metaphysical reality 
underlying Nature.
This is a price which, however, I am willing to pay if necessary. Physics tells us nothing about the physical  
world except for its abstract structure with respect to the causation of percepts, what we might, following 
Russell, call the ‘causal skeleton of reality’.18 The onus is on anyone who thinks that physics grants us non-
structural knowledge to explain how this can be the case. Certainly, on the Russellian view of perception, all 
we are  immediately acquainted  with  are  the  contents  of  our  own sense-experience.  Unless  some relation 
figures in this experience that we can project beyond our experience, there seems no prospect of discovering 
more about the world besides its abstract structure. Russell himself, as we have seen, picked out copunctuality  
(which is the same as compresence for Russell) to fulfil exactly this role, and we have criticised this view as  
untenable. If the ‘structuralist’ account of science leads to the view that we can know nothing about external  
reality beyond its cardinality (without reducing physics itself to triviality) then this is a conclusion we ought to 
accept. It may seem painfully sceptical, but as philosophers we ought to be prepared to embrace painfully 
sceptical conclusions, and in any case I do not personally find it so irksome.
For a start, the view that I am proposing is certainly not the same as phenomenalism. For the physical-object 
language cannot be reduced to the phenomenological language. Hence, to describe the content of experience in  
physical-object terms presupposes the existence of genuinely external entities, entities other than percepts. It 
might be supposed that if, as we have argued, we know nothing about the intrinsic nature of these entities then 
we have no reason to suppose that they are not themselves percepts, so that the ‘objects’ of our perception 
would, curiously, be our own percepts. This,  however, can quite definitely be ruled out. We have already  
remarked that there is more going on, at the microphysical level, in any region of our brains than is ever 
reflected in phenomenology. Furthermore, our brains are only a tiny corner of the physical universe. Thus the 
physical universe is immensely more complex than our percepts and thus has a much greater cardinality. The 
cardinality  of  the  universe  is  vast,  and  indeed  quite  possibly transfinite.  There  is  thus  no  doubt  that  the  
applicability  of  physical-object  terms  to  our  sense-experience  carries  the  implication  that  there  exists  a  
genuinely external reality.
But the outcome of our enquiry is perhaps somewhat Kantian. If my defence of structural realism is sound,  
then the entities that figure in the physical universe as ‘events’ are, in themselves, ‘noumenal’ entities, in the 
Kantian sense. Physics describes this noumenal reality  as it affects our experience, rather than how it is ‘in 
itself’. What remains of the Russellian thesis is the identity of percepts with certain events occurring in the 
18  The Analysis of Matter, p. 391.
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brain. Interestingly, even this identity theory was prefigured in Kant. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure  
Reason,  in the second paralogism, Kant considers the idea that the noumenal reality corresponding to our 
phenomenal bodies could be identified with a self – which for Kant is a ‘simple’, non-composite, entity. The 
passage is sufficiently interesting to be worth quoting in full:
If matter were a thing in itself, it would, as a composite being, be entirely different from the soul, as a 
simple  being.  But  matter  is  mere  outward  appearance,  the  substratum of  which  cannot  be  known 
through any predicate that we can assign to it. I can therefore very well admit the possibility that it is in  
itself simple, although owing to the manner in which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition 
of the extended and so of the composite. I may further assume that the substance which in relation to our 
outer sense possesses extension is in itself the possessor of thoughts, and that these thoughts can by 
means of its own inner sense be consciously represented. In this way, what in one relation is entitled  
corporeal would in another relation be at the same time a thinking being, whose thoughts we cannot 
intuit, although we can indeed intuit their signs in the [field of] appearance. Accordingly, the thesis that  
only souls (as particular kinds of substances) think, would have to be given up; and we should have to  
fall back on the common expression that men think, that is, that the very same being which, as outer  
appearance,  is  extended,  is  (in  itself)  internally a  subject,  and is  not  composite,  but  is  simple  and  
thinks.19
Of course, there is a crucial distinction between this Kantian speculation and the idea that I am suggesting 
above, a distinction which makes the idea I am proposing much more ‘Russellian’; namely, that Kant thinks  
the  noumenon might  be a  ‘soul’,  whereas  I  am suggesting  that  the  ‘matter’ or  ‘substratum’ of  the  brain 
comprises entities that include sensations or percepts (rather than a soul or souls) as a proper subset. In fact, if  
sensations are amongst the things in themselves that constitute the matter or substratum of the brain then, more  
generally, things in themselves will manifest themselves in the physical world as physical states (or processes) 
occupying small finite regions of space-time, that is, as ‘events’, in the Russellian sense.
I hinted at the start of this section that perhaps subjective time could be given a physical interpretation. To the 
extent that such an interpretation is possible, to that extent we would be able to claim knowledge not only of  
the abstract structure of the physical world but also of its character, at least in part. But first it is necessary for  
us to determine what are the fundamental relations that characterise the physical world according to physics. 
We must therefore investigate the nature of space and time as it figures in modern physical theory. Here, the 
most important physical theory is that of relativity. In addition, it would, I think, be useful to investigate the 
19  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 339-40.
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claims that are sometimes made with respect to the implications of quantum physics for our conception of  
physical reality. If, for example, quantum mechanics presupposes a fundamental physical distinction between  
the macroscopic and the microscopic, or if it implies that physical particles have no reality at all until they are 
observed, then this would have fundamental implications for our conception of reality and for the place of  
mind within this reality. It is to these matters, therefore, that we shall now turn.
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Chapter 6
Philosophy and the Development of Twentieth 
Century Physics
I. INTRODUCTION
One of  the  things  Russell  insisted  on  was  that  philosophy was  not  a  discipline  distinct  from science.  In 
particular,  he  believed  that  philosophers  need  to  be  acquainted  with  science  in  order  to  make  useful  
contributions  to  human  knowledge.  At  the  end  of  Russell’s  intellectual  autobiography,  My Philosophical  
Development, having reviewed Ryle’s The Concept of Mind somewhat critically, Russell was to conclude by 
saying:
One  very general  conclusion  to  which  I  have  been  led  by reading  Professor  Ryle’s  book is  that 
philosophy cannot be fruitful if divorced from empirical science. And by this I do not mean only that  
the philosopher should ‘get up’ some science as a holiday task. I mean something much more intimate: 
that his imagination should be impregnated with the scientific outlook and that he should feel that  
science has presented us with a new world, new concepts and new methods, not known in earlier  
times…1
This attitude is one that I would heartily endorse. The physics of the twentieth century is wholly incompatible  
with the common sense view of the world, as I hope to show in the following pages. Russell’s outlook here  
stands  in  stark  contrast,  not  only  to  the  Oxford  ‘ordinary  language’ philosophers  who  were  Russell’s  
contemporaries, but also to some present-day philosophers who underestimate the effect that the scientific 
revolutions of the twentieth century have had on our view of the physical world.
In this chapter I want to explore the  philosophical implications of twentieth century physics. What changes 
does  modern  physics  imply  concerning  the  nature  of  reality?  Russell  was  particularly  interested  in  this  
question, and I have found his discussion of these matters in The Analysis of Matter to be most illuminating. It 
1  Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 187.
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is a pity that The Analysis of Matter has not been the object of closer study by philosophers. No doubt this is  
because it presupposes a certain degree of scientific knowledge which all too often philosophers have not felt it  
worth their while to acquire.
I shall begin with the implications of relativity to our world-view before discussing quantum physics.
 
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF RELATIVITY
In pre-relativity physics, space and time were assumed to be absolute in the sense that between any two events  
there was an objective interval of space, r (where, for any suitable coordinate system, r = √(x 2+y2+z2)) and an 
objective interval of time, t. The first thing that relativity did was to abolish this assumption. Instead of a single 
cosmic time, there is now a plurality of ‘local times’. The derivation of this from the invariance of the speed of  
light between different frames of reference is not difficult. Imagine a single pulse of light in a given inertial  
reference frame that begins at point P and ends at P'. This takes a certain time t. But now, let us suppose that  
this reference frame is moving relative to another reference frame in a direction perpendicular to the direction 
of the light-pulse. In  this instance,  the light begins at  P and ends at  P',  as in  our initial  reference frame. 
However, since this takes some time, and since in this reference frame out initial reference frame is in relative 
motion, when the light arrives at P'  it  has traced a diagonal path. Hence, it has traversed a longer spatial  
distance. However, its speed in this reference frame remains the same at c. Therefore, it has taken a greater  
interval of time. What takes place in a given interval of time in our first reference frame takes a slightly longer  
interval for our external observer. The time intervals between events (in this case, the pulse leaving P and the 
pulse arriving at P') is measured differently by different observers. Time, therefore, is broken up into the times 
of diverse observers, and there is no longer any one single all-encompassing time. The time interval that is 
observed between two events, therefore, does not represent anything objective. (There is an exception to this 
rule, namely with respect to a body’s ‘proper time’, which I shall come to below.) However, the time order can 
represent something objective – though only if the spatial distance between the two events is not objective. 
Consider two events which happen to one object at two different times. Suppose, for example, that a lightning  
bolt strikes the top of a granite monument, and then, six months later, a lightning-bolt strikes the monument  
again. Do these two events happen ‘at the same place’? Initially, one might be inclined to say that they do on  
the  ground  that  they  both  happen  to  the  monument  and  the  monument  hasn’t  moved  relative  to  its  
environment. However, the Earth is orbiting around the sun, the whole solar system is moving within the  
Milky Way, and the Milky Way is moving towards some galaxies and away from others. Hence, from other  
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points of view the lightning-bolt did not strike in the ‘same’ place at all. If I ask, ‘yes, but who is really correct 
here?’ one can see, I hope, that this question is meaningless. Until a frame of reference is specified, it makes no 
sense to say that the two events happen in either the same place or a different place. Some observers will 
observe the two events happening at the same place; others at different places. Similarly the time interval 
between the two events will be measured differently by diverse observers. However, their time order will be 
the same for all possible observers. Each will see event A preceding event B, and no observer can perceive 
event B as occurring before event A. The time-order between the two events is therefore an objective property  
of physical reality. In cases such as these it is possible for an observer to be at both events.
If we disregard one of the dimensions of space (i.e. take space to be two-dimensional) and take the third  
dimension to be that of time, then a pulse of light emitted from a given event in every spatial direction will  
describe a cone in space-time with its apex at the given event. Whatever event lies within this cone might be 
reached by an observer at the apex, or origin, and all such events have a definite time order with the original  
event; they are all after it. We can imagine a circle of light converging on to the event at the origin, and every 
event within this past light-cone is definitely before the origin event. Thus events within the ‘light-cone’ of a 
given event have a definite time-order with respect to this event. They are either in its ‘absolute past’ or its  
‘absolute future’. Of such events it makes no sense, however, to say that they happen at either a different place 
or at the same place in space.
Events outside the light cone are different. Given the invariance of the speed of light, it is impossible for an 
observer to be at both the original event and at an event outside the original event’s light-cone. In this sense,  
the event outside the light-cone can be regarded as definitely and objectively ‘elsewhere’ in space – though this 
really amounts to no more than that no body can be at both events and thus no transference of energy can  
proceed  between  them.  If  an  event  is  outside  a  given  event’s  light-cone  then,  although  is  it  absolutely 
elsewhere, it makes no sense to say that (objectively speaking) one event precedes the other in time, nor that  
the two events are simultaneous. It is not so easy to see this as to see the fact that two events between which  
there is a definite time order have no absolute spatial interval, because we are inclined to think of events  
belonging to continuous objects that do not move about. So instead imagine that two pulses of radiation are 
spontaneously  emitted  from two  points  of  empty  space,  where  these  two  points  are  in  distant  galaxies. 
Furthermore, suppose that an observer cannot move so as to be at both events. Then for some observers, event 
A will precede B, for others B will precede A, and for yet others the two will be simultaneous. It might be 
thought that we could privilege the point of view of an observer who is spatially exactly between the two 
events. But how do we determine where this point is? Ordinarily, if I lay a ruler between two objects, I can find 
their mid-point, but only because the two objects exist simultaneously. If, however, the two events are not 
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‘simultaneous’, then there is no objective ‘mid-point’, and thus no way of using this as a means of privileging 
any observer over any other.  Thus between two events  that  are  spatially separate,  as  it  were,  there  is  no  
objective time-order.
Two events can be objectively at the same place and at the same time if and only if they overlap in space-time. 
Thus, overlapping in space-time must also be an ‘objective’ relation of physical reality. Overlapping in space-
time  is  the  same  as  absolute  simultaneity.  Two  events  can  be  absolutely  simultaneous  (as  opposed  to 
simultaneous from someone’s point of view) if, and only if, they happen ‘at the same place’. Thus ‘here’ and 
‘now’ denote the same thing in relativity theory.
In relativity, there is a certain measure of time which, in a manner of speaking, is privileged, and this is the  
time along a given space-time route as measured by an object describing that route. This time – the time of a  
given object – is referred to as the object’s ‘proper time’. Thus intervals of time have an objective magnitude  
when we are dealing with the time along a given space-time route.
We have said that the spatial and temporal intervals between any two events will be measured differently by 
different  observers,  and  that  although the  ordinal  properties  of  events  (i.e.  their  order in  space-time)  are 
objective, the spatial and temporal  distances that are observed from outside do not correspond to anything 
objective. Is there then a metrical relation between events which is objective? (A ‘metrical’ relation is one that 
not only establishes an order amongst its terms but also has a certain numerical magnitude – i.e. can be greater  
or less.) According to relativity, the answer to this question is ‘yes’. There is a certain proportion between the 
spatial and temporal distance between two events which is the same for all observers no matter what precise  
spatial and temporal distances they measure. This is the space-time ‘interval’ between the two events. In the 
Special Theory of Relativity, which only deals with Euclidean space, the interval, s, is related to the observed  
spatial distances, x, y and z and time interval, t, such that:
s2 = c2 t2 – x2 – y2 – z2
This, at least, is the interval between an event and another within its light-cone. The c2 t2 is a way of converting 
time into a measure of space utilising the invariance of the speed of light. Where the one event lies within the 
light-cone of the other, c2 t2 > x2 + y2 + z2. In this case, the interval is called ‘time-like’ (because there is a 
definite time-order between the two events). Where one event lies outside the light-cone of the other c 2 t2 < x2 
+ y2 + z2 and the interval, s, is such that:
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s2 = x2 + y2 + z2 – c2t2
In this instance the interval, s, is said to be ‘space-like’. We can simplify this equation, by putting:
x1 = x
x2 = y
x3 = z
x4 = ict
where i2 = –1 (i.e. i = √–1). Then,
s2 = Σ xi2   (i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
            i
More generally, any interval s, whether space-like or time-like, satisfies the equation,
 s2 = ׀ Σ xi2 ׀  (i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
                 i
where, for any x, ׀x׀ is the modulus of x, i.e. ׀x׀ = +√(x2) (the positive root of the square of x. This means that 
the modulus of a is itself, whereas the modulus of –a is a).
There is a limiting case when one event lies along the surface of the light-cone of the other. This happens, for  
example, when we are considering two parts of a light-pulse. In this case, c2 t2 = x2 + y2 + z2, and s2 = s = 0 (i.e. 
the interval is zero). This kind of interval is, for obvious reasons, called a ‘null interval’. Where one event is 
the seeing of the other then the interval between them is null. 
The equations above are only for a Euclidean space and are a good approximation where the effects of gravity 
can be neglected. However, the presence of mass distorts the geometry of space, so that the above equations 
are not quite correct. The equations which are then required, which are specified in the General Theory of  
Relativity,  involve rather  more mathematics than is  appropriate  for  this  exposition,  but  introduce  no new 
difficulties of principle. What we are interested in here is what relativity says concerning our conception of 
external reality. What sorts of relations are presupposed by relativity as actually characterising physical space-
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time?
Relations of ‘interval’, of course, are what are real, but these coincide with relations that are known in our 
experience only in certain limiting cases. Thus, where the interval between two events is time-like there will be 
many space-time routes connecting the two. However, in one of these routes the measured time will be a 
maximum. This will be the time measured by an observer who is ‘at’ both events and whose path between the 
two events describes a ‘geodesic’ A geodesic is the path described by a body in ‘freefall’, where it is subject to  
no forces (such as electromagnetic forces) other than gravitation. In this case (i.e. along a geodesic), the spatial  
distance, i.e. √(x2 + y2 + z2), is zero, and thus the interval can be taken as the measured time between the two 
events. Likewise, whenever the interval between two events is ‘space-like’, there will be some perspective 
within which they will be observed to happen simultaneously. In this case, the time measurement, c2t2, is zero, 
and the ‘interval’ will be measured by the spatial distance observed between the two events in this perspective.
It  would  be a  mistake,  however,  to  regard ‘interval’ as  either  a  spatial  or  a  temporal  relation,  as  we are 
acquainted with these in our experience. The two above cases are limiting cases. In most cases, the interval 
will not be measured by either a spatial or a temporal distance and will be calculated as a function of observed 
space and time. 
As it so happens, a light ray follows a geodesic in space-time. Of course, here the interval between the two 
events is null, and so is the measured time along the light-ray’s path (i.e. its ‘proper time’). But there is no way  
of proceeding from one part of the light-ray to the other which would describe a path involving a non-zero time 
interval. 
So, given relativity, which relations in fact characterise physical reality? Firstly, when two events are separated 
by a time-like interval, the time-order of the two events is objective. So ‘before-and-after’ is a real physical 
relation. It is, incidentally, a quite separate question whether the physical ‘before-and-after’ is the same relation 
as the before-and-after that figures within our experience. Russell indeed tacitly identifies the two, but this is 
not implied by anything in physics itself. Now, whenever A is absolutely before B, there will be several space-
time routes connecting A and B, in all of whose proper time A precedes B. Thus ‘before-and-after’ can be  
reduced to proper time. It seems also to follow from this that all space-time routes comprise events (otherwise 
there would be nothing for the proper time to measure), and hence that space-time is a plenum. 
When the interval is space-like, there can be no transference of energy between them. It is usually assumed that 
this means that the two events are causally isolated from each other, but this does not necessarily follow from 
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relativity by itself, and in any case seems inconsistent with quantum entanglement.2 But it is a definite mistake 
to think of space-like separation as at all analogous to spatial separation as it figures in our experience. A 
spatial interval is only perceived between two percepts that are simultaneous. However, events that are related 
by a space-like interval are not simultaneous, and it is scarcely intelligible that they should be related by the 
sort of spatial relation exemplified in our visual or tactual experiences. For this reason, I should be inclined to 
say that all that is meant by saying that one event has a space-like separation to the other is that there can be no 
transference of energy between the two regions they are at. It follows from this that – other than the effects of 
quantum entanglement – there can be no causal interaction between them. In this sense, then, a space-like  
separation between two events is not a primitive relation in relativity theory. It is reducible to something else,  
namely, to the fact that the two events concerned do  not have a physical time-order and that therefore it is 
impossible for them to interact (except insofar as the effects of quantum entanglement can be thought of as 
‘interaction’).
In addition to before-and-after, there is an objective relation which characterises two events that occur at the  
same  place  in  space-time  –  the  absolute  ‘here-and-now’ as  it  were.  This  relation  can  be  referred  to  as  
‘copunctuality’. In fact, Russell takes copunctuality as a five-termed (quintadic) relation, for reasons connected 
with the dimensionality of space. In a one-dimensional space, a point can be defined as a set of events that are  
such that any pair chosen from the set overlap. However, this is not adequate for defining a point in a two-
dimensional space. For with two-dimensional figures it is possible that A can overlap with B, B with C, and A 
with C, without there being a region (or point) common to all three. If we wish to define points in a two-
dimensional space we need a triadic relation of copunctuality, i.e. a relation which belongs to triads. Generally, 
in order to construct an adequate geometry for a space of N dimensions, we require a relation of copunctuality  
between  N+1  terms.  For  four-dimensional  space-time,  therefore,  point-instants  are  constructed  out  of 
copunctual quintets, and copunctuality is a quintadic relation. A ‘point-instant’ in space-time will be a set of  
events such that any quintet of events belonging to the set are copunctual and no four events within the set  
form a copunctual quintet with any event outside the set. Thus, relativity requires a five-termed relation of  
copunctuality.
Copunctuality and temporal succession can be used to define the ‘ordinal’ properties of events and point-
instants, i.e. their space-time order. Obviously, time-order is an ordinal property. But even when events are  
separated by space-like intervals their ordinal properties can be defined by copunctuality. It is a necessary  
condition of two events belonging to a given copunctual quintet that they overlap in space-time. Now, if A 
overlaps with B and B with C, but A and C do not overlap, then we can say that B is ‘between’ A and C.  
2  See Appendix.
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Overlapping  in  space-time  can  thus  be  used  to  define  an  order  amongst  events  quite  independently  of  
considerations  of  time.  It  is  also  possible  to  define  similar  relations  amongst  points in  space  using  such 
techniques.3
 
The above assumes that the fundamental ‘stuff’ of the world consists of a manifold of ‘events’, each of which  
occupies some finite continuous region of space, but none of which occupy a mere point. It is not clear from 
relativity itself what constitutes an ‘event’. Sometimes, events are taken as extensionless ‘point-events’, but  
these can be regarded as an idealisation, so that they can be identified with certain groups or series of events. If  
point-instants (or point-events) are treated as fundamental, then it will still be necessary to define topologically  
continuous  regions,  and  then  these  will  have  the  properties  of  copunctual  events;  and  some  relation  of 
‘neighbourhood’ between point-instants  will  have to  be posited which would allow for this. Thus even if  
copunctuality is  not  fundamental,  some more or  less  equivalent  relation is,  and furthermore  from such a  
relation the relation of copunctuality must be capable of being constructed. It  is therefore convenient  and 
philosophically legitimate to take copunctuality itself as fundamental. 
Time-order (between events separated by a time-like interval) and copunctuality are thus the physical relations 
that are presupposed by relativity. These, as we noted above, are sufficient to define the ordinal properties of  
events. Relativity also allows the existence of a relation which defines the metrical properties of the manifold 
of events, namely ‘interval’. This is an objective relation which is inferred  from  the fact  that ׀ Σ xi2 ׀ is
                                                     i
invariant   between   diverse  observers.  The  quantity  ׀ Σ xi2 ׀ is  itself  a measure of space; however interval 
            i                               
itself is not a spatial relation, but a relation which is inferred from the invariance of this quantity.
So, according to relativity, the relations which are objective properties of the physical world are:
proper time (before-and-after)
overlapping in space-time (absolute simultaneity)
copunctuality
interval
Copunctuality, incidentally, always formally implies overlapping in space-time. That is, if two events belong to  
a copunctual group then they also overlap. The converse, however, need not hold. Overlapping in space-time is 
3  See Russell, The Analysis of Matter, p. 305.
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also the same relation as absolute simultaneity. Thus the first two entries in the above list are relations of time. 
Copunctuality – insofar as it implies overlapping in space-time and thus absolute simultaneity – can hardly be  
thought of as a spatial relation at all analogous to the spatial relations that figure within our visual or tactual  
data. Of the above relations all four supply ordinal properties of the manifold of events. Only the first and the 
fourth entries are metrical relations. Proper time is a real metrical relation for the following reason: although 
between  two  events  separated  by a  time-like  interval  the  measure of  time  will  be  different  for  different 
observers, the measure of time along a given space-time route connecting the two events is perfectly objective.  
Indeed, if it were not, no measurement of time would be possible at all.
The above is relatively uncontroversial. Few would deny that these relations do exist. A question, however,  
arises as to whether all the entries on this list are necessary. What do we really know about the character of  
these relations (if anything), and are any of them reducible to the others?
Now, it seems to me that copunctuality is simply an ordering of events into groups such that the resulting 
space-time structure is mirrored by percepts – subject to the constraint that whenever two events belong to a  
given copunctual group, they also overlap (are simultaneous). At least, I cannot see what else copunctuality can 
be. Copunctuality does not seem to be a relation with which we are directly acquainted. It is true that it always  
implies absolute simultaneity, and it may be argued that we are directly acquainted with this latter relation, but 
copunctuality itself is not identical with it; and so absolute simultaneity seems simply to be a constraint on the 
groups that can be regarded as copunctual. In the previous chapter we saw that an aggregate is the bearer of  
relations with every abstract structure compatible with its cardinality.  Thus there will  be some relation of 
‘copunctuality’ which orders events in the necessary manner. Since,  however,  we know nothing about the  
intrinsic character of this relation, we fail to make a substantial assertion about the world when we assert the  
existence of this relation amongst events. In this sense, it  is not a ‘real’ relation but a convenient way of 
collecting events into groups. Since it supplies no substantive information concerning external reality, we can, 
I think, remove it from our list of relations whose existence is presupposed by relativity. Its inclusion is otiose,  
for it is bound to exist so long as the manifold of events has a certain cardinality. Indeed, on this basis the only 
entries that we should keep on the list are those relations with which we are acquainted in experience. It  
remains to be seen whether any of the relations satisfy this criterion.
‘Interval’, too,  is a relation with which we are not directly acquainted. In this case, however,  it  might be 
possible to reduce it to something else. In the case of time-like intervals, the interval can be identified with the 
proper time along a geodesic connecting the two events. This, however, cannot be applied to the case of space-
like intervals. It might prove possible to construct these out of time-like intervals. Russell attempted such a  
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construction in The Analysis of Matter, but I do not think that the construction is technically correct.4 However, 
it is possible that interval can be derived from copunctuality, so long as interval is ‘quantized’, i.e. so long as  
all intervals are measured by some cardinal number. This would require that there is a minimum size to events;  
but, given the graininess of matter that has been introduced into physics by quantum theory, this is, I think, a 
reasonable assumption. Russell describes the quantization of space-time as follows:
Let us observe, to begin with, that events may be divided into zones with respect to a given event. There 
are first those that are compresent with [i.e. overlap] a given event, then those not compresent with it, 
but compresent with an event compresent with it, and so on. The nth zone will consist of events that can 
be reached in n steps, but not in n-1, a ‘step’ being taken as the passage from an event to another which 
is compresent with it. We will call two points ‘connected’ when there is an event which is a member of  
both. The passage from event to event by the relation of compresence may be replaced by the passage  
from point to point by the relation of connection. Thus points also can be collected into zones. If there is  
a minimum to the size of events, we may assume that it is always possible to pass from one event to 
another by a finite number of ‘steps’. If so, there must be a smallest number of steps in which the  
passage can be made; thus every event will belong to some definite zone with respect to a given event.5
Once space-time routes are thus quantized, ‘interval’ can be reduced to relations of connection between points  
which are in turn a function of overlapping, or copunctuality, between events. Since the proper time along a 
given route is equivalent to the integral of ds (infinitesimal changes of interval) along the route, the proper time 
along a route can be quantized as well. The only thing distinguishing a time-like from a space-like route is that  
along a time-like route there is a relation of before and after between any two events, which is not true for all  
pairs of events along a given space-like route. Since time is one-dimensional, overlapping in time can be 
considered  equivalent  to  absolute  simultaneity.  Thus  proper  time  intervals  are  reducible  to  absolute 
simultaneity and a relation of before and after. If  copunctuality  (unlike  straightforward  overlapping  in 
space-time) is not to be regarded as anything more than a way of collecting events into bundles, and if interval  
can be reduced to copunctuality or overlapping, then we can amend our list of the relations presupposed by  
relativity. Given some plausible assumptions it now turns out that the relations presupposed by relativity are:
before-and-after 
overlapping in space-time (absolute simultaneity) 
Both these, it will be noted, are relations of time. Essentially, relativity is saying that only time exists. Space is 
4  Ibid, pp. 370-1.
5  Ibid, p. 304.
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simply an arrangement of events and local histories into a three dimensional manifold. ‘Space’ in the sense of  
private space – the space within points of view – still exists, but it is now wholly relativised to these points of  
view. The spatial relations that we perceive cannot be identified with any relation which physics employs to 
relate items in the physical world. This is indeed acknowledged by Russell who, having reduced space-like to 
time-like intervals, and the latter to rather complicated statements about an event’s ‘causal ancestry’, notes that 
‘It will be observed that, in our theory, spatial distance does not represent any physical fact, but is a rather 
complicated way of speaking about the possibility of a common causal ancestry or posterity.’6
III. TIME IN PHYSICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY
But now, do we really know anything about the two relations of time that we listed above? We are accustomed  
to talk of time and simultaneity as relations that we know in our experience. It is therefore natural to think that  
the relations characterising ‘proper time’ in physics are identical with the relations of before and after with 
which  we are  acquainted  in  our  experience.  The  localisation  of  times  in  relativity  seems  to  make this  a 
possibility. Given relativity theory, it is almost irresistible to identify my psychological time with the local  
time, or proper time, of my brain. Indeed, this is an identity that Russell takes almost for granted. In  The 
Analysis of Matter, he writes:
I  shall  assume…that,  when  we  are  speaking  of  physical  space,  all  our  percepts  are  in  our  head.  
Consequently, psychological time is the same as time measured by our watches, assuming that we carry  
them on our person.  Our head moves along a  world-line,  and our psychological  time intervals  are 
measured physically be integrating ds along this world-line. Thus there is no difficulty in adapting the 
statement  that  psychological  and  physical  times  are  identical  to  the  requirements  on  the  theory of  
relativity.7
However, although Russell is prepared to identify subjective time with the physical ‘local time’ of my brain  
and body, he immediately adds an important qualification. He writes that ‘the time-intervals between percepts  
are only to be obtained by means of inferences of the same sort as those which lead us to the physical world.’ 8 
‘Perceived relations’, he goes on to say, ‘are not between events at different times’, for ‘all that we perceive is  
in the present, and the time-order of the original events is inferred from relations among the simultaneous 
events which constitute our present recollection.’ Thus ‘Psychological time may be identified with physical 
6  Ibid, p. 380.
7  Ibid, p. 253.
8  Ibid.
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time, because neither is a datum, but each is derived from data by inferences…which allow us to know only  
the logical or mathematical properties of what we infer.’9 If this is true then we can know nothing about the 
character of physical time from the fact that it is identical with subjective time.
I am not at all sure if Russell is right here. I incline to the view that time-relations can sometimes be directly 
perceived.  But even if this  is so,  Russell  is surely correct  in saying that our inference to  subjective time 
involves a large measure of inference. Take, for example, two periods of conscious experience separated by an 
interval of unconsciousness, such as deep sleep. When we wake up from sleep, we do not  perceive that our 
earlier period of consciousness prior to falling asleep occurred before our current consciousness. We simply 
infer that the earlier period happened before the present period because we remember it.  Thus, insofar as  
temporal  succession  is  sometimes  an  immediately  perceptible  relation,  it  only  relates  items  that  are 
immediately successive. Consequently, we can have no knowledge of the character of any relation between  
two stretches of experience separated by an interval of unconsciousness. So far as we are concerned, the time 
relation here is solely the physical time relation – and this is inferred, not immediately known.
But now let us consider those time-relations, if any, which are ‘given’ in our experience. As we saw above, in  
The Analysis of Matter, Russell was to assert that there are no perceptible time relations, on the ground that all 
that we perceive is in the present. In fact, I do not think an account of this nature is capable of accounting for  
the phenomenology of time. I wish now to re-introduce the term ‘perspective’ into my account, but using it in a  
somewhat different way to the way in which the term was used when I first introduced it in chapter 1. There, I  
defined a perspective as all the events within a given small space-time region. Now, I shall instead use the term 
in  such  a  way  that  the  total  contents  of  any  current  experience  constitute  a  ‘perspective’.  However, 
perspectives are not defined in terms of consciousness. Let us denote by ‘compresence’ that relation which,  
when it figures in our experience, is the relation that two percepts have to each other when they occur ‘at the  
same time’ to a given observer. Then we shall define a perspective as a class of compresent events such that (i)  
any two events belonging to the class are compresent, and (ii) no event outside the perspective is compresent  
with  every member of  it.  Thus  a  ‘perspective’ is  what  Russell,  in  his  later  philosophy,  calls  a  ‘complete  
complex of compresence’. (A class, or ‘complex’, which satisfies condition (i) but not condition (ii) Russell  
calls an ‘incomplete complex of compresence’.) Compresence is a symmetrical and non-transitive relation. 
This means that if A is compresent with B then B is compresent with A, but that if A is compresent with B and  
B with C, it does not automatically follow that A is compresent with C. Hence, it is quite possible for two  
perspectives to contain common members, and thus ‘intersect’.
9  Ibid, p. 253-4.
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Now, the view I wish to propose is that a given perspective contains everything that forms part of what some 
philosophers like to call the ‘specious present’, and thus that a perspective is extended in time. Consider the 
following example.  I  hear a rapid clicking noise. Now, in this case, I  hold that one can actually hear the  
clicking,  not  just  separate  notes  separated by short  intervals  of  silence.  If  my current  perspective  had no 
extension in time, then I could only hear one click at a time, and I would rely on memory to inform me that I  
was hearing a sequence of rapid clicks. But this does not seem to me to be an accurate description of the  
phenomenology in this case. I think it is possible for the clicking itself to be ‘given’, not just an isolated sound,  
so that to deny the clicking involves not merely supposing my memory to be mistaken (which is, after all, not  
that unusual an experience), but denying something immediately given and thus much more certain. If this 
account is true then in one specious present I might hear a number of clicks, each preceding the last in time.
Suppose that the sounds I hear are represented by bold letters, thusly:
a b c d e f g
Then, one perspective (let us call it C1) might comprise the complex
a precedes b precedes c
Another (C2) will be
b precedes c precedes d
and so on. As a result, each perspective includes relations of before and after  given in the perspective itself. 
This  would  account  for  my  perception  of  clicking  in  the  case  we  considered  above,  as  well  as  similar  
experiences (for example, I may immediately  know that the sound I hear is continuous and does not exist 
merely at a single instant).
It is important to avoid certain fallacies. For example, it is not the case that C1 precedes C2, or, more generally, 
that Cn precedes Cn+1. Cn and Cn+1 intersect. In the above example, b is a member of both Cn and Cn+1. Hence, it 
is incorrect to say that Cn precedes Cn+1 except in some artificial and ‘constructed’ sense. Otherwise, to say that 
Cn precedes Cn+1 is to assimilate perspectives to the items (a,  b,  c, etc.) within the perspectives. Cn+1 can be 
defined as the successor to Cn, but only in a ‘mathematical’ sense, i.e. we can define the successor relation so  
that Cn ‘precedes’ Cn+1 if, and only if, Cn and Cn+1 have common members, but Cn has at least one member 
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which precedes a member of Cn+1 and which is not itself preceded by any member of Cn+1. But with regard to 
the relation of ‘precedes’ as it figures in our experience, it is quite unintelligible to say that Cn ‘precedes’ Cn+1.
In the light of this analysis of perspectives as bearing a temporal ‘thickness’, we can say that our experience is  
not like a cinematograph – a series of frames, as it were. Rather, the overlapping of perspectives allows us, I  
think, to account for our sense of the ‘flow’ of time.
Returning to the question of the relation of subjective time to physical time, I think we can say that subjective 
time coincides with the proper time of my brain, and in some degree merges with it (as I hope to show), so that 
subjective time can indeed be identified with the physical proper time of my brain.
Let us first take continuous, unbroken stretches of consciousness. Such continuous periods of conscious 
experience will comprise a series of percepts. We shall say that two percepts are directly continuous when they 
belong to a single perspective (as defined above). And we shall say that two percepts are indirectly continuous 
when they are not themselves directly continuous but are linked by a series of direct continuities, such that 
each item in the series precedes its successor (in the sense of 'precedes' in which it is an immediately 
perceptible relation). Then any two percepts which belong to a single continuous period of consciousness will 
be either directly or indirectly continuous.
Between two periods of consciousness separated by a period of unconsciousness, the relation is more 
complicated and indirect. I may recall an experience that happened to me yesterday, but I do not recall 
everything that happened to me yesterday. Nevertheless, for any experience I had yesterday that I do not 
currently recall, this experience is likely to be indirectly continuous with an experience I do recall. Still, the 
connection between my current experience and any past experience is mediated by memory.
Memory is essentially a form of causality, in the sense that for a putative memory to be genuine there has to be 
a causal link of a certain sort between the remembered event and my remembering it. It may happen that I do 
not recall an event in my early childhood, but that others who witnessed the event describe it to me so vividly 
that I eventually think that I do remember it and even have a putative 'memory'. However, although there really 
is a causal relation between my past experience and my current 'memory', it is a relation mediated by the 
experiences of others, and so does not constitute a genuine memory. For the memory to be genuine, the 
remembered experience must be one which I remember because it happened to me and not because others 
remember it. My purpose here is not to furnish a full-fledged analysis of memory, but simply to point out that 
the relation between an event and the memory of the event involves causality in its very definition.
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Now between two experiences that are neither directly nor indirectly continuous, but belong to the same 
'subjective time', there will be relations mediated by memory. However, the relation between any event and an 
event in its light-cone (i.e. to which it has a time-like interval) is a causal one. An event in the past light-cone 
of a given event E may exercise some causal influence on that event. And E may itself have some effect on any 
event within its future light-cone. Since we have no notion of what a time-like interval actually is intrinsically, 
it seems to me that the whole notion of time-like interval should be analysed in causal terms. Indeed, I 
suggested above that to say that two events are separated by a space-like interval is simply a way of saying that 
neither can have a causal influence on the other.
If this is the case, then the relation of recollection between an event and a past event is actually not dissimilar  
to time-like interval in general. This is what I mean when I say that subjective time 'merges' with physical time.
Still, even in the case of conscious states that are directly or indirectly continuous, the subjective time-order of  
these events will be equivalent to, or coincide with, the physical time-order of the same events. That is, if some 
percept P1 precedes some other percept P2, either directly or indirectly, then P1 will also be in the past light-
cone of P2. And if a percept P1 is simply remembered in a later stretch of consciousness comprising percept P2, 
then again P1 will be in the past light-cone of P2. This latter is not just an equivalence but arguably an identity, 
since we have seen that both an event being remembered and an event being in a past light-cone may both be 
primarily statements about the causal influence of one event on another. 'Subjective time', then, comprises both 
relations of direct and indirect continuity, and also relations of recollection. Thus, at the very least, it is always 
equivalent to the proper time of the brain. That is, if percept P1 is before percept P2 in subjective time then P1 is 
before P2 in physical time (the proper time of the person's brain), and vice versa.
Thus, there is no obstacle to our identifying subjective time with physical time. The fact that the relation 
between present  recollection and a  past  event recollected is  practically the same as the time-like interval  
between two events is a very strong argument for this identity.
However, we should be careful about what we have established when we have made this identification. The 
essence of  memory is  causal,  and,  as Hume showed, causality is  not  a 'simple'  or  immediately perceived 
relation. So arguably, knowing that subjective time is the same as the proper time of my brain doesn't give me  
any insight into the essence of any physical relations.
What  about  the  actually  perceived relation  of  temporal  precedence  which,  I  have  argued,  links  events 
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belonging to one and the same continuous period of consciousness? If we could infer such relations amongst 
non-percepts in the external world then clearly this would give us some insight into the nature of a physical 
relation. However, I do not see on what basis we could make this inference. I do not see that we have any  
ground for supposing that such relations of time as are immediately perceived relate anything beyond the terms 
that they are observed to relate. Similarly (as we have seen) the physical relation of copunctuality cannot be 
identified (as Russell thought) with the perceived relation of compresence. Hence, no immediately perceived 
relation reveals the intrinsic nature of time as a physical relation. It follows from this that, although subjective  
time is identical with the physical (proper) time of my brain, nothing can be inferred from this concerning the 
nature of any physical relations outside of my sense-experience (and the sense-experiences of others).
The conclusion is thus a rather austere one, and somewhat more austere than Russell's, who allowed that some 
physical time relations could also be immediately perceived in our experience (specifically the relation of  
compresence), and that the nature of some relation which relates events wholly outside our experience could be 
known in its inner essence. The need to maintain this view would,  indeed,  have been seen as even more 
pressing after Newman's criticism of Russell's initial stance in The Analysis of Matter. But I have argued above 
that it was not necessary for Russell to concede as much as he did to Newman in order to preserve his realism.  
If the above argument is correct, then we have no knowledge of the nature of any physical relations or relata 
(except those which happen to be percepts) and structural realism can be upheld in all its austere and pristine  
splendour.
Hence, perceived time has a physical significance. Of course, it is still the case that nearly all physical time 
relations are inferred and are thus known only with regard to their mathematical properties. In any case, this 
leads us back to the point I alluded to earlier, that relativity implies a more-or-less Leibnizian view of reality.  
What relativity is saying is that time is real (albeit broken up into local times along diverse space-time routes),  
but that space can hardly be thought of as real in the same sense. The relation of interval is either constructed  
out of proper times, or from copunctuality. Copunctuality can scarcely be identified with any relation we know 
in our experience, and must therefore be taken as merely a way of ordering events, subject to the constraint that 
copunctual events must overlap in space-time (i.e. be absolutely simultaneous), which is, again, a relation of  
time. It  is true that Russell  believed that overlapping in space-time  could be identified with a perceptible 
relation, but, even if he was right, overlapping is not the same as copunctuality, since the latter is a five-termed 
relation, whereas overlapping is a dyadic relation. Thus the only relations with which we are acquainted which 
we might possibly regard as characterising physical events are absolute simultaneity and before-and-after, both 
of which are relations of time. The universe certainly is not characterised by spatial relations of the kind that  
figure in our experience. In practice physical space tends to become a mere arrangement of local spaces. Thus,  
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given relativity, at the very least our view of the world will be Leibnizian. Russell, of course, frequently drew 
attention to the similarity of Leibniz’s metaphysic to his own.
Before leaving the topic of time I should say that I regard the whole question of subjective time, its character  
and its relation to physical time as very perplexing, and that I should treat what I have written above as no  
more than a set of suggestive ideas. Indeed, this holds good for virtually everything I write in this latter portion  
of my thesis.
IV. RELATIVITY AND MIND-BRAIN MONISM
There is perhaps one more important metaphysical implication of relativity, and that is that relativity renders 
any form of mind-body dualism wholly untenable. This might seem to be a very bold claim, but it seems to me  
difficult to avoid.  It was Russell who first pointed out this implication. In The Analysis of Matter, he writes:
It has become difficult to hold that mental events, though in time, are not in space. The fact that their  
relations to each other can be viewed as only temporal is a fact which they share with any set of events 
forming the biography of one piece of matter. Relatively to axes moving with the percipient’s brain, the 
interval  between  two percepts  of  his  which  are  not  compresent  should  always  be  temporal,  if  his 
percepts are in his head. But the interval between simultaneous percepts of different percipients is of a 
different kind; and their whole causal environment is such as to make us call this interval space-like.10
In dualism of the Cartesian variety, mental events were in physical time, but not in physical space. Relativity  
has made this notion impossible. Events which have a time-like interval to some events will have a space-like  
interval to others. The only obvious way of avoiding this conclusion would be to say that mental events have  
no relation of ‘interval’ to anything physical at all. This, however, would be to remove mind wholly out of  
physical time as well as physical space. As a consequence it would seem difficult to see how one could regard  
physical events as causes or effects of percepts, insofar as whenever one event causes another the former is 
before the other in physical time. And if there is no causal interaction between mind and the physical world  
then it is difficult to see how we could take our putative perceptions as furnishing us with evidence for the  
existence of an external world at all, given that they would be just what they in fact are even if there were no  
external reality which causally underlay them. Thus, if we are to avoid solipsism, we must suppose that there 
are time-like intervals between mental events and physical events. Time-like interval is an instance of interval; 
10  p. 384.
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therefore, mental events are related by the same relations that order events in physical space-time.
I suppose that a sufficiently determined dualist could maintain that although mental events have time-like  
intervals to physical events, they are not characterised by space-like intervals to anything. It is not clear to me 
what would be accomplished by this move, nor what conceivable ground there could be for allowing mental  
events to be exceptional in this regard. But, in any case, we have already seen that ‘space-like interval’ is not  
some fundamental relation which is directly perceived but is rather something constructed from other relations.  
Hence, when these other relations obtain, a space-like separation will obtain by definition. Thus, it might be  
that to say that there is a space-like separation between two events amounts to no more than to say that there is  
no direct temporal relation between them but that something is the joint causal ancestor or causal descendent of 
the two events. And in this case, that mental events have a space-like interval to purely physical events would  
be an unavoidable implication. 
The relativistic argument for monism has been revived by Michael Lockwood in his  Mind, Brain and the  
Quantum, who devotes a whole chapter to setting out the case.11
The purpose of this chapter so far has been to show how relativity theory might have important implications  
for our conception of reality that philosophers cannot really afford to ignore. Russell devoted a great deal of  
attention to  the philosophical  implications of  physical  theory in  The Analysis  of  Matter,  and I  can’t  help 
thinking that it is something of a pity that few contemporary philosophers are acquainted with this work. For 
my part,  I  think that  Russell’s  discussion  of  relativity  does a  great  deal  to  clarify and sharpen our ideas 
concerning the philosophical implications of relativity theory. Russell also discusses quantum mechanics in 
The Analysis of Matter, but, of course, the theory was still very much in flux at the time Russell was writing, 
and  Russell  frequently  acknowledges  the  tentative  nature  of  his  speculations.  In  fact,  by the  end  of  the 
twentieth century, all sorts of claims had been made concerning the supposed philosophical implications of  
quantum physics. In the next section I shall seek to determine to what extent these claims were justified.
V. THE INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
The  two  great  developments  of  the  twentieth  century  in  physics  are,  of  course,  relativity  and  quantum 
mechanics. Both these theories necessitate radical revisions to the common sense conception of reality. There  
is, however a crucial philosophical difference between the two theories. The world that relativity presents for 
11  See Lockwood’s Mind, Brain and the Quantum, chapter 5, ‘Einstein and the Identity Theory’, pp. 71-8.
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our belief may be odd and unfamiliar in many respects, but it  is perfectly intelligible and the outcome of  
relativity  for  our  conception  of  physical  reality  has  been  thought  to  be relatively uncontroversial.  I  have 
suggested in the previous section how in fact relativity might require rather more radical revisions to our 
understanding  of  reality  than  even  most  physicists  realise.  Nevertheless,  traditionally  the  implications  of 
relativity have not been taken as problematic. The case stands differently with quantum mechanics. Here there  
is considerable controversy concerning the precise nature of the changes that acceptance of the quantum theory  
requires for our understanding of reality. This has led to a plethora of mutually incompatible ‘interpretations’ 
of quantum theory, beginning with Bohr’s ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation. Concerning the task of adequately 
interpreting quantum theory, the great physicist Murray Gell-Mann once wrote that ‘Niels Bohr brainwashed a 
whole generation of theorists into thinking that the job was done 50 years ago.’ 12 This is perhaps unfair to 
Bohr, who can hardly be blamed for the fact that others after him chose not to think. Nevertheless, it is fair to 
say that the hardening of Copenhagen into an orthodoxy constituted a powerful obstacle to fresh thought on the  
subject for some decades after Bohr first developed his views.
In order to see our way through these philosophical issues, it might be useful to consider the matter historically 
and  ask  how  these  various  interpretations  first  arose.  Although  quantum  theory  has  revolutionised  our 
understanding of atomic structure, the origins of quantum theory really lie in the investigation of the properties 
of light.
The first fact to note about light is that it is, of course, completely and absolutely invisible.13 We do not see 
light; we see the objects from which light is reflected. If we could see light itself then whenever we opened our  
eyes we would see nothing but an opaque fog, and the sense of sight would be useless for perceiving anything  
from which we were separated by an interval of space. Light might be perceptible through the sense of touch. 
For it is known that light manages the neat trick of having a certain momentum despite having no mass, and  
thus exerts a certain pressure on the surfaces on which it is incident. It is therefore a theoretical possibility that  
some being could have sufficiently sensitive touch perception as to feel this pressure on its skin. But although  
light might possibly be tangible, it certainly could never be seen. And in any case, the sense of touch in human 
beings  is  not  sufficiently  fine  to  detect  the  presence  of  light.  As  a  consequence  the  only way for  us  to 
investigate light is through its effects on its environment, which makes it somewhat elusive.
It was Thomas Young who, at the turn of the nineteenth century, established through experiments involving 
interference that light is a wave. Or at least it seemed that this is what he had established, though, as we shall 
see, it may be that the results of his experiment were misinterpreted.
12  Quoted in Karl Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, p. 10.
13  See John Lloyd, John Mitchinson & Stephen Fry, The Book of General Ignorance, p. 79.
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In one of Young’s most famous experiments, light was shone on a screen containing two small apertures, or  
slits, and the light that passed through these apertures was incident on a further screen which displayed the 
intensity of light at each point across its surface. The result was a series of light and dark bands such as is  
indicative of a wave phenomenon. Where the wave from each of the apertures arrived at the screen in phase the 
light was most intense. At portions of the screen where the light from one aperture was completely out of phase 
with the light from the other, the two waves cancelled each other out and the result was a band of darkness.  
Later in the century, Maxwell identified the nature of this wave as electromagnetic. It was felt that waves  
required a medium, and so the luminiferous aether was duly supplied. However, this medium turned out to be  
even more elusive that light. As Russell wrote:
the aether was never so comfortably material as ‘gross’ matter. It could vibrate, but it did not seem to  
consist of little bits each with its own individuality, or to be subject to any discoverable molar motions.  
No one knew whether it was a jelly or a gas. Its properties could not be inferred from those of billiard 
balls, but were merely those demanded by its functions. In fact, like a painfully good boy, it only did  
what it was told, and might therefore be expected to die young.14
At any rate, by the end of the nineteenth century physicists had a dualistic picture of physical reality: a wave 
picture of light and a corpuscularean picture of matter. The first real cracks in this picture came with Max 
Planck’s hypothesising that energy can only be transferred (emitted or absorbed) in discrete increments. Such  
an  assumption  seemed  necessary  to  explain  the  observed  frequencies  of  radiation  in  certain  experiments  
involving ‘black bodies’ (objects that absorb all the radiation incident on them). We need not go into the details  
of this problem here, since in any case it is not clear to what extent Planck took the notion of ‘quanta’ – the 
indivisible units of energy – as anything more than a calculational device.
It was Einstein who really took the notion of quanta seriously, and in doing so originated quantum mechanics.  
When light  is  shone on certain substances,  electrons are  discharged from the atoms at  the surface of  the  
substance. It is possible to reduce the energy incident on the surface to such an extent that, on the assumption 
that the energy of the light were spread out in a wave, it would take a certain measurable interval of time for  
any  atom  to  acquire  sufficient  energy  to  emit  an  electron.  However,  this  is  not  what  is  in  fact  found 
experimentally. On the contrary, no matter how weak the light, electrons are emitted from the substance on 
which it is incident from the moment the light source begins emitting. This can only be explained if the light  
energy,  far  from being spread out,  is  concentrated at a point.  Furthermore,  the momentum of the emitted  
14  The Analysis of Matter, pp. 19-20.
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electron, far from being in any way related to the intensity of the light, is a function merely of its frequency.  
Again, this can only be explained if light consists of a stream of particles, each comprising a single quantum of  
energy. The ‘intensity’ of the light is the same as its energy content. The greater the intensity, the more quanta 
are being emitted. For a single unit or ‘photon’ of light, the energy is proportional to its frequency, v:
E ∝ v
For light generally,
E ∝ Nv
where N can take only (non-negative) integer values. This proportion represents what is actually observed. The 
introduction of the constant ‘h’ is designed merely to secure the conversion of a proportion into an equality. 
The left-hand side of the proportionality is measured in Jooles (J). (Its ‘dimension’ – the specific physical  
quantity it measures – being energy.) ‘N’ is just a number and has no dimensionality. ‘v’ measures the number  
of waves passing a point per unit of time, and so its dimension is the inverse of time. If this is measured in  
seconds we can say that the units of the right hand side of the proportionality are s -1. In order to convert the 
right hand side of the proportionality into something equal to the left hand side we need simply to introduce a  
constant on the right-hand side whose dimension is the product of energy and time, measured in Joole-seconds  
(Js). Let us call this quantity ‘h’. Then the above equation implies
E = Nhv
And where N=1 (i.e. for a single quantum of light),
E = hv
The units of h, i.e. Joole-seconds, are units of energy multiplied by time, which in physics is called ‘action’.  
The point is that the proportionality is what is actually observed. Everything in quantum mechanics could be 
stated without h, provided physicists were content with statements of proportion rather than equations. ‘h’ is 
constructed essentially because physicists prefer statements of equality to statements of proportionality.
Einstein had succeeded in showing that the behaviour of light in certain circumstances could only be explained  
by assuming that light consisted of particle-like units. It was not easy to reconcile this with the supposed wave 
nature of light. It might be thought that the wave nature of light that was displayed in the two-slit experiment 
was perhaps a result of the interaction of photons with each other as they passed from emitter to screen. 
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However, in the twentieth century it became possible for the first time to set up the experiment in such a way  
that the incident light could be reduced in intensity until it comprised a single photon passing through the  
apparatus at any one time. There was therefore no possibility that any pattern that was subsequently built up 
could be the result of interactions between photons. When the experiment was performed, with the point at  
which each photon was absorbed being recorded, it was found that, over time, the absorption points formed an 
interference pattern just as when the light was of greater intensity. Furthermore, if either aperture was blocked,  
all the light that passed through the remaining aperture was absorbed opposite the aperture (allowing for the  
effects  of  diffraction)  and no interference  pattern such as  is  associated with  both slits  being opened was 
observed. All this was deeply puzzling, and it wasn’t clear how these results were to be interpreted. What had 
been established was that the behaviour of the photons was not a result of their interaction with each other, but  
that the behaviour of each photon was a function of its total environment.
Similar properties were found to apply to matter. In 1924, de Broglie proposed the existence of ‘matter waves’; 
that is, he hypothesised that just as light exhibited particle-like properties, so matter would exhibit wave-like 
properties.  Experiments  involving  electrons  confirmed that  electrons  exhibited  interference  phenomena as 
much as light, and this duality of properties has been confirmed with every particle or group of particles for 
which it is possible to perform the experiment. One consequence of this wave-particle duality is to overthrow 
the dualism of matter and radiation which had characterised nineteenth century physics: both matter and light  
exhibit both wave and particle properties.
This  wave-particle  duality  is  not  to  be confused  with  Bohr’s  notion  of  ‘complementarity’,  which was  an  
explanation for the phenomenon of wave-particle duality. The problem was this: how could light (or matter) be  
both a wave and a particle? On the face of it the two pictures were inconsistent with each other. For example, a  
wave is spread out in space whereas a particle occupies a point. Bohr’s answer to this conundrum was to  
relativise  the wave properties  and the particle  properties  to  experimental  contexts.  When we measure the 
position or wavelength of a photon, for example, the property we measure is not a property of the photon 
simplicitur,  but  rather  a  property  of  the  photon  relative  to  a  given  experimental  context.  One  of  the 
consequences of this idea is that such physical properties as position, momentum, wavelength, and so forth,  
cannot be correctly ascribed to the particle  itself,  but  only to some whole comprising the particle and its 
‘classical’ context. Since these contexts will  be different according to whether we are measuring wave or  
particle properties, it follows that the apparent inconsistency of wave-particle duality is overcome. Instead of 
being inconsistent, waves and particles are now regarded as ‘complementary’ descriptions of the same object  
under different and mutually exclusive experimental contexts.
100
However, a very heavy price is paid for this resolution of the paradox, namely that a particle considered in 
itself has no measurable physical properties. It has neither position, nor momentum, nor wavelength, nor any 
other physical property. The particle thus becomes a ‘thing in itself’ about which nothing can be said. It is  
questionable  whether  this  Kantian  remnant  of  physical  reality  serves  any  further  function  in  scientific  
explanation, and it is not surprising that, in practice, the ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ which Bohr originated  
has tended to merge with instrumentalism. 
A crucial stage in the further development of these ideas was supplied by Heisenberg, who formulated his 
famous Uncertainty Principle. This is essentially an equation which states that the accuracy with which the 
momentum of a particle can be determined is inversely proportional to the accuracy with which its position can 
be determined. Thus, the more precisely a measurement of position is made, the less precisely the momentum 
is known, and vice versa. The precise interpretation of this result is a matter of some controversy. In the earlier  
formulations of this principle, it was explained by saying that measuring the position of (say) an electron by 
shining a light on it causes a perturbation in its momentum as a result of the interaction. However, Heisenberg  
came  to  regard  this  as  an  inaccurate  way  of  presenting  his  account.  It  is  central  to  the  Copenhagen 
Interpretation, developed by Bohr and Heisenberg, that the particle only has the properties that are measurable. 
Thus  to  the  extent  that  the  position  of  a  particle  is  determined  precisely,  the  momentum  becomes 
indeterminate. And to say that the momentum becomes indeterminate here is not merely to say that we are  
unable to determine it but rather that the particle has no momentum.
It  was  discovered  that  momentum and position  are  only one  example  of  pairs  of  ‘observables’ (physical  
quantities  that  are  directly  measurable)  that  are  such  that  the  more  precisely  one  is  determined  the  less 
precisely the other is determinable. Such pairs of observables are called ‘incompatible’. Observables that are 
not incompatible are called ‘compatible’. For compatible observables, the measurement of one does not affect 
the measurement of the other, but for incompatible observables the measurement of one precludes a similarly  
precise determination of the other. 
Suppose  we  measure  a  given  observable  and  then  subsequently  measure  an  incompatible  observable. 
According to the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory due primarily to Niels Bohr, before the second 
observable  is  measured  the  particle  does  not  have  any  property  corresponding  to  the  observable  to  be 
measured. The act of measuring the observable causes the particle to adopt a given value of the observable. 
Measurement, therefore, plays a crucial rôle. Properly speaking, measurement rarely records a pre-existing 
value for some quantity, but rather causes the particle to have that quantity. Quantum physicists like to say that  
measurement  ‘prepares’ the  state  of  a  given  particle  and  sometimes  substitute  the  term ‘preparation’ for  
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‘measurement’.
During the mid-1920s, Heisenberg and Schrödinger developed the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The 
two approaches were different but were suspected of being mathematically equivalent, as indeed proved to be 
the case. Schrödinger’s approach is known as ‘wave mechanics’ and his equations determine how the wave 
associated with each particle evolves over time. This  evolution occurs in a completely deterministic  way, 
however it  only determines the outcome of measurement  in  a probabilistic  manner.  Effectively,  the wave 
determines the statistical distribution of the outcome of sets of measurements on a set (or ‘ensemble’) of  
similarly prepared particles.  However,  for  any individual particle,  in  general  no prediction concerning the  
outcome of a given measurement is  possible.  This  is  the principle  of  indeterminacy.  Schrödinger himself  
thought of the waves as ‘real’. In this he was followed by de Broglie, who ascribed reality to both the wave and 
the particle, the former guiding the behaviour of the latter, an interpretation that came to be known as the ‘pilot 
wave’ idea. However, Max Born insisted, quite rightly, that the only thing that Schrödinger’s wave equations 
determine is the probability of finding a particle at a given place. The waves should thus be thought of as  
‘waves of probability’, not as something ‘real’.
It is difficult to go any further without at least a brief acquaintance with some of the mathematics of quantum 
physics. For those unacquainted with the relevant mathematics I must apologise for the brevity of my account.  
But my purpose here is to chart the development of physics in the twentieth century, not to offer a primer in the  
mathematics of quantum mechanics. According to orthodox quantum mechanics, the physical state of a particle 
is wholly represented by a mathematical object known as the ‘state vector’. The state vector is a vector that 
inhabits an abstract space known as Hilbert space. Hilbert space is characterised by an infinite number of  
dimensions. Furthermore, the scalars in this space (the quantities which measure the ‘lengths’ of the vectors, as  
it were) are all  complex numbers. This, along with the infinity of mutually orthogonal axes, makes Hilbert  
space essentially incapable of being visualised, but never mind. All vectors that ‘coincide’ in fact represent the  
same state (i.e. if two vectors differ from each other in magnitude alone then they correspond to the same 
physical state). For this reason a physical state is often thought of as a set of all vectors such that of any two  
the one is a scalar multiple of the other. Such a set is a one-dimensional subspace, or ‘ray’, in the vector space. 
A given set of orthogonal axes corresponds to a given ‘observable’. Each axis corresponds to a state in which  
the observable is determinate. Now according to quantum mechanics, the state of a given particle is normally 
represented by a vector that does not coincide with any axis corresponding to an observable. That is, ordinarily,  
neither the position, nor the wavelength nor any other observable is determinate. Instead, the state vector  
determines the  probability that a certain result will  be obtained if a measurement of a given observable is 
carried out. To find the probability of a given outcome one first takes the vector corresponding to the physical 
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state (i.e. belonging to a given ‘ray’) whose ‘norm’ is unity. The ‘norm’ of a vector can be thought of as a  
measure of its ‘length’. Remember, however, that the scalars in Hilbert space are complex numbers, so we  
cannot think of ‘lengths’ in quite the same way as we ordinarily think of lengths in Euclidean space. In fact, the  
norm of a vector is simply the positive square root of its ‘square modulus’. The ‘square modulus’ of a complex 
number, a+ib, is the product of the complex number and its ‘complex conjugate’, a–ib. Hence, the square 
modulus of a+ib is simply a2+b2. A vector whose norm is unity is said to be ‘normalised’. Once we have the 
normalised  state  vector  corresponding  to  a  given  physical  state,  we  can  determine  the  probability  of  a  
particular outcome of observing a particular observable by finding the perpendicular projection of the vector 
on the appropriate axis. This projection represents the ‘probability amplitude’. To find the actual probability of  
this outcome one finds the square modulus of the amplitude.15
According to the Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is a one-one correspondence 
between the state vector and the physical reality it represents. Thus, a particle has no position, momentum, etc. 
until it is actually observed. Measurement is equivalent to performing an ‘operation’ on the state vector as a 
result  of  which  it  coincides  with  an  axis  representing  an  observable.  The  resulting  vector  is  called  an 
‘eigenvector’ of  the  associated  operator  and  the  measurement  result  it  represents  is  its  ‘eigenvalue’.  The 
physical  state  of  an  object  whose  representation  coincides  with  an  eigenvector  is  an  ‘eigenstate’.  Thus 
measurement  changes the state  vector  so that  it  coincides  with  an eigenvector.  This  is  referred to  as  the 
‘reduction’, or ‘collapse’ of the state vector (or wave-function). The projection of an eigenvector on itself does 
not, of course, change the vector. Thus, once a given measurement of an observable is performed and a result 
obtained, if the same observable is measured immediately afterwards the same result will be obtained with a  
probability of 1 (unity).
It  is axiomatic to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics that the state vector is a  complete 
representation of the physical state it represents. This, however, leads to certain difficulties. For, unless the  
state  vector  is  parallel  to  an  eigenvector,  the  vector  will  not  determine  a  definite  value  for  any physical 
observable. But can we really conceive of a physical object that lacks position, momentum, wavelength, indeed 
every possible physical property? It might be said in response to this that the physical object does possess the 
objective physical property corresponding to its being represented as a specific vector in Hilbert space. But  
what physical property does this in fact represent? Merely the  probability that the measurement of various 
observables  will  result  in  various  eigenvalues.  Thus  it  seems  difficult  to  differentiate  this  position  from 
instrumentalism.  This  fact  is  made  even  more  explicit  in  von  Neumann’s  version  of  the  Copenhagen 
interpretation. To some commentators, von Neumann’s philosophy represents a variation on Copenhagen. It 
15  For further material on the mathematics of quantum mechanics, see R. I. G. Hughes, The Structure and 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
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seems to me, however, only to make explicit what is already implicit in Bohr and Heisenberg.
Von Neumann distinguished between two types of occurrences, which he called Type 1 and Type 2. Type 2  
occurrences are those physical processes that occur prior to ‘measurement’. They are completely described 
(according to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics) by the wave-function and evolve through 
time in accordance with Schrödinger’s wave equations. This time evolution is wholly deterministic. The wave-
function represents the object in a ‘superposition’ of states. If we consider a given state vector, we can see that  
every vector can be represented as a linear combination of eigenvectors, each corresponding to the state of the  
object  subsequent  to  a definite  measurement.  However,  when we observe an object  we observe only one 
eigenvalue. Type 1 processes are measurement type events. They involve the collapse of the state vector and 
the selection of a single eigenvalue. Von Neumann reasoned that at some point between the quantum object  
described by the Schrödinger equation and our observation of the object there must be a transition from a type 
2 to a type 1 occurrence. There is, in other words, a ‘cut’ in reality, though we cannot locate precisely where  
this cut is made. Von Neumann’s colleague, Eugene Wigner, went further and placed the ‘cut’ at the level of  
conscious awareness. For Wigner it is consciousness that collapses the wave-function. This, at least, has the 
virtue of making the subjectivism and idealism that is contained within the Copenhagen interpretation explicit.
The subjectivist implications of Copenhagen are now perhaps better understood, since there seem to be more 
and more physicists who reject the orthodox interpretation (to the extent that the Copenhagen Interpretation 
can no longer be regarded as the ‘standard’ view). An attempt was made by Hugh Everett III to avoid the  
subjectivism of Copenhagen by boldly stating that every eigenstate of a given physical state is real. Note,  
however,  the  assumption  that  this  shares  with  Copenhagen,  namely  that  the  state  vector  is  a  complete 
description of the reality it represents. Only if one accepts this dogma (for it is a dogma) does one have to  
choose between idealism and a multiplication of worlds. And yet the idea that, prior to observation, an object is  
in an actual superposition of states is wholly unempirical. No object is ever observed in a superposition of 
states. Indeed, if such a thing were possible then it would be inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The notion  
of a real superposition of states is thus a piece of unwarranted metaphysics. The notion of a ‘cut’ in reality 
seems to me quite unwarranted and fantastical. It is an irony of the Copenhagen Interpretation, as developed by 
the  Princeton  physicists,  that  it  claims to  be  ultra-empirical  but  in  fact  presupposes  a  highly tendentious  
metaphysic. By supposing that each component of a given superposition is ‘real’, Everett’s interpretation fails  
to be radical enough in its questioning of the assumptions behind the orthodox view which it (rightly) rejects. I  
think we can arrive at a more acceptable view by sticking to the observed facts, as I hope to show.
There is one matter, however, that Everett’s many worlds (or ‘relative-state’) interpretation perhaps has right,  
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namely that the whole notion of the collapse of the state vector as a result of a ‘measurement’ is a myth. The 
collapse of the state vector is not itself implied by anything within the mathematics of quantum theory itself.  
This is why its introduction leads to unedifying controversies as to where in fact the cut in reality occurs. For  
example, those who are sympathetic to Copenhagen, but want to avoid ascribing any cosmic significance to 
‘consciousness’, have come up with the ingenious idea that what constitutes a measurement-type event is an 
event which is thermodynamically irreversible. However, besides being quite arbitrary, the theory relies on 
there being an absolute distinction between reversible and irreversible events, something that current physics  
does not admit. 
Incidentally, for anyone who seeks to defend a Copenhagen, or ‘neo-Copenhagen’, view, this defence is quite 
inconsistent  with  the  claim  that  quantum  physics  is  a  complete  description.  For,  as  I  mentioned  above,  
quantum mechanics does not in itself specify what circumstances constitute a measurement (or measurement 
type process). Hence, a neo-Copenhagenist must admit that physics is to this extent an incomplete theory of  
reality.
But there is a further problem with the notion of the collapse of the wave-function. Not only is it not implied  
by quantum mechanics, it is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with it. I remarked above that what constitutes a 
‘measurement’ is not determined within the mathematics of quantum mechanics itself. When a particle whose  
state vector does not coincide with an eigenvector interacts with any measuring apparatus then, if we take  
quantum mechanics seriously, the measuring apparatus will be represented by a vector which is also not an 
eigenvector but a ‘superposition’ of eigenvectors, corresponding to various eigenvalues of the corresponding  
measurement. Theories which posit wave-function reduction all have an uncomfortably ad hoc nature, and it is 
surely preferable to get along without this metaphysical posit if we possibly can. Of course, there must  be 
‘measurements’. The state vector implies statements concerning the probabilities of measuring various values 
of observables and so measurement undoubtedly occurs. In order to reconcile this with the non-existence of 
wave-function collapse we need merely add that measurement does not affect the wave-function of the object 
measured. Instead, measurement can be taken to select the portion of the wave-function that is henceforth of  
interest to us.
This does not in the least imply the relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics. We have yet to say 
anything concerning the precise nature of the wave-function. The relative-state interpretation takes the wave-
function as a real entity. But there is no reason whatsoever to do this. Instead, we can adopt a purely statistical 
interpretation  and  regard  the  wave-function  as  referring  to  the  hypothetical  outcomes  of  measurements  
performed  on  an  indefinitely  numerous  ensemble  of  particles  (where  an  ‘ensemble’ is  a  set  of  similarly  
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‘prepared’ objects, i.e. particles that start off in the same state and within the same experimental set-up). This  
perspective  involves  taking  Max  Born’s  statistical  interpretation  of  the  wave-function  seriously  and 
abandoning the last vestiges of the supposition that the wave is a ‘real’ entity associated with each individual 
particle.  On  this  interpretation,  the  traditional  ‘fuzziness’ of  quantum mechanics  has  nothing  to  do  with  
physical reality but rather with our knowledge of that reality.
To interpret quantum mechanics in such a ‘realist’ manner is certainly within the spirit of many of the greatest 
quantum physicists of the twentieth century. Schrödinger, de Broglie and Einstein were all  ‘realists’ about  
quantum physics and insisted that reality itself cannot be ‘fuzzy’. Indeed, the point of Schrödinger’s famous  
cat was precisely to underline the absurdities of the anti-realist outlook which the realists saw as implicit in  
Bohr and Heisenberg’s interpretation.
Schrödinger’s paradoxical cat (Latin name, Felis paradoxicalis Schrödingeri) is a rather odd creature, existing 
as it does in a sort of limbo between life and death, forever waiting for someone to observe it and collapse its  
wave-function. It inhabits a sealed chamber within which is a contraption connected to a physics experiment  
which involves measuring the value of a given observable in such a manner that, for the time the cat is left 
inside the chamber, there is a precisely 0.5 chance that the apparatus will measure a certain eigenvalue. In the  
instance that this value is recorded the contraption to which the apparatus is connected releases a hammer 
which breaks a vial of cyanide, poisoning the cat. According to orthodox quantum mechanics, the particle is in  
a superposition of states prior to the observable being measured, and this superposition is communicated to the  
apparatus and ultimately to the cat, which is also in a superposition of being alive and being dead. Schrödinger  
took  this  latter  notion  as  obviously  unacceptable.  By  reductio  ad  absurdum one  of  the  premises  of  the 
argument must be mistaken, and Schrödinger concluded that a particle is never in a ‘real’ superposition of  
states. Schrödinger distinguished between two kinds of ‘pictures’: a picture of something that is actually fuzzy  
or indistinct, such as a photo of clouds or fog, and a blurred, indistinct picture of something that is in itself  
perfectly sharp. Physicists seemed to be prepared to accept the idea that somehow reality itself is indistinct  
(like the fog) and the state vector a precise representation of it, but this was only because such notions, being  
confined to the quantum world of sub-atomic particles, are comfortably remote from everyday experience. 
Schrödinger’s thought-experiment connects the quantum realm with the everyday realm so as to bring into  
sharper focus the implications of the orthodox interpretation. For Schrödinger, an object cannot be ascribed 
incompatible qualities (such as being alive and being dead), and consequently we must reject the notion that  
the wave-function in quantum mechanics is a precise picture of something intrinsically indistinct. Instead, we 
should regard the wave-function as a blurry picture of something which in itself is perfectly well defined.
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Schrödinger’s example seems to me felicitous, and brings out what we have argued above, that the whole 
notion of the reduction of the wave-function is an unwarranted metaphysical posit.
The interpretation I propose for quantum mechanics is one inspired by Born and developed by Einstein, which 
is  known as  the  ‘Ensemble  Interpretation’.  This  interpretation  is  tailored  strictly  to  the  facts.  The  wave-
function is taken to be what empirically it  is,  namely a description of the behaviour of a  set of similarly 
prepared objects (‘ensembles’). The interpretation of the wave-function is thus purely statistical. Individual 
particles  have  definite  trajectories  at  all  times.  However,  the  behaviour  of  any  individual  particle  is  not  
predictable.  On  the  contrary,  only  the  behaviour  of  the  ensemble  is  predictable.  Thus  the  ensemble  
interpretation is capable of retaining indeterminacy. It may be said that the interpretation I have just supplied  
does not explain the behaviour of the ensemble. This is indeed the case, for which reason this interpretation has 
sometimes been called a ‘minimal explanation’. However, explanations must come to an end somewhere (at 
least provisionally) and nothing is gained by interpreting the wave-function in anything other than a statistical  
sense. For the properties of the wave-function are only capable of investigation by investigating the behaviour 
and properties of the ensembles of particles whose behaviour they determine. The Schrödinger ‘wave’ has no 
further properties. Like the aether its properties are restricted solely to its functions. No theoretical gain is thus  
accomplished through reifying it. (This was really the point made by Max Born.) There is therefore no such  
thing as a superposition or a collapse of the state vector. One might as well say that a dice, before being  
thrown, is in a ‘superposition’ of states corresponding to each of the six possible outcomes of the throw. There 
is no need to think of the dice as physically existing in a summed state of each possible eigenstate. The wave-
function describes the behaviour of ensembles of particles, but does not describe a single particle.
On this  basis,  the paradox of wave-particle  duality ceases to  be mysterious – it  is  merely the distinction  
between whole and part. Ensembles are described by the Schrödinger wave equation and to this extent have  
wave-like properties. Insofar as, when we talk about ‘light’, we are referring to an ensemble, light is correctly 
described as a wave. The  constituents of ensembles, however, have particle-like properties. On the level of 
individual quanta, light is correctly described as a particle. What quantum physics is telling us is that at the  
most fundamental physical level the world has an irreducible graininess. 
In a manner of speaking, of course, the relative-state interpretation is also a ‘statistical’ interpretation of the  
wave-function, except that it goes quite beyond any empirical data in regarding the various eigenstates of a  
given wave-function as existing simultaneously rather than successively. There is thus no difficulty which the  
ensemble  interpretation  encounters  which  is  not  equally  a  difficulty  for  the  relative-state  interpretation,  
whereas the latter involves vast metaphysical posits which the ensemble interpretation avoids. It is therefore 
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preferable to accept the ensemble interpretation.
The ensemble interpretation is certainly compatible with deeper explanations in terms of ‘hidden variables’, 
but does not presuppose the success of these theories. I have so far not referred to hidden variable theories,  
which  might  seem  an  odd  omission  by  someone  intent  on  adopting  a  realist  interpretation  of  quantum 
mechanics. After all, Bohm’s theory, which develops de Broglie’s ‘pilot wave’ idea that a physical wave guides 
the trajectory of an associated particle, resolves the paradox of wave-particle duality by positing both a wave 
and a particle. As a result,  Bohm’s theory deftly avoids wave-function collapse. Certainly the grounds on 
which theories such as Bohm’s have been rejected have, in general, been vague and unsatisfactory, or based on 
highly subjective aesthetic criteria. As Euan Squires says in his book The Mystery of the Quantum World, ‘the 
whole hidden-variable enterprise was readily dismissed as arising from a desire, in the minds of those too 
conservative  to  accept  change,  to  return  to  the  determinism of  classical  physics;  the  significance  of  not  
requiring wavefunction reduction could only be appreciated when the problems associated with it had been 
accepted  and,  for  most  physicists,  they  were  not,  being  lost  in  the  mumbo-jumbo  of  the  “Copenhagen” 
interpretation.’16 The  fact  remains  that  Bohm’s  theory  is  consistent  with  all  the  predictions  of  quantum 
mechanics. Therefore, it can scarcely be denied that it might be true. And such a theory is surely preferable to  
the vast and fantastical metaphysical machinery of the relative-state interpretation with its branching universes 
or Copenhagen with its implicit subjective idealism.
Critics  are  on  firmer  ground  when  they  point  out  that  the  theories  of  Bohm  have  proven  resistant  to 
experimental  verification.  And  this  may  not  be  a  mere  historical  contingency  arising  from  our  current  
technological or theoretical capacities. It may be that the sub-quantum world that Bohm posits must remain 
forever hidden. I think we should take seriously the possibility that there are limits to scientific investigation. It  
is, if you think about it, something of a miracle that we know as much as we do. Who would have thought, in  
the seventeenth century, that it might one day be possible for us to know the structure of matter on a sub-
atomic level, so that we could explain the properties of chemical elements; or that we would one day describe  
the condition of  the universe a thousandth of a second after  its  beginning,  13.7 billion years ago? In his 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,  Hume laments that we will  surely never know ‘the origin of 
worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity.’17 And yet contemporary cosmology purports to tell 
us precisely this.
The reach of our knowledge is, indeed, extraordinary; but it may be that our luck is finally running out. The 
seeming impossibility of probing the sub-quantum world postulated by hidden variable theories is perhaps 
16  Euan Squires, The Mystery of the Quantum World, pp. 81-2.
17  David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.162 [130].
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permanent. And if this is the case, a hidden variables type theory becomes metaphysical, rather than physical. I  
should make this concession to positivism, that if there is no way of empirically testing a theory then it ceases 
to be an hypothesis in physics. If this is the case, then we should stick close to the testable facts, and this leads 
us back to an interpretation in terms of ensembles.
In fact, the limitations of human knowledge is precisely the point I wish to emphasise. I take the view which  
has been made familiar by Hume and Kant that human beings have no privileged epistemic access to the reaity.  
And the reason for this is that we ourselves are a part of this reality. Hence, we can only grasp the world in a  
manner adapted to our faculties. The fundamental problem with current interpretations of quantum mechanics  
is that they reject this postulate. Both Copenhagen and the relative-state interpretation assume that the wave-
function is a complete description of reality, that is, that reality can extend no further than our best theories. 
Both these interpretations are philosophically pre-critical. If human beings are a part of nature then we should  
accept the epistemological consequences of this concerning the possible limits of human knowledge.
Thus it  might be said that my account is unsatisfactory because I have left the explanation for the wave-
function wholly mysterious. And this is indeed the case. Precisely the same argument was applied by the  
Cartesians to Newton's concept of 'gravitation' in the late seventeenth century.18 To the Cartesians, the notion of 
gravitation seemed obscurantist and scientifically reactionary. It was a reversion to the occult qualities of a pre-
modern world view and contrasted strongly with the robust mechanistic explanations furnished by Descartes 
and his followers. But of course the Cartesians missed the point entirely. Whereas the Cartesians assumed that 
the human mind was adequate to completely disclose all  the secrets of nature, Newton did not make this 
assumption. His account of gravitation was descriptive. As he famously said in another context, he framed no 
hypotheses. This, however, does not in the least mean that he rejected hypotheses as metaphysical, as some 
positivists like to think. He doesn't rule out the possibility that a successful hypothesis might be formulated; he  
merely refrains for the moment to do so. And in pursuing this methodology he is essentially revealing his 
approach as a naturalistic one, one which recognises the potential limitations of human knowledge. It was, of  
course, precisely the Newtonian approach which turned out to be scientifically fruitful. Similar considerations, 
I believe, apply to the wave-function. As with gravitation we should, for the moment at any rate, take the  
wave-function simply as a description of the facts.
Properly interpreted, then, the most important change that quantum physics necessitates with regard to our  
common sense conception of reality is a change as to the nature of causality. Causation, it seems, at least 
insofar  as  causal  relations  are  known  to  us,  operates  on  ensembles  and  not  on  individual  quanta.  The 
18  See the first two chapters of H. O. Mounce's Hume's Naturalism.
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fundamental laws of mechanics are statistical in nature and do not suffice to determine the outcome of an 
experiment in a particular case. This, in essence, is the much-vaunted ‘principle of indeterminacy’. Whether it 
represents merely a limitation on our knowledge or whether individual events are in some absolute sense 
indeterminate is scarcely something we can know.
There is one further issue which I feel ought to be discussed when considering the philosophical issues  arising 
from quantum mechanics, and that is the whole debate between Bohr and Einstein concerning the so-called  
'EPR' thought-experiment. This has frequently been thought of as vindicating Bohr's interpretation of quantum 
mechanics and finally disposing of realism. I believe that this is a profound mistake. But since I have already 
showed that nothing in the remainder of quantum mechanics has such anti-realist implications, or is in any 
other way inconsistent with Russellian realism, I shall discuss this issue in the Appendix.
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Chapter 7
The Russellian Approach to Intentionality
I. A PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
If, as Russell believes, the events that constitute reality are intrinsically neither mental nor physical, then it  
would seem that none of them can be identical to intentional states such as beliefs, desires, etc. since these are  
paradigmatically mental occurrences. Mental states which are conscious states pose no great difficulties. My 
current visual percept of a desk and a clock, for example, comprise certain expanses of colour, and there is 
nothing intrinsically 'mental'  about an expanse of colour. The difficulty, however, arises when we turn our 
attention to intentional states, such as beliefs, desires and expectations. The difficulty is that such 'propositional  
attitudes'  are intrinsically characterised by a mental attitude directed towards a given 'content'. If Russell's  
neutral monism is to be tenable, then he must indicate how intentional states can be integrated into his overall  
theoretical framework.
In the course of presenting his account of intentionality, Russell was to develop ideas concerning the right 
methods for  psychology,  in  contrast  to  both psychoanalysis  and behaviourism, though leaning very much 
towards the latter. For Russell, philosophy was not an activity distinct from the sciences, and what Russell  
really develops in such works as The Analysis of Mind, and in An Outline of Philosophy, is the framework for a 
philosophical psychology.
Russell's  overall  approach  is  clearly  very  influenced  by the  behaviourism of  Watson,  to  whose  work  he 
constantly refers in The Analysis of Mind. In this work he identifies behaviourism and psychoanalysis as the 
two most important theories of mind. Whilst he does not dispute Freud's theories in general, he criticises the  
Freudian view of desire and of the unconscious from a Watsonian point of view. Desire, Russell maintains ' like 
force in mechanics, is of the nature of a convenient fiction for describing shortly certain laws of behaviour.' 1 
He elaborates this idea as follows: 'A hungry animal is restless until it finds food; then it becomes quiescent.  
1  The Analysis of Mind, p. 32.
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The thing which will bring a restless condition to an end is said to be what is desired. But only experience can  
show what will have this sedative effect, and it is easy to make mistakes.'2 As a consequence, self-knowledge is 
regarded by Russell as something quite rare, and definitely as something that is acquired. 'Most people', he 
writes,  'in  thinking  about  punishment,  have  had  no  more  need  to  hide  their  vindictive  impulses  from 
themselves than they have  had to  hide the  exponential  theorem. Our  impulses are  not  patent  to  a  casual 
observation, but are only to be discovered by a scientific study of our actions'.3 In particular, he thinks that the 
failure to see that desire is simply a kind of behavioural disposition leads the Freudians into theoretical errors 
in their model of the psyche: 
[The Freudians] speak always as though it were more normal for a desire to be conscious, and as though a 
positive cause had to  be assigned for  its  being unconscious.  Thus 'the unconscious'  becomes a sort  of  
underground prisoner, living in a dungeon, breaking in at long intervals upon our daylight respectability 
with dark groans and maledictions and strange atavistic lusts. The ordinary reader, almost inevitably, thinks 
of  this  underground person as another consciousness,  prevented by what  Freud calls  the 'censor'  from 
making his voice heard in company, except on rare and dreadful occasions when he shouts so loud that  
every one hears him and there is a scandal.4
In contrast to this picture, Russell puts forward his theory that so-called 'unconscious' desire is the natural form 
of desire:
The  unconscious  desire  [he  writes]  is...the natural  primitive form of desire,  from which  the other  has  
developed through our habit of observing and theorizing (often wrongly). It is not necessary to suppose, as  
Freud seems to do, that every unconscious wish was once conscious, and was then, in his terminology,  
'repressed'  because  we  disapproved  of  it.  On  the  contrary,  we  shall  suppose  that,  although  Freudian 
'repression'  undoubtedly occurs and is important,  it  is  not the usual reason for unconsciousness of our 
wishes. The usual reason is merely that wishes are all, to begin with, unconscious, and only become known 
when they are actively noticed. Usually, from laziness, people do not notice, but accept the theory of human 
nature which they find current, and attribute to themselves whatever wishes this theory would lead them to 
expect. We used to be full of virtuous wishes, but since Freud our wishes have become, in the words of the 
Prophet Jeremiah, 'deceitful above all things and desperately wicked'. Both these views...are the products of 
theory...5
2  Ibid.
3  Ibid, p. 61.
4  Ibid, pp. 37-8.
5  Ibid, p. 39.
112
Russell does not claim that this view of the unconscious is original, but ascribes it to Watson.
However, Russell is also deeply critical of certain aspects of Watsonian behaviourism. In particular, he is 
critical of Watson's denial of the existence of mental images, as opposed to sensations. Thus Russell writes that 
according to Watson when we think of a table 'we are making small movements of the throat and tongue'  
similar to those which we would make if we were saying the word 'table'. Hence, our 'thoughts' are a kind of 
sensation of our own bodily movements. On this issue, Russell chooses to remain agnostic. However, when it  
comes to visual images, such as a mental picture I might form of a friend, he is much more strident. 'It seems 
to me [he writes] that in this matter he has been betrayed into denying plain facts in the interests of a theory,  
namely, the supposed impossibility of introspection.'6 
In An Outline of Philosophy, published six years later, Russell is even more strident. He rejects the notion that 
even verbal thoughts are sensations of the throat and larynx. In relation to this theory he makes an interesting 
and (I think) valid point concerning scientific methodology:
It  should be realised that  behaviourism loses much of its  attractiveness if  it  is  compelled to  postulate 
movements that no one can observe and that there is no other reason to assume...Physics believes in a large  
number of phenomena which are too minute to be observed even with the strongest microscope, and if  
physics is at all correct, there must be minute movements in all parts of the human body, of a sort which we 
can never hope to see. We cannot reasonably demand of the behaviourist that he should abstain from an  
hypothesis  which  physics  asserts  for  very  good  reasons...But  when  the  behaviourist  assumes  small  
occurrences for which there is no ground in physics, and which are needed solely in order to safeguard his 
theory,  he  is  in  a  less  strong  position.  Dr.  Watson  asserts...that  whenever  we  'think'  there  are  small 
movements in the larynx which are beginnings of the movements we should make if we spoke words out  
loud. It may be that this is true; certainly I am not prepared to deny it. But I am not prepared to say that it  
must be true merely because, if it were not, behaviourism would be false. We do not know in advance that  
behaviourism is  true;  we have to  find out  whether  it  will  explain  observed  facts.  Whenever  it  has  to  
postulate something unobserved merely in order to avoid a refutation, it weakens its case.7
The point is that behaviourism ceases to be an 'economical' explanation if it has to resort to ad hoc hypotheses 
for which there is no evidence. In any case, given Russell's overall epistemology, the behaviourist attempt to 
eliminate images has little theoretical advantage. Sensations, for Russell, are just as 'internal' and subjective as 
6  Ibid, p. 152.
7  An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 79-80.
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images, since their character is affected by the sense-organs, nerves and brain. If sensations are admitted (as  
Watson concedes) then there seems little advantage in denying the existence of mental images that are not 
sensations.
It  should be noted, however,  that although Russell  defends the notion of mental imagery,  he does not, in  
general,  overestimate  its  importance  in  accounting  for  intentional  phenomena,  a  point  that  is  sometimes 
overlooked. In An Outline of Philosophy, for example, with reference to the part imagery plays in memory, he 
writes:
As regards the part played by images, I do not think this is essential. Sometimes there are memory-images,  
sometimes not; sometimes when images come in connection with memory, we may nevertheless know that 
the images are incorrect, showing that we have also some other and more reliable source of memory.8
Surprisingly, even 'imagination', for Russell, need have nothing to do with mental imagery:
Imagination is not, as the word might suggest, essentially connected with images. No doubt images are 
often, even usually, present when we imagine, but they need not be. A man can improvise on the piano 
without first having images of the music he is going to make; a poet might write down a poem without first  
making it up in his head.9
This analysis, it should be noted, precedes Wittgenstein's Blue Book, in which similar ideas are expounded, by 
six years – though some of Wittgenstein's examples are, I think, particularly felicitous. The point is that the  
downgrading of images in the analysis of mental phenomena was by no means as novel, when Wittgenstein 
adumbrated it, as is customarily supposed.
When it comes to the analysis of memory in  An Outline of Philosophy, Russell distinguishes two questions: 
firstly, 'What is happening now when I recollect?', and secondly, 'What is the relation of the present happening  
to the event remembered?'10
As to the first question, we have already seen that Russell thinks that images are not necessary to constitute a  
memory experience. However, where they do not occur it is at least necessary that there should be words,  
8  Ibid, p. 195.
9  Ibid, p. 198.
10  Ibid, pp. 205-6.
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either spoken aloud or merely said 'in my head'.11 It  may be objected that I can 'remember'  a person (for 
example) without any words or images. Russell does recognise this point, but he prefers to call events of this  
kind 'recognition' rather than 'true recollection'.12 'True recollection' consists of the memory of specific past 
events. Russell notes that 'images are not enough to constitute recollection, even when they are accurate copies 
of a past occurrence. One may, in a dream, live over again a past experience; while one is dreaming, one does 
not seem to be recalling a previous occurrence, but living through a fresh experience. We cannot be said to be  
remembering, in the strict sense, unless we have a belief referring to the past.'13 Remember that Russell is still 
seeking to answer the first question he posed above concerning memory, namely, what is happening now when 
I  recollect.  The  feeling  which  makes  us  'refer  the  images  to  a  past  prototype'  is  simply  the  feeling  of 
'familiarity'.14 This analysis of all very well, but it is hard to see how it can be applied to memory experiences 
comprising words, where no feeling of familiarity need attach to the words used to express the recollection.  
But then, in this case, the simple use of the past tense is sufficient to refer the words to the past.
The really important question is the second one: what is the relation of the present happening to the event 
remembered? Here, I believe, Russell falls into a major error. He writes that 'If we recollect correctly, the  
several images will have that kind of resemblance of quality which images have to their prototypes, and their 
structure and relations will be identical with those of their prototypes.'15 But similarity of image to its prototype 
is insufficient to constitute genuine memory. It seems to me that the past occurrence constitutes a recollection  
if it expresses a belief about the past which is suitably related to the past event recollected. And this 'suitably 
related' must be some sort of causal connection. Thus I might know of some event in my childhood because  
I've been repeatedly told about it. This may lead me to form a visual image of the past event, which may be  
quite  accurate,  and which  I  might mistake  for  a  genuine memory.  But  it  would not  constitute  a  genuine 
recollection because it is not caused directly by the past event's effect on me. Rather, it is only because the  
event had effects on external objects or persons (in this case, other people), who then affected me, that I know 
about it at all. It seems to me that a genuine memory has a particular kind of causal relationship to the past  
event remembered. Russell's omission of such considerations vitiates his analysis. He does not realise that  
memory may involve nothing but a belief that has a certain causal relation to the event remembered.
When, however, Russell comes to the consideration belief and knowledge, his analysis is altogether more 
satisfactory.  With  regard  to  knowledge he begins by adopting a  behaviouristic  perspective:  'We may say,  
broadly, that  a response to a stimulus of the kind involving desire...shows “knowledge” if it  leads by the 
11  Ibid, p. 206.
12  Ibid, pp. 204-5.
13  Ibid, p. 206.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid, p. 207.
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quickest or easiest route to the state of affairs which...is behaviouristically the object of desire.'16 This is not 
altogether  adequate  as  it  stands,  for  the  behaviour  which  is  in  fact  the  quickest  or  easiest  route  to  the  
satisfaction of desire might be adopted purely by accident, rather than through knowledge; but still, this initial  
definition might form the basis for a more adequate definition. Indeed, a little later on, Russell moves a little  
beyond straightforward behaviourism, and adumbrates what might be called a 'proto-functionalist'  position. 
Thus he writes that:
It should be observed...that knowledge is neutral as among different purposes. If you know that arsenic is 
poison, that enables you equally to avoid it if you wish to remain in health, and to take it if you wish to  
commit suicide. You cannot judge from a man's conduct in relation to arsenic whether he knows that it is a 
poison or not, unless you know his desires. He may be tired of life, but avoid arsenic because he has been 
told that it is a good medicine; in this case, his avoidance of it is evidence of lack of knowledge.17
Of course, Russell does not identify belief or knowledge with a functional state of the organism, but he comes 
close. 
The  above account  of  Russell's  approach  to  questions  of  intentionality  is  very brief  and  inadequate.  The 
question I wish to ask is: is Russell's general approach to intentionality capable of integrating intentional states  
into his neutral monism? I think we can answer this question in the affirmative, provided we recognise that  
Russell was fumbling towards  functionalism.
II. A RUSSELLIAN THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY
But what ground have I for favouring functionalism?
The first thing to note about intentionality is that there simply must be some sort of logical connection between 
intentional states and behaviour. In his book, Mind, Brain & the Quantum, Lockwood illustrates this with an 
example taken from a radio talk given by the late Professor Richard Braithwaite:
Imagine [Lockwood writes] a man standing on a high diving board over a swimming pool containing  
just  three  inches  of  water…On the  assumption  that  the  man wanted  to  go  for  a  swim,  we should  
naturally take his action in diving from the board as indicating that he believed that the pool was full.  
16  Ibid, p. 95.
17  Ibid, p. 97.
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Conversely, on the assumption that he believed that the water in the pool was only three inches deep, we 
should naturally infer  from his  action in  jumping from the board that  he wanted to injure  himself,  
perhaps to commit suicide. This is assuming a normal set of background beliefs; it would clearly make a 
difference if we knew that he believed he could fly, or was immortal. Beliefs, actions and desires form a 
kind of interlocking triad, such that a sufficient knowledge of any two enables us to infer the third.18 
Hence, it seems necessary to identify a given intentional state – such a belief or desire – as a functional state.  
However, it should be noted that the functional state with which a given intentional state is identical is a  
functional  state  against  a  background  of  other  intentional  states which  constitute  the  functional  state’s 
‘inputs’. Thus, to say that the man believes that the pool is full of water is to imply that he dives into the pool if 
he desires to dive into a water-filled pool, and also that he does not dive into the pool if he does not desire this.  
To say that the man believes the pool to be near-empty, on the other hand, is to imply that he dives into the 
pool if he desires to injure himself. Of course, I have represented this situation in highly schematic terms.  
However, the point is that the conditionals which are implied by a given attribution of an intentional state to a  
person are conditionals whose protases indicate the presence of other intentional states.
This has an important consequence. Although, in a given case, it is possible to identify an intentional state with 
a functional state, it is only possible to do this against a background of further intentional states. These are  
themselves identifiable with functional states, each against a further background of intentional states, and so  
on. However, in each case, the identification is only possible because there are other intentional states and each 
identity implies the existence of other intentional states. There is thus no question of reductionism. It is not  
possible to ‘reduce’ intentional states to non-intentional states, in the sense that it is not possible to rephrase 
intentional states in terms of functional states in such a manner as to exclude all reference to intentionality. In 
this  sense,  mind  is  irreducible.  However,  any  specimen intentional  state  that  you  care  to  present  can be 
identified with a functional state (albeit against the background of further intentional states).
There is a long-standing philosophical difficulty with functionalism which concerns the possibility of human-
like automata. Functionalism identifies intentional states with functional states. The ‘inputs’ to these functional  
states are physical sensory inputs – impulses in afferent nerves – and the ‘outputs’ are behaviour – or impulses 
in efferent nerves which give rise to behaviour. But this seems to allow that there could be intentional states so  
long as there were purely physical causes and effects linking these intentional states. Hence, it would not be 
necessary to assume the existence of conscious states. But then it would be logically possible for there to exist  
a being which had beliefs, desires, and so forth but not only had no conscious states, but did not even possess  
18  Michael Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the Quantum, pp. 43-4.
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the capacity for conscious states. Such a possibility is surely paradoxical. An entity incapable of consciousness 
would not be an entity to which we could ascribe a mind.
I think the correct solution to this paradox has been provided by Michael Lockwood.19 He begins by noting, as 
we did above,  that  although we can intelligibly credit  an unconscious being with beliefs  and desires (for  
example, a man who happened to be asleep), it makes no sense to credit a being with beliefs and desires who is 
not  even  theoretically  capable  of  conscious  awareness.  From  this  he  concludes  that  the  ‘inputs’  to  the 
functional states with which we identify intentional states must  include states of conscious awareness. The 
mistake  of  traditional  functionalism  was  that  it  regarded  the  ‘inputs’  as  essentially  events,  such  as  the 
stimulation of the optic nerve, that were purely physical and that occurred outside of the subject’s immediate 
conscious  awareness.  Instead,  we  should  take  as  inputs  the  subject’s  percepts  (in  addition  to  his  other  
functional states). If we do this, then it ceases to be logically possible for a being to have intentional states  
unless it is capable of states of conscious awareness, which is exactly the outcome required.
The  theory  I  have  expounded  in  this  chapter,  whilst  not  reductionist,  succeeds,  I  believe,  in  taking  the 
‘mystery’ out of the existence of mental processes. Mind no longer counts as an anomalous interloper in an 
otherwise  physical  world.  That  monism of  a  Russellian  variety succeeds  in  removing  the mystery  out  of  
conscious states is, I think, pretty evident. All events have intrinsic qualities; sensory qualities are merely the 
intrinsic  qualities  of  events  that  happen to be sensed.  As Russell  says,  there is no greater mystery to  the  
transformation  of  impulses  in  afferent  nerves  into  percepts  than  there  is  in  the  transformation  of 
electromagnetic  waves into sound waves in  a radio receiver.20 But now, with regard to  intentional  states, 
although they are irreducible, nevertheless each individual intentional state can be identified with a functional 
state (against a background of further intentional states). Hence, the existence of intentional states becomes no 
more mysterious than the existence of functional states, that is, the truth of conditional statements. (It is true  
that  some  philosophers  think  that  conditional  statements  are  quite  mysetrious  and  present  philosophical 
difficulties, but to pursue this topic now would take us too far from out current concern.)
Just as there is a dualism between structure and intrinsic quality in the case of events, which accounts for the  
‘mental’ side of things, so there is a dualism in the case of ‘states’, between facts describable in categorical  
terms and facts describable in conditional terms, which accounts for mentality in this case too. In each case, 
what would otherwise have been an unaccountable dualism of the mental and the physical is seen to be a mere 
by-product of a dualism which is not at all mysterious, but logically unavoidable.
19  See Lockwood, op. cit., p.44.
20  Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 16.
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And though this theory is not reductionist, it is monist. As we have already seen, an identity can be established 
between conscious states and brain-events. In the case of intentional states, the identity is between intentional 
states  and functional  states.  These functional  states  are  not  strictly  identical with  brain-states.  Rather the 
correct  way to express the relationship is  to  say that  brain-states  realise the functional  states  with which 
intentional states are identified. But this is still clearly a monist theory. The functional states are realised by the  
brain-states which causally ground them and without which it would not be physically possible for them to  
exist.
Indeed, it cannot be said that the distinction between the ‘mental’ and the non-mental is a metaphysically  
fundamental distinction. The ‘mental’ includes all intentional states, as well as all ‘events’ which form part of 
the immediate ‘input’ to such states, and whose occurrence they therefore presuppose.
In the light of the account I have given, intentional states can be seen simply as a result of a certain degree of  
functional complexity on the part of living organisms, grounded in a corresponding degree of neuro-physical 
complexity.  In this sense, we can regard mind as ‘emergent’, but only in a manner that makes its existence 
scarcely mysterious.
III. RUSSELL'S NEUTRAL MONISM AND CONTEMPORARY WORK ON THE MIND-BODY 
PROBLEM
It is sometimes said that Russell is coming back into fashion and that a lot of thinkers in the philosophy of  
mind are adumbrating 'Russellian' solutions to the mind-body problem. However, almost invariably I find that 
the characterisation of these positions as Russellian depends on a very inadequate or truncated view of Russell.  
Furthermore, I often find that it is their lack of understanding of Russell's philosophy which gets these thinkers 
into  all  sorts  of  conceptual  difficulties  –  that  Russell's  actual  metaphysic  already clearly disposes  of  the  
problems that lead these thinkers into muddle, and that if these thinkers had a better understanding of Russell's  
actual philosophy then they would not have these difficulties. This is an instance where the understanding of  
Russell's neutral monism can help to illuminate contemporary discussions.
To illustrate this, I shall deal very briefly with a modern 'Russellian', David Chalmers. His ideas about mind 
and body are set out in the last portion of his book The Conscious Mind, published in 1996.
There is a lot of discussion by Chalmers of 'information', which is characterised informally as the 'difference  
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that  makes  a  difference'.21 That  is,  the  information  embodied  in  a  physical  system  refers  to  the  causal-
functional state of the physical system. A system with two possible effects (e.g. a light-switch that can turn a  
bulb either on or off) has many possible physical states, but many of these states will be identical in terms of  
their effects. In fact, there are only two possible states if these are identified by their effects, and it takes a  
single 'bit' of information (either 0 or 1) to represent the state of the light-switch in this regard. The information  
embodied in a physical system is represented by a series of numbers which are necessary and sufficient to  
completely specify the causal-functional state of the system. Chalmers notes that phenomenal qualities are 
isomorphic with the causal-functional state of certain regions of the brain. Assuming a Copernican principle 
that the brain is not a metaphysically unusual object in the universe he then suggests that we ought to suppose  
that 'all information is associated with experience'. From this he concludes that 'it is not just information that is  
ubiquitous. Experience is ubiquitous too.'22 This leads him into all sorts of difficulties, since this would seem to 
commit him to panpsychism, a philosophical position from which he seeks to dissociate himself.
Now it  is  true  that  causal-functional  states  of  the  brain  are  associated  with  phenomenal  qualities.  What  
Chalmers never recognises is that the qualities that figure in our experience are not intrinsically 'phenomenal'. 
Take,  for  example,  a  region  of  red  within  the  visual  field.  Why should  a  region  of  red  be  regarded  as  
intrinsically mental?  Naïve  realism ascribes colours  to  physical  objects  and certainly does not  regard the 
surfaces of unobserved physical objects as 'mental'. Qualities which are individuated to particular occasions 
and places can count as events. Now what makes events mental is, on the Russellian view, nothing intrinsic to 
the events themselves. Rather it consists in the contingent causal relations which events have to each other.  
Essentially,  we credit  an entity with a  'mind'  to  the extent  that  we think it  capable  of  learned responses. 
Humans learn from experience. In the case of lower lifeforms things are not so clear and thus we might be 
uncertain  whether  to  credit  them with  minds  or  not.  Since,  however,  mentality  concerns  a  set  of  causal 
properties of events there need be no absolutely right or wrong answer as to whether some lifeforms has a 
mind. There is a vagueness about the concept of mind, just as there is about the concept of baldness.
There is therefore no need for Chalmers' unedifying discussions concerning the experiences of thermostats. 
Since a thermostat has no learned responses, the events which serve to constitute it are not 'experiences', and  
the  qualities  characterising  these  events  are  not  'phenomenal'.  It  is  not  'experience'  which  is  ubiquitous; 
qualities are  ubiquitous.  At  one  point  Chalmers  canvasses  the  idea  that  non-mental  events  do  not  have 
phenomenal qualities but 'protophenomenal' qualities. This sounds promising, but the concept is never well-
defined. Furthermore, he says that the cost of admitting protophenomenal qualities 'is the postulation of a class  
21  Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, p. 281.
22  Ibid, p. 293.
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of unfamiliar properties that we do not understand'.23 It is not easy to understand Chalmers' difficulties here. 
Certainly, we are not acquainted with the qualities characterising events that are not experiences, and to that  
extent they would indeed be 'unfamiliar', just as 'colours' would be unfamiliar to a blind man who has never 
experienced colour. But why this would pose any theoretical difficulties, or why such a notion is not one we 
'understand', is not something that Chalmers ever explains.
At one point Chalmers considers the possibility that 'the world might as well be [regarded as] exhausted by an 
informational characterisation.'24 This is the idea that the world has a structure but no intrinsic qualities. The 
problem with this view is that it is incoherent. An abstract structure is not a concrete structure but a class of 
concrete structures. Hence, if any actual objects (as opposed to sets) exist at all, then they will form a concrete  
structure which comprises a certain set of relations and qualities, whose description is not exhausted by their  
purely formal properties, for this concerns merely the isomorphism class to which they belong.
Chalmers himself rejects the view that information alone exists, and thus returns to the problem of how the 
qualities of physical reality are related to physical states. His suggestion is that, if phenomenal qualities are 
indeed ubiquitous, then the unknown qualities of the world are precisely the phenomenal qualities.
He characterises this position as Russellian, and there are important Russellian elements to it, but in truth he  
has completely failed to understand Russell's philosophy, and this failure leads him into all sorts of muddles.  
His main problem is that phenomenal properties – at least those associated with brains – correspond to the 
states of macroscopic objects. But in physics the fundamental stuff comprises entities on the microscopic level. 
How can an experience be identical  with a  vast  number of  microphysical  occurrences,  given the relative  
homogeneity of  experience and the relative 'fine-grain'  of  physical  reality?  This  is a version of  'the grain  
problem'.
He considers three answers. The first answer is that functional states are realised by phenomenal states at all  
levels, macroscopic as well as microscopic. He rejects this on the ground that the macroscopic functional states 
are  fully  grounded  in  the  microscopic  physical  states.  So  once  the  microscopic  states  are  realised  by 
phenomenal states, any realisation of the macroscopic functional states would in fact duplicate these states.
The second possibility is that 'macroscopic phenomenology might be  constituted by these microphenomenal 
properties'25, though this would surely lead us once again back to the grain problem. How this can be avoided 
23  Ibid, p. 298.
24  Ibid, p. 303.
25  Ibid, p. 307.
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is,  as  Chalmers  admits,  'not  easy to  understand'.26 The  third  option  is  simply  to  regard  the 
macrophenomenology  as  supervenient  on  the  microphenomenology  –  the  two  are  related  by  laws.  This,  
however,  diminishes  the  attractiveness  of  the  proposal,  since  the  macrophenomenology  would  be  quite  
arbitrarily  related  to  the  more  fundamental  microphenomenology.  In  contemporary  parlance,  the 
macrophenomenology would constitute a set of 'nomological danglers'. 
Chalmers' difficulties arise entirely from the assumption that the micro level is ontologically fundamental. But  
why  make  this  assumption?  If  our  percepts  are  related  to  the  functional  states  of  macroscopic  physical 
structures,  then  why  not  assume  that  macroscopic  'events'  are  fundamental,  and  that  the  micro  level  is  
constituted from them. This would eliminate all the problems Chalmers considers.
For  example,  percepts  would  no  longer  be  arbitrarily  related  to  the  physical  structures  on  which  they 
supervene. Rather they would serve to constitute (along with other events) these physical structures. It would 
then  follow  as a matter  of  logic that  they 'supervene'  on the physical  structures.  For if  a  given physical 
structure comprises a given set of events, (A, B, C, D,...) then, if a given event belonging to the set alters, we  
can say that the physical structure is thereby altered. If, however, the physical structure alters (i.e. one of its  
constituents is altered), then a percept belonging to the set need not alter since it is not necessary that  every 
element of the set alters for us to say that the set alters, but merely that at least one event alters. Thus, two 
brains which were in precisely the same physical state would necessarily be associated with the same percepts,  
but  two  sets  of  identical  percepts  need  not  be  associated  with  precisely  the  same  physical  state  on  the  
microphysical level. And this is precisely what is implied by supervenience. Hence, on the Russellian view, the 
'supervenience' of percepts on the brain is deducible from the metaphysic, and is not longer just a brute fact.  
Percepts, on the Russellian view, are no longer anomolous 'nomological danglers'. Rather the supervenience of  
percepts on the brain would be something that we could deduce from the metaphysic even if we did not know 
of it beforehand. The fact that the supervenience of percepts on the brain is completely explicable is surely a  
point in favour of neutral monism.
To be fair, Chalmers' account does contain one tiny reference to the possibility that macroscopic 'events' should 
be taken as fundamental. He writes: 'One could try...making macroscopic grounding primary, but it would then 
be hard to deal with cases of isolated microscopic systems and the like.'27 And this is all he says about this 
possibility. The objection he raises here seems to be that if we represent a particle by an event, then (since this  
event  occupies  a  region),  the  event  could  equally  well  represent  a  particle  within  the  same  region  but 
occupying a slightly different point. Making the macroscopic primary fails to give the physical world the fine-
26  Ibid.
27  Ibid, p. 306.
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grain that we are seeking. But of course if we take the macroscopic level as primary then the microscopic level  
will be constituted out of groups of events, not single events. A given particle, or point, will be a whole set of 
events. This is not a possibility that seems even to occur to Chalmers. But it is precisely the Russellian theory.
The point I want to make here is that Russell has only been very partially appreciated and this is leading to  
thinkers  who  consider  themselves  'Russellian'  from  failing  to  consider  the  very  elegant  solutions  to 
metaphysical  problems  which  Russell's  theoretical  approach  already  supplies.  This  in  turn  serves  to 
demonstrate  how  a  better  understanding  of  Russell's  neutral  monism  could  greatly  assist  contemporary 
discussions, and I hope that in the course of this thesis I have furthered this objective of understanding.
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Chapter 8
Theory of Knowledge: The Transformation of 
Empiricism
I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PREMISES: THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT
In 1948, Russell published his Human Knowledge, a work which (like Hume's Treatise) 'fell dead-born from 
the press'. In part this was because, by the time this book was published, philosophers had largely come to the  
conclusion that any epistemology which begins from a starting-point of private 'percepts' was untenable. Such  
an epistemology, it was thought, had been revealed as radically mistaken due to the work of Wittgenstein, in  
particular by the 'private language argument'. It was furthermore thought that starting out from percepts would  
lead to solipsism, imprisoning the subject within the circle of his own experiences. We shall later on show how  
this  is  not  true,  and  does  not  follow from Russellian  premises.  But  for  now,  I  wish  to  defend Russell's  
epistemological starting point by examining the private language argument.
I have, earlier on, offered a very brief defence of the terminology of percepts.1 If the terminology of percepts 
can be made intelligible, as I think it can, then it seems to me that the introduction of this vocabulary is (as I 
think Ayer once said about sense-data) legitimate and advantageous. It is most useful to have some way of 
describing the character of my phenomenology which is strictly tailored to the phenomenology itself in the  
sense that it does not go beyond it. No doubt such a vocabulary would not be useful in everyday life, for in  
everyday life  we are  rarely concerned with the  precise  character  of  our current  experience  and are  more 
concerned with the physical objects of which the current experience is taken to be a sign. Nevertheless, it 
seems to me that it is perfectly possible to describe the colours, sounds and other qualities of my experience  
without implying any existences other than the experience.
This conclusion was precisely what Wittgenstein and his followers sought to refute on the basis of the ‘private 
language argument’. The precise structure of this argument is a matter of some contention, so if I set out what I  
1  See above, p. 10.
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take to be a refutation of Wittgenstein’s argument it is vulnerable to the charge that I have misinterpreted him.  
Nevertheless, the gist of the argument goes something like this. Suppose that I use the word ‘red’ to describe,  
not a publicly observable quality of physical objects, but the character of a private sensation. The meaning of 
the term ‘red’ is thus directly known only to me. Now, all words, if they are meaningful, must be governed by  
some criterion of correct usage. But how do I know, in the present instance, that I am using the word ‘red’  
correctly if  I  use it  to  describe something purely private? It  is  not  as  though I  can produce the previous 
sensation to which I ascribed redness and compare it with my present sensation. To rely on memory is no use,  
for I have no way of independently checking my memory. Hence, there simply is no criterion of ‘correctness’  
here, which is to say that the word ‘red’ is meaningless.
If, however, this is Wittgenstein’s argument, then I think it is certainly fallacious. For a start, it conflates two 
quite separate issues: on the one hand, whether there is a criterion for the correct use of a given word, and on  
the other,  how we can know, in  a given instance,  that  this  criterion is  satisfied.  I  see no reason why we 
shouldn’t be able to answer the first question in the affirmative, and even say what the criterion is, without  
being able to answer the second question. Thus, a word such as ‘red’ is used correctly if it is used consistently,  
i.e. if it is used to denote the same colour on every occasion of its use. In a given instance it might well be the  
case that this criterion is satisfied, and thus the word used correctly, without the user of the word even knowing 
whether or not he has used the word correctly. Hence, since a criterion for correct usage is capable of being  
satisfied quite independently of whether it is known to be satisfied, Wittgenstein fails to show that there is a  
difficulty  here.  Wittgenstein’s  argument  slides  between  semantic  and  epistemological  issues  quite  
unwarrantably. In fact, the problem of how we know that we have used a word consistently is just a special  
instance of the more general  problem of justifying our claims to knowledge concerning the past.  This  is,  
indeed, a difficult problem in epistemology, but I don’t think that Wittgenstein contributed much to its solution.
In case my presentation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument is taken to be a caricature, I shall refer to  
the account supplied by Anthony Kenny, whom I take to be a faithful expositor of his master’s work. 2 Kenny 
identifies the heart of the private language argument as aimed against the claim that one can meaningfully say  
‘this is S again’, where ‘S’ stands for the character of a sensation that I had previously noted as occurring in 
my experience. Suppose someone says ‘this is S again’ about such a sensation. Kenny says that if we asked the  
person ‘what do you mean by S?’ then three answers would be possible: ‘he may say “I mean this”; he may  
appeal  to  a  private  memory-sample  of  S;  he  may mention  a  public  correlate  of  S’. 3 Kenny (interpreting 
Wittgenstein)  rightly rejects  the  first  alternative  on the  ground that  this  would  strip  the  utterance  of  any  
descriptive content.
2  See his book Wittgenstein, published in 1973.
3  Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 193.
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It is the second alternative that is the crucial one. In this alternative, ‘S’ stands for the same sensation (in terms 
of character) as occurred in the past. Kenny says that in order to be able to make the claim that ‘S’ has the same 
phenomenal character as a past sensation the person making this claim must rely on memory. ‘But’, Kenny  
writes, ‘he must call up the right memory.’ Now is it possible that the person will call up the wrong memory? If 
not, then ‘whatever seems right is right’ which means that there is no criterion of correctness here, and ‘S’ is  
meaningless (this part of the argument can be accepted as sound). But if it is possible that the person might call  
up the wrong memory then, Kenny argues, the claim that S is the same sensation becomes meaningless. I  
cannot check the accuracy of my memory by calling to mind a memory-table as it were. For there can be no 
real looking up of which sample goes with ‘S’; all that I can do is try to remember which sample goes with S,  
and for this I shall need once again to rely on my original memory. This is why the appeal to a memory-sample  
is ‘As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was 
true.’4 This, it seems to me, is an apposite analogy, and shows that a given instance of recollection can gain no  
additional security by being checked against a mental memory-sample. However, it is not clear to me why such 
an appeal to a memory-sample is necessary. The fact that my memory is fallible can be admitted without it 
following that any claims made purely on the basis of memory are actually devoid of literal significance. It  
seems to me that Wittgenstein, perhaps unconsciously, is presupposing a verificationist account of meaning. 
For only on such a basis could one conflate being unable to check a given memory by literally resurrecting the  
past  with  the  statement  about  the  past  being  meaningless.  Kenny  himself,  by  his  attempts  to  dissociate 
Wittgenstein from positivist assumptions, reveals that he is aware that Wittgenstein's argument is vulnerable to 
the  charge  of  presupposing  verificationism.  However,  I  do  not  think  his  attempt  to  decouple  the  private  
language  argument  from  positivism  is  wholly  successful.  The  question  Wittgenstein  asks  is  not,  Kenny 
maintains, ‘how would you ever find out?’ but ‘what possible difference would it make?’ 5 But besides the fact 
that these questions are not, after all, so very far apart (except that the latter question has a curiously pragmatist  
ring to it), I would maintain that it is possible for a proposition to be true without it making any ‘difference’ to  
the course of my experience. For this reason, I do not think Kenny is altogether successful in differentiating  
Wittgenstein’s philosophy from verificationism.
In the example above, I mentioned that, when asked what the private sensation S stood for, there was a third  
reply that the person could make, according to Kenny, namely, that he could mention a 'public correlate' of S.  
Suppose,  for example,  that  whenever I experience the sensation S my blood pressure rises.  Then I  could  
identify ‘S’ as  the correlate  of  blood pressure rise.  But  if  this  is  how the sensation is  identified  then  its  
character would seem to be irrelevant. Effectively, ‘S’ has become synonymous with ‘sensation causing a rise  
4  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 265, quoted in Anthony Kenny, op. cit, p. 192.
5  Anthony Kenny, op cit, p. 195.
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in blood pressure’. Of course, I could deny this last step. Just because I identify S through the rise in my blood 
pressure it does not follow that ‘S’ means ‘sensation causing a rise in blood pressure’. I can allow that the  
criterion of similarity takes precedence over any of its physiological effects and that where the sensation is  
qualitatively similar then it is an instance of S, even if it does not cause a rise in blood pressure. However,  
Kenny denies this possibility. He writes ‘Suppose that I say “S” and the blood pressure does not rise: what 
reasons  have  I  to  say  that  I  have  misidentified  the  sensation  rather  than  misremembered  which  kind  of 
sensation goes with the rise?’ Because I have no independent way of checking my memory in this instance, 
Kenny concludes that there is no difference between these two cases. Hence, to talk of a supposed qualitative 
character of S accessible only to myself is meaningless. But again, this argument depends on verificationist  
assumptions. Because there is no independent way of checking my memory, Kenny assumes that the appeal to  
memory is somehow suspect, and this is an assumption for which he (along with Wittgenstein) has failed to  
provide argumentative support.
II. RUSSELL'S ANSWER TO HUME
Having disposed of one objection to Russell's epistemology, we are in a position to explore his ideas more  
sympathetically. In particular, I want in the remainder of this chapter to show how the fact that we begin with  
private sensations in no way implies scepticism about the external world. On the contrary, by developing a 
form of epistemological naturalism, Russell was able to transcend Humean empiricism and set out an account  
of human knowledge which is based on human beings already being in a world with which they are connected.  
I shall begin my exposition by showing how, in Human Knowledge, Russell answered Hume's scepticism 
derived from the latter's analysis of causation. Nowhere in Human Knowledge does Russell tackle this directly.  
His remarks are spread throughout the work. But I believe that they add up to a very significant and important  
theory.
For Russell, causality, or cause-and-effect, is nothing but nearly invariable sequence. I say 'nearly' invariable 
sequence, because no laws of this form are entirely invariable. If I strike a match, it will light, but this does not  
always happen, since sometimes I do not strike the match hard enough, or the match is wet. Thus no causal  
sequence is in fact completely invariable. The fundamental laws of physics - those which are in fact invariable  
-  are  expressed  in  the  form of  differential  equations  in  which  'cause'  and  'effect'  are  not  distinguished.  
Schrödinger’s wave equations might be examples of fundamental causal laws. Nevertheless, the traditional 
concept  of  causality  as  consisting  of  'cause  and  effect'  is  still  important  in  science  since  it  is  from 
generalisations of this sort that science is built up and which eventually yield the more exact and invariable  
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laws  of  physics.  Since,  then,  science  rests  on  generalisations  of  the  cause-and-effect  variety,  it  must  be 
legitimate for us to talk of cause and effect and apply these terms to real events. However, if statements of this 
kind are to be true, then cause and effect must stand, not for invariable sequence, but for nearly invariable  
sequence.
The fact that causal sequences are not invariable is a further nail in the coffin of the notion that there is some 
sort of necessary connection between cause and effect. Russell accepts the empiricist doctrine, derived from 
Hume, that we have no genuine concept of necessary connection. But if we have no insight into any genuine 
necessary connection between cause and effect then on what basis can we legitimately infer the effect from the 
cause? This is Hume's problem. He demonstrated that there is no logically (deductively) valid inference from 
cause to effect.  It  is not contradictory to suppose that what we have hitherto taken as causal laws should 
henceforth cease to be applicable. It is no use appealing to experience to support our belief in causal laws since  
all arguments from experience presuppose their existence.
Russell, as I shall now show, solved this problem, and he solved it definitively. His discussion of these topics  
in  Human Knowledge is the most sophisticated discussion of non-demonstrative inference in the history of 
philosophy, and it is a shame that it has gone largely unnoticed, even to this day. (We shall examine later on the 
reasons for this ignorance.)
Russell's strategy is to first construct a definition of knowledge which anticipates, by nearly twenty years, the 
externalist and reliabilist account of knowledge of Alvin Goldman. In the chapter on 'Kinds of Knowledge' he 
first distinguishes between data and inferential knowledge. Interestingly, he takes inferential knowledge to  
include  'perception'.  When,  for  example,  I  perceive  a  table,  I  perceive  something  which  arouses  certain 
expectations (e.g. that it will be hard to the touch), and these expectations are essential to my perception of the  
object as a table. These expectations amount to inferential beliefs which are a result of prior experiences. 
Consequently,  most  of  what  passes for  'experience'  involves a considerable  degree of  inference.  There is, 
indeed, a sensational core to my experiences, but only philosophers are interested in this core. When I do not  
misperceive something, then, so long as there is the appropriate causal connection between my perception and 
the object of my perception, my perception counts as a piece of knowledge. Sensation, however (the 'core' of 
the perception which does not involve any inference), does not itself amount to knowledge. If I become aware 
of a sensation then this awareness can count as knowledge. Knowledge that does not involve inferences is said  
to be knowledge of 'data'.
Besides the data of sensation, the other source of data arises from memory. In  Human Knowledge, Russell 
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reiterates his claim that remembering occurs now whereas what is remembered is in the past, and thus that  
there is nothing logically inconsistent in supposing that I have the 'memories' that I have even if there were no  
past  at  all.  Of  course,  in  this  case  we must  put  the  word  'memory'  in  scare  quotes  because  the  putative 
memories will not be genuine. But I cannot distinguish a genuine from a delusive memory-experience from 
any mark within the experience itself. However, it is important to realise that Russell does not think that our 
knowledge of the past is inferred from present memory-experiences. On the contrary, where a putative memory 
is genuine the 'data' concerns past events themselves, not present occurrences. We look through the memory, as  
it were, and epistemically grasp a past event. There is thus no question of 'justifying' our claims to knowledge  
about the past on the basis of inference from some present occurrence.
All our data, both that of sensation and of memory, are particular facts. In order to infer any further facts from  
this data we must rely on general principles that are not themselves data. But now this is precisely where  
Hume's problem supervenes. Any general principles which can enable us to infer particular facts from a wholly 
separate set of particular facts cannot be analytic. Nor can such general principles be given in experience,  
which is confined to particular facts. Nor, finally, do we have any insight into a supposed relation of necessary 
connection between separate events which could ground our inferences. So how can beliefs which are based on 
such principles count as knowledge?
Russell's answer is to posit a radically externalist account of inferential knowledge. Discussing the case of  
expectation, he begins by pointing out that 'Since every case of knowledge is a case of true belief, but not vice  
versa, we have to inquire what must be added to truth to make a true expectation count as “knowledge”.' 6 
Russell provides several examples of cases of true belief that are not knowledge. For example, 'suppose you  
are expecting Mr. X to ring you up on the telephone. The telephone bell rings, but it is not Mr. X. In this case 
your expectation that the bell would ring, though true, was not knowledge.' 7 The examples are similar, in 
essence, to those given in  The Problems of Philosophy back in 1912,8 and the same conclusion is drawn, 
namely that an expectation is not knowledge if it is based on an argument with false premises. In the telephone 
case, my expectation that the telephone would ring was a consequence of my belief that Mr. X would ring. If in  
fact Mr. X was not going to attempt to ring me this afternoon then my expectation that the telephone would  
ring, though true, would not amount to knowledge.
It is perhaps of interest to note that this argument would also apply to Gettier's examples of justified true belief 
that were not knowledge in his famous paper on the definition of knowledge. Thus his 'Case 1' involves Smith 
6  Human Knowledge, p. 445.
7  Ibid, p. 446.
8  See The Problems of Philosophy, p. 76.
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having a justified belief that 'Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket', on  
the basis of his justified belief in each of the conjuncts. From this proposition he concludes that 'The man who  
will get the job has ten coins in his pocket'. This latter proposition turns out to be true, but only because it is 
Smith who will get the job and (unknown to Smith) Smith has ten coins in his pocket. It cannot be said that  
Smith knows the conclusion which he believes and which he seems justified in believing. The reason for this is  
that his  belief in this conclusion is derived solely from his  belief  in  the conjunction, and the conjunctive 
proposition is false. Similarly, in Gettier's 'Case 2', Smith has good reason to believe that Jones owns a Ford 
but has no idea of the whereabouts of his friend Brown. Realising that 'Jones owns a Ford' entails 'Either Jones  
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', Smith accepts this disjunction on the basis of this entailment. But now 
it turns out that Jones does not own a Ford, and, by sheer coincidence, Brown is in Barcelona. Again, Smith's  
belief in the disjunctive proposition can hardly be admitted to count as knowledge, even though it is justified 
and true. The reason again is that the disjunction is only accepted on the basis of a false disjunct.
Russell does not discuss the question of whether knowledge is justified true belief (and thus I do not think that  
it can accurately be said that he 'anticipated' Gettier), but it is clear that his own account of knowledge does not  
fall prey to the sorts of Gettier-type counter-examples to which (for example) Ayer's account is vulnerable,  
since Russell is clear that valid claims to knowledge cannot rest on arguments with false premises.
In Russell's case, the 'false premises' which he particularly has in mind as invalidating a claim to knowledge 
are not so much premises regarding particular facts as premises embodying general propositions. He writes 
that 'If I think that A is almost always followed by B, and therefore, having seen A, I expect B; if, in fact, A is  
very seldom followed by B, but this happens to be one of the rare cases where it is so followed, then my true  
expectation of B cannot count as knowledge.'9
Russell considers the case of a dog which becomes excited in expectation of being taken for a walk when her  
owner takes out its lead. Here, taking out the lead has invariably been followed by a walk. Therefore, the dog 
comes to expect that taking out the lead will be followed by a walk on this occasion. 'The dog', Russell writes,  
'goes through no such process of  reasoning.  But  the  dog is  so constituted that,  if  A has been frequently  
followed by B in her experience, and B is emotionally interesting, A causes her to expect B. Sometimes the 
dog is  right  in  this  expectation,  sometimes  wrong.  Suppose  that,  in  fact,  A is  always,  or  nearly always,  
followed by B; can we say, in that case, that the dog is right to expect B?' 10 To answer this question Russell 
first invites us to consider the situation where 'although A is in fact always followed by B, this generalization 
only happens to be right, and most logically similar generalizations are wrong. In that case we must regard it as  
9  Russell, Human Knowledge, p. 446.
10  Ibid.
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a stroke of luck for the dog that she has hit on a case in which a fallacious process, by chance, leads to a true  
result.'  Russell concludes that 'I do not think that in such a case the dog's expectation can be regarded as  
“knowledge”.'11 But now Russell invites us to consider the contrary case:
suppose  [he  writes],  not  only that  A is,  in  fact,  almost  always  followed by B,  but  further  that  the 
experienced cases of A being followed by B belong to a definable class of cases in which generalization  
is nearly always in fact true. Shall we, now, admit the dog's expectation as 'knowledge'? I am assuming  
that, although generalizations of the kind considered are in fact almost always true, we know of no 
reason why they should be.  My own view is  that,  in  such a  case,  the dog's  expectation should be 
admitted as 'knowledge'. And, if so, scientific inductions also are 'knowledge', provided the world has 
certain characteristics.12
The crucial line here is the remark that 'although generalizations of the kind considered are in fact almost  
always true, we know of no reason why they should be so.' Thus the fact that we have no reason or ground for  
assuming that a given class of generalisations is true does not prevent generalisations belonging to this class 
counting as knowledge so long as they are nearly always true in fact. This, then, completely answers Hume. 
We have genuine knowledge of the world not because we have any rational insight into a relation between  
cause and effect which could ground the inference we make from one to the other. As Hume conclusively 
showed, we have no such insight. But this is besides the point. For we still have knowledge of the world so  
long as nature is a certain way and so long as our nature is such that our propensities to certain sorts of  
inferences appropriately mirrors the way nature is.
Russell  concludes  his  chapter  on  'Kinds  of  Knowledge'  by  setting  out  a  set  of  necessary  and  sufficient  
conditions for knowledge of a certain important class of general propositions:
I shall say that an animal 'knows' the general proposition 'A is usually followed by B' if the 
following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) The animal has had repeated experience of A being followed by B.
(2) This experience has caused the animal to behave in the presence of A more or less as it  
previously behaved in the presence of B.
(3) A is in fact usually followed by B.
(4) A and B are of such a character, or are so related, that, in most cases where this character or  
relation exists, the frequency of the observed sequences is evidence of the probability of a general if not 
11  Ibid.
12  Ibid, p. 447.
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invariable law of sequence.13
By implication, beliefs in particular facts are also knowledge if they are based on a conjunction of known 
general propositions and data. This reliabilist definition of knowledge provides an answer to Hume which is  
completely definitive and completely satisfying. Instead of seeing man as a Cartesian subject who starts out  
imprisoned within his own private world and then has to find some epistemic route out of it, Russell's account 
sees human beings as already related to a physical world of which they are a tiny part. Our knowledge is based 
on propensities to belief that have been given to us by nature. Provided nature is a certain way, these beliefs  
will count as knowledge. Thus a correct account of knowledge is only possible if we see human beings as in  
the world and, as natural creatures, having certain innate propensities. As Russell writes, 'Owing to the world  
being such as it  is,  certain occurrences are  sometimes,  in  fact,  evidence for  certain others;  and owing to 
animals being adapted to their environments, occurrences which are, in fact, evidence of others tend to arouse  
expectation of those others.'14 
This is a particularly important point because Russell is sometimes charged, quite falsely, with adopting the 
standpoint of 'methodological solipsism', which tries to construct all our knowledge on the basis of private data  
alone. It is difficult to see, on such a basis, how actual solipsism could be avoided. But far from endorsing such 
a view, in his later work Russell is always scathing and dismissive of it. Thus in the chapter on 'Solipsism' in  
Human Knowledge, Russell relates that he 'once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine  
Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a 
logician, this surprise surprised me.'15 Of course, if Mrs. Franklin believed the solipsist hypothesis then the 
non-existence of other solipsists, far from being surprising, would have been a logical consequence of her 
beliefs which such an eminent logician could scarcely have overlooked. The point is, of course, that Mrs.  
Franklin could not in fact have believed what she professed to believe, at least if her surprise at there being no  
other solipsists was genuine. As Russell writes:
The fact that I cannot believe something does not prove that it is false, but it does prove that I am  
insincere and frivolous if I pretend to believe it. Cartesian doubt has value as a means of articulating our 
knowledge and showing what depends on what, but if carried too far it becomes a mere technical game 
in which philosophy loses seriousness.16
13  Ibid, p. 450.
14  Ibid, pp. 514-5.
15  Ibid, p. 196.
16  Ibid.
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Rejecting, then, the standpoint of methodological solipsism, Russell's account instead anticipates by several 
years  the  'naturalised  epistemology'  of  Quine.  Explaining  his  method  in  My Philosophical  Development,  
Russell  writes  that  'I  reverse the process which has been common in philosophy since Kant.  It  has been 
common among philosophers to begin with how we know and proceed afterwards to what we know. I think  
this is a mistake, because knowing how we know is one small department of knowing what we know.'17
One should be careful as to what Russell's  epistemological naturalism means. Jaegwon Kim, for example, 
criticised Quine's version of this thesis for effectively destroying epistemology entirely. 18 If Quine is correct, 
Kim argues, then the only thing to investigate is the causation of belief. Questions of whether or not a belief is  
justified have no place, and thus the term 'knowledge'  should have to be jettisoned as lacking application.  
Russell's  views are  not  vulnerable  to  this  criticism -  and  it  could  be  considered  an  uncharitable  way of 
interpreting Quine. Certainly for Russell, the point is not that normative notions such as justification have no 
place in philosophy or science but rather that any account of how our beliefs are justified must appeal to 
knowledge  that  is  already  supplied  by  science.  This  is  viciously  'circular'  only  if  the  aim  is  to  justify 
knowledge on an indubitable foundation - an aim to some extent shared by both Descartes and Hume, but 
repudiated by Russell (and by Quine).
The similarities between Russell and Quine should not, however, be exaggerated. One important difference is  
as  to  what  Quine  calls  'observation  statements',  which  Quine  construes  in  terms  of  symbols  referring  to 
material 'bodies'. But if observation statements are to ground inferences then they cannot themselves by the 
result of inferences. Hence, they cannot embody the influence of past experience. Now talk of 'bodies' does 
embody inferences which are the result of experience - this is why Russell felt the need to distinguish between 
sensation and perception, and why 'observation statements', pace Quine, must refer to sensation alone, and thus 
omit all reference to 'bodies'. I cannot help thinking, therefore, that Russell's account is greatly superior to that 
of Quine's, both theoretically and in terms of clarity of exposition.
III. THE REJECTION OF INDUCTION
Our scientific beliefs amount to knowledge, then, if the world has certain characteristics - characteristics which  
are  mirrored  by  our  inferential  habits.  The  statements  embodying  these  characteristics  cannot  be  further 
17  My Philosophical Development, p. 12.
18  See his paper on 'What is “Naturalized Epistemology”?, in J. E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical  
Perspectives 2: Epistemology, pp. 381-405, reprinted in Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (eds.), 
Knowledge: Contemporary Readings in Epistemology, pp. 279-97.
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justified, because they are presupposed by all justification. Nevertheless, if  they are true then we do have 
knowledge, and beliefs that are validly derived from them (in conjunction with data) are justified.
It is normally thought that in order for our non-demonstrative inferences to be justified we need to assume a  
principle such as the 'uniformity of nature' or a principle to the effect that every event has some preceding  
event which always precedes events of this kind. In other words, it is assumed that the principle required is 
something that would validate inductive inference. One of the most interesting features of Russell's account of 
scientific inference is his uncompromising rejection, from 1944 onwards, of induction as a valid method of 
inference. Induction can sometimes be of service to science, but only in certain limited circumstances. On the 
whole,  science  cannot  rest  on  inductions  for  the  simple  reason  that  induction  more  often  leads  to  false 
conclusions than to true ones. The induction which Russell is talking about here is what he calls 'induction by 
simple enumeration'. We observe that A has always been accompanied by, or followed by, B, and we have 
never observed A not being accompanied by, or followed by, B. When we have observed this conjunction  
enough times we conclude that As are always accompanied by, or followed by, Bs, and we are entitled to feel  
more confident in this conclusion the more times we observe A accompanied by, or followed by, B.
Russell's criticism of induction is first set out in the chapter on 'Causal Laws' in Part IV of Human Knowledge 
and is further elaborated in the remainder of the book. He begins with a felicitous example:
If there is no limit to the complexity of possible laws [he writes], every imaginable course of events will  
be subject to laws, and therefore the assumption that there are laws will become a tautology. Take, for 
example, the numbers of all the taxis that I have hired in the course of my life, and the times when I  
have hired them. We have here a finite set of integers and a finite number of corresponding times. If n is  
the number of the taxi that I hired at the time t, it is certainly possible, in an infinite number of ways, to  
find a function f such that the formula
n = f(t)
is true for all values of n and t that have hitherto occurred. An infinite number of these formulae will fail  
for the next taxi that I hire, but there will still be an infinite number that remain true. By the time I die, it 
will be possible to close the account, and there will still remain an infinite number of possible formulae,  
each of which might claim to be a law connecting the number of a taxi with the time when I hire it.19
19  Human Knowledge, pp. 229-30.
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On this ground, Russell concludes that it is not induction that makes scientific laws probable, but some other  
principle  or  principles.  It  should  be  noted  that  Russell's  criticism of  induction  clearly anticipates  Nelson 
Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction'. It is true that Russell doesn't come up with predicates such as 'grue' to  
illustrate his thesis, but in fact such adjectives are unnecessary to set out the central point, which is that unless  
some  restriction  is  placed  on  the  regularities  which  we  project  to  unobserved  instances,  every  observed 
regularity which serves to justify a given generalisation will equally justify generalisations which are logically 
incompatible with this first one. As Russell says, refering to the taxi example above:
All past observations as to these numbers are compatible with a number of laws of the form n = f(t), and 
these will, as a rule, give different values for the next n. We cannot therefore use them for prediction,  
and in fact we have no inclination to believe in any of them. Generalizing, we may say: Every finite set  
of observations is compatible with a number of mutually inconsistent laws, all of which have exactly the 
same inductive evidence in their favour.20
Russell's  conclusion is  uncompromising:  'pure induction is  invalid,  and is,  moreover,  not what we in fact  
believe.'21
Russell's argument is stated somewhat more formally later on. Suppose that all hitherto observed members of 
the class α have been found to belong to the class β, and we infer either that the next α will be a β or that all α's  
are β's. 'It is obvious', Russell writes, 'that, if we are allowed to select our class β as we choose, we can easily  
make sure that our induction shall fail.'22 This is demonstrated in the following manner:
Let a1, a2,...an be the hitherto observed members of α, all of which have been found to be members of β,  
and let an+1 be the next member of α. So far as pure logic is concerned, β might consist only of the terms 
a1, a2,...an; or it might consist of everything in the universe except  an+1; or it might consist of any class 
intermediate between these two. In any of these cases the induction to  an+1 would be false.23
In fact, most inductions are certain to be invalid, and to yield false conclusions. Thus, from the fact that all the  
sheep Kant ever saw were in Königsberg, he might have inferred inductively that all sheep are in Königsberg.  
This conclusion would, however, be false. Russell is adept at supplying other examples of inductions which 
have false conclusions. Thus, in an unpublished paper, he writes that:
20  Ibid, p. 330.
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid, p. 422.
23  Ibid.
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You have, let us suppose, a growing boy whose height you measure on the first of every month. You 
may find that, for a certain period, his rate of growth is constant. If you knew nothing about human 
growth, you might infer by induction that he would continue to grow at this rate until his head strikes  
the stars. There are, in fact, an infinite number of formulae which will fit any finite set of facts as to  
your boy's growth. Pure induction, if valid, would lead you to regard all these formulae as probable, 
although they contradict each other.'24
Such examples can be multiplied indefinitely. In another unpublished paper, Russell pointed out that if in one 
year all  the murderers in France had surnames beginning with letters belonging to the second half of the 
alphabet, you would not draw any conclusion from this concerning the names of future murderers.25 This is 
because we do not believe that there is any causal connection between a person's surname and their moral  
character. In practice we know that such an induction is invalid and we have an instinctive feel for which  
inductions are valid and which are not, but Russell's point is that pure induction itself does not place limits on 
its own applicability. Thus some further principle or principles must be presupposed in non-demonstrative 
inference besides (or instead of) induction.
Induction is also held to be inadequate for other reasons. Russell argues that when a number of observers hear 
a sound we believe that their experiences have a common external source which is propagated through the  
intervening medium by sound waves. But, Russell insists, 'there cannot be inductive evidence (unless in some 
extended sense) for something outside human experience, such as a sound wave.'26 The reason for this is that:
Our  experience will  be the  same whether there really  are  sound-waves,  or,  though there are  none,  
auditory sensations occur as they would if there were sound-waves; no inductive evidence can ever 
favour any one of these hypotheses rather than the other. Nevertheless, everyone in fact accepts the  
realist alternative...We do this on grounds that have nothing to do with induction - partly because we 
like laws to be as simple as possible, partly because we believe that causal laws must have spatio-
temporal continuity, i.e. must not involve action at a distance.27
So what is needed are a set of principles, such as that embodied in the denial of action at a distance, which both 
give warrant to the inferences which are necessary to science and also will show which observed regularities 
24  'Note on Non-Demonstrative Inference and Induction [1959]', reproduced in Collected Papers 11, p. 139.
25  'Non-Deductive Inference [1945?]', reproduced in Collected Papers 11, p. 123.
26  Human Knowledge, p. 331.
27  Ibid, p. 330.
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are in fact projectable. This is precisely the point of Russell's 'Postulates of Scientific Inference'.
Before getting on to this topic, however, it might be worthwhile to note that such a principle as 'same cause, 
same effect', which Russell had invoked in an earlier part of his career, also suffers from the vagueness of  
'induction'. As we have seen, Russell himself had noted in his paper 'On Matter' that the principle is not exact  
as it stands; for he pointed out that the totality of my sense-data at any moment is almost certain to be different 
to the totality of my sense-data at any subsequent moment. Thus, all I can infer from the principle, strictly 
interpreted, is that the total state of the universe is never precisely duplicated. In order to derive anything of  
greater significance from the principle it  is necessary to break up our sensory experience into groups and  
consider these groups separately. The principle of 'same cause, same effect' doesn't itself tell us how to go 
about this. This is not to say that it cannot be a useful and important, even an indispensable, principle, merely  
that  -  like 'induction'  -  it  is  not  genuinely fundamental,  but  presupposes other  principles for  its  effective  
application.
IV. PERCEPTS AS SIGNS
The principles of non-demonstrative inference which we are  to frame must also embody our belief  in an 
external physical world. That is, it is not the case that any principles of non-demonstrative inference could  
serve to justify our belief in the physical world as an inference from experience on the same basis as an 
ordinary scientific hypothesis. Our belief in an external world is simply not of the nature of an empirical  
hypothesis which could be justified by the raw material of experience. It was Hume who first saw clearly that 
this was case in the section entitled 'On Scepticism with Regard to the Senses' in his Treatise. 
Hume proceeded by describing how we come to believe in an external world. Experience, he thinks, has two 
important characteristics in this regard, which he called its 'constancy' and its 'coherence'. By the 'constancy' of 
my sense-experience he simply meant that  similar  sense impressions are  obtainable  at  the  end of  similar 
sensory routes. Whenever I have the experience of returning to my apartment via the front entrance of my 
apartment block, taking the elevator up to the seventh floor, turning the lock of my front door with my keys,  
and entering the hallway of my flat, I find everything just where I had previously left it. I therefore imagine  
that these same objects that I saw when I was last here persisted unchanged during the period of time when I  
was not observing them. Similarly, when things do change, they frequently change in a given interval of time 
in the same way as they would have changed had they been observed throughout this interval. If I put a pie in 
the oven and watch it over a certain period I see the pastry gradually turn a golden brown. If, however, instead 
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of observing it, I leave the kitchen and return to the pie later on, I see that it has turned golden brown, just as it  
would have done had I observed it continuously throughout the interval when it was in fact unobserved. I  
therefore easily imagine that it continued to gradually turn brown whilst unobserved just as it would have done  
had I continuously observed it.  This is what Hume called the 'coherence' of my experience. Thus it is the 
constancy and coherence of my sense impressions which leads me to construct a physical world which exists  
independently of my experience.
But now, says Hume, we encounter a problem. Having constructed this world we discover that the qualities we 
actually observe are dependent on the state of our bodily organs, not the objects we imagine that we are 
observing. We thus transfer the perceptible qualities of things to the observer's account and replace the 'vulgar' 
system of common sense with a 'philosophical' system, such as that of Locke. But Hume holds that such a 
move is actually disastrous for any claim we might have concerning knowledge of the physical world. For the 
credibility of the philosophical system rests entirely on the vulgar system which it has displaced. Had the  
qualities we perceived been admitted from the outset to be fleeting we should never have constructed the  
vulgar system without which the philosophical system loses its credibility.  What the philosophers such as 
Locke, who create the philosophical system, in fact do is in effect to create a duplicate set of percepts which 
can be ascribed the permanence that our actual percepts lack. But this only needs to be stated in order for it to  
be seen to be a cheat. Once it is admitted that the philosophical system can derive no support from our ordinary  
imaginative inferences (since we are mistaken in ascribing to our percepts a continuous and uninterrupted  
existence), there remains no further source of support. We could never straightforwardly infer physical objects 
from our transient percepts, since by the nature of the case we only have perceptual access to one term in the  
causal connection - our percepts. We could scarcely be warranted in inferring from this something which by its 
very nature could never be observed. Hume's conclusion was that our inference to an external world is in fact  
unwarranted. And yet he, along with everyone else, would continue to believe in such a world. Nature is too 
strong for philosophical reflection, in this regard. What Hume has in fact shown, I believe, is that our belief in 
the physical world is not justified as some sort of inference from percepts on the same level as an ordinary  
empirical hypothesis.
There is, however, another important point, namely that the physical world is presupposed by all (or nearly all) 
hypotheses or statements of causal connection. There may be some 'laws of association' which are sufficiently 
reliable that they can be taken as actual causal laws, and which relate sensations with (say) mental images.  
Such laws would then only presuppose the data of introspection. However, this is obviously a very special  
case. All the laws that are of any interest to us link physical events, and require the terminology of physical 
objects.  Hence (with the trivial  exception described above) all  causal  laws presuppose the existence of  a  
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physical world. Thus, the physical world is not inferred on the basis of some causal law. Rather, the existence  
of the physical world is itself presupposed by causal statements. And in this sense, our knowledge of the  
physical world can be said to be a priori. If we did not already interpret our percepts as signs of physical  
objects then we could never come to this belief in an external world - or at least we could never justify it. But 
in fact our knowledge of the physical world is not itself the outcome of empirical enquiry; rather (as we have 
seen) it  is presupposed by empirical  enquiry,  since without this knowledge there could be no causal  laws  
(apart, perhaps, from the most trivial laws of association).
The neglect of this point is apt to lead to all sorts of difficulties for the theory of knowledge. Thus Howard  
Robinson in his  book on  Perception argues that  causal  laws do not presuppose the existence of  physical 
objects. All they require is that sense-experience behaves as though the physical objects or events which figure  
in causal hypotheses exist. This, however, seems to me a muddled position.
For what could possibly be the explanation for sense-experience behaving as though physical objects existed 
except that they did in fact exist? Robinson maintains that this question is misplaced, since the order and 
regularity of sense-experience that is embodied in the physical-object language does not stand in need of any 
further explanation. This, it seems to me, must be mistaken. The crucial concession on Robinson’s part is his 
concession that the physical-object language cannot be dispensed with if one is to describe the order and 
regularity of one’s sense-experience in a manner that is projectable. If this is granted, then it follows that the 
description of the (projectable) pattern in sense-experience presupposes the existence of physical objects if  
such descriptions are to be true. If I maintain, with Robinson, not that the physical world exists but merely that  
experience behaves as though it exists, I can legitimately ask why this is the case. For the fact that experience  
behaves in a certain manner would, I think, stand in need of explanation. To say that experience behaves as  
though the physical world exists does not itself constitute an explanation of the course of our experience - 
merely a description. But without an explanation it seems that we have no basis for supposing that the pattern 
hitherto exhibited by our experience will continue to hold. If we are inclined to suppose that it will, this is only  
because we implicitly assume that some causal explanation for this pattern exists which can therefore be relied 
on. But what explanation could there be for the fact that experience behaves as though physical entities exist  
except that such entities do exist?
Robinson concedes that what he calls 'analytical' phenomenalism - which holds that statements about physical  
objects can be translated into statements about sense-data - is untenable. The terminology of physical objects is  
indipensible to any description of our experience which could warrant factual inferences. But if the above 
argument is correct,  then the failure  of analytical  phenomenalism should spell  the end of  phenomenalism 
139
generally. If there is no physical world then there is nothing to ground the regularities that we observe in our 
experience, and no reason to suppose that these regularities will continue. To say this is not to suppose that 
every instance of order or regularity stands in need of explanation (a position which would seem to threaten an  
infinite regress). Rather the point is that the order and regularity exhibited by our sense-experience cannot even 
be adequately characterised without presupposing the existence of physical entities. We cannot describe the 
pattern in experience in a manner that is projectable without employing the terminology of physical science; 
and this  means that  we cannot describe the pattern in  experience in  a manner that  is projectable without  
implying the existence of physical  entities.  Since we all  as a matter of fact believe that the sun will  rise  
tomorrow, Robinson's phenomenalism turns out to be a position that none of us could ever sincerely hold. And  
if we know that the sun will  rise tomorrow then it follows that we know that the sun belongs to a mind-
independent reality, and that phenomenalism and idealism are false.
The upshot of this discussion is that analytical phenomenalism was the only intellectually respectable form of 
phenomenalism. If it fails, then phenomenalism fails. Had analytical phenomenalism turned out to be tenable - 
had statements about physical objects been susceptible to translation into statements about sense-data - then 
Ockham’s Razor would have allowed us to dispense with physical entities. As it is, analytical phenomenalism 
is not tenable (as Robinson concedes), and this entails that phenomenalism generally is untenable as well. In  
practice, a position such as Robinson’s is indistinguishable from the sort of instrumentalist approach which  
says that experience behaves as though certain entities are real when in fact they are not; and the objection to 
this approach is that it fails to supply an explanation for this fact in a manner that would warrant inferences 
which all of us, including Robinson, in fact make.
Turning to the realist alternative to phenomenalism, Robinson discerns certain epistemological difficulties with 
representative realism. These difficulties, however, seem to me more apparent than real. The problem he is 
particularly  concerned  with  is  why  the  order  and  regularity  of  our  experience  should  stand  in  need  of  
explanation at all. The answer to this is that without such explanation we should be unable to characterise the  
pattern  within  sensory  experience  and  thus  would  be  unable  to  project  it  to  future  instances.  However,  
Robinson mistakenly takes our belief in the physical world as an instance of an ordinary scientific theory. This  
leads him to think that the realist is committed to justifying our belief in the physical world by resort to the  
mathematical calculus of chances.
He begins his account by claiming that ‘A postulated physical world would not...bring order to our ideas, for 
the whole point of it is that it seeks to relate ideas to things that wholly transcend our minds.’28 If, however, the 
28  Howard Robinson, Perception, p. 216.
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order we discern in experience cannot be identified without resort to the language of physical objects - a point  
that Robinson himself is prepared to concede - then it seems to me that the postulation of a physical world can 
bring order to our ideas, and that nothing else can. Robinson goes on to say that ‘Any search for an explanation  
presupposes that there is something in need of explanation - that is, something which is improbable unless  
explained. In this case, this would be so only if it were improbable that it should be a brute fact, without any 
explanation, that our experience should be highly ordered.’29 This statement appears to me to be mistaken. It 
seems to me that, in the absence of a postulated order or pattern, it is meaningless to say that a given event or  
sequence of events is either ‘probable’ or ‘improbable’. Such adjectives presuppose projectable regularities in  
experience; in the absence of such projectable regularities, judgements of probability are inapplicable. And all 
such causal regularities, we have argued, presuppose the physical world, since causal laws relate physical  
events. Robinson seems to think that he can refer to the ‘order’ of experience in a way that does not presuppose 
an explanation for experience. But what does ‘order’ mean in this context, if it doesn’t refer to a projectable  
order? A bare description of the sequence of events constituting our experience to date would indeed not  
formally entail the existence of a physical world. But neither could we rest content with such a description -  
not because such events would be ‘improbable’ a priori, but because on the basis of such a description we 
could make no judgements concerning the future course of our experience.
Robinson’s argument that an ordered sequence is a priori improbable is flawed. He writes that ‘What we are 
interested in is the probability of a series which is so structured that a conscious subject is able to discern  
manageable recurrent regularities. There are obviously many more series of logically possible experiences that 
do not fit this requirement than ones that do.’30 From this premise he fallaciously derives the conclusion that 
‘As there are many more series which do not fit this requirement than ones that do, a priori it is improbable 
that  one  fitting  the  requirement  would  occur  by  chance.’31 The  fallacy  is  a  common  one.  It  consists  in 
supposing that from the purely formal calculus of chances it is possible to derive a substantive conclusion 
concerning which statements it is reasonable to expect to be true. As A. J. Ayer wrote, ‘Since the calculus of  
chances is a branch of pure mathematics, it does not in itself yield any conclusion about the likelihood of  
actual events...The application of the calculus to games of chance depends on the empirical assumption that the  
objects  which  are  used  in  them  behave  in  a  way  that  accords  with  the  mathematical  distribution  of 
chances...This is a point that is too often overlooked. In particular, it is often assumed, quite unwarrantably,  
that if things were left to themselves, they would be equally indulgent to all the logical possibilities.’32 The 
point is that, a priori, there is no reason to regard a highly ordered sequence as any less probable than an  
29  Ibid.
30  Ibid, p. 217.
31  Ibid.
32  A. J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, p. 165.
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unordered one. Rather, judgements of probability already presuppose projectable regularities in events. Our 
justification for positing the existence of an external, mind-independent physical reality is not that a given  
sequence of sense-data, or percepts, is a priori improbable, but rather that the regularity exhibited by this  
sequence cannot even be described (at least not in a manner that is projectable) without presupposing the  
existence of physical objects that are not themselves reducible to sense-experiences. Without the physical-
object language, no projectable regularities in our experience could be identified and scientific enquiry would 
be impossible.
What I am contending is that the percept is an effect of the physical object perceived, but it is not just an effect;  
it is also a sign. It is a sign in the sense that it is an element in a pattern whose characterisation presupposes the  
terminology of physical objects. This account has the virtue that it captures the twofold nature of perception. 
On the one hand, I agree with Russell that the percept is an effect of the object perceived - a link in a long  
causal chain which is such that the percept is not likely to resemble the object which is its approximate cause 
except in regard to certain highly abstract, mathematical features. On the other hand, the percept is a sign of 
the physical object which is its remote cause. That is, it is an element in a pattern of sense-experience which 
can only be described by positing the existence of physical objects. Human beings must view experience in 
such a way as to discern projectable patterns in experience. In other words, we interpret our sense-experience, 
and in fact necessarily interpret it in terms of physical objects. The reason for this is that the only way we can 
identify projectable patterns in sensory experience is by recourse to description in physical-object terms. And I  
have argued that  the physical-object  language presupposes the existence of  objects  or  events  that  are  not  
themselves constitutive of sensory experience. Thus experience discloses or reveals physical objects, and is not  
merely the effect of physical objects.
I think that it is this fact that enables us to overcome what might otherwise seem an insuperable obstacle to the  
plausibility of any form of realism. The epistemic relation between percepts and physical objects is not one in  
which we infer the supposed cause (the physical object) from the effect (the percept) without ever having had 
any experience of  the cause.  We have argued above that  Hume was surely right  in  arguing that  such an  
inference could never be warranted. But in fact our inference is not of this kind; our positing a world of 
physical objects is not of the nature of a scientific hypothesis or theory (it is not as though the ‘theory’ that  
there exists a physical world has any serious rival as a means for accounting for our sense-experience). Rather, 
the existence of a physical world is presupposed by any and all hypotheses and theories concerning the course 
of our experience - such theories and hypotheses themselves being corroborated by their predictive success.  
Percepts are not just effects of external physical things, they are signs of these things. It is necessary for us to  
interpret experience so as to employ it  as a guide to the future. In order to accomplish this task we must  
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identify the projectable pattern in our experience. The identification of this pattern presupposes the positing of 
physical objects, that is, it reveals the existence of an independent physical world. Thus the existence of the  
physical world is in this sense a priori. It is not the outcome of any process of empirical enquiry but rather a  
presupposition of it.
V. RUSSELL'S POSTULATES
I have discussed this point about the a priori nature of our belief in the physical world at some length in order  
to make more comprehensible the form that Russell's postulates take. For these postulates effectively describe 
how the world must be if it is to be possible for us to describe it in terms of physical objects. Now Russell  
certainly does not discuss the matter in the way I have done above. He does not refer to Hume, or say that  
percepts are signs, or anything of that nature. Nevertheless, I think that understanding this point about the 
physical world being a priori enables us to understand why Russell formulates his postulates in the way that he 
does.
Assuming, then, that the existence of the physical world is presupposed by science and not the outcome of it,  
what does it mean to say that there is a physical world? For Russell, the world consists not of permanent  
physical 'things' but rather 'events'. However, it is still the case that the physical-object language is applicable 
to experience and that this is only possible if events form groups which have certain characteristics such as  
make it possible to talk in terms of persistent things. For Russell, the existence of things will amount to there  
being certain identifiable strings of events that have certain properties. The existence of such strings of events 
is embodied in the first two of Russell's postulates.
The  first  postulate,  which  Russell  calls  'the  postulate  of  quasi-permanence',  is  formulated  by  Russell  as  
follows:  'Given  any event A,  it  happens very frequently that,  at  any neighbouring  time,  there  is  at  some 
neighbouring place an event very similar to A.'33 Thus, 'there is not [Russell writes] very much similarity 
between a three-months' embryo and an adult human being, but they are connected by gradual transitions from 
next to next, and are therefore accepted as stages in the development of one “thing”.'34
This postulate, Russell explains, is not, however, sufficient to arrive at the concept of matter as used in physics.  
For example, we can pass continuously from one drop of water in the ocean to another, but two separate parts  
of the sea are not necessarily materially the same. However, when such situations arise, we believe that there is  
33  Human Knowledge, p. 506.
34  Ibid, p. 507.
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some one other part of the ocean which is materially the same as a part of the ocean a moment before. This  
requires that the postulate of quasi-permanence be complemented by Russell's second postulate, 'the postulate 
of separable causal lines'. This is stated as follows: 'It is frequently possible to form a series of events such that,  
from one or two members of the series, something can be inferred as to all the other members.' 35 As well as 
allowing us,  in  conjunction with the postulate  of  quasi-permanence,  to  assume that  the world consists  of 
continuous material  things,  the postulate  of separable  causal lines also allows us to suppose that separate  
causes frequently have separate effects, and thus that whenever we have two separate percepts they frequently  
have  distinct  causes.  This,  therefore,  supplies  a  justification  for  the  more  rough-and-ready  principle  of 
'different effects, different causes' which Russell had appealed to previously.
A series of events connected with each other in a manner suggested by the postulate we are discussing is called 
by Russell a 'causal line'. By way of explanation, Russell adds the following:
Between any two events belonging to one causal line, I should say, there is a relation which may be called one 
of cause-and-effect. But if we call it so, we must add that the cause does not completely determine the effect,  
even in the most favourable cases. There is always some influence, which is also causal, though in a slightly 
different sense, of the environment on the causal line. A photon in interstellar space is slightly deflected by 
gravitation from its rectilinear path, and in general the disturbing effect of the environment is much greater 
than in this case. What our postulate asserts may be re-stated as follows: A given event is very frequently one 
of a series of events (which may last a fraction of a second or a million years) which has throughout an  
approximate law of persistence or change. The photon preserves direction and velocity of motion, the billiard 
ball preserves shape and colour, a foetus develops into an animal of the appropriate species, and so on.36
Russell believes that these first two postulates must be complemented by a third which allows us to deny 
'action  at  a  distance'  and assert  that  'when there  is  a  causal  connection  between two events  that  are  not 
contiguous, there must be intermediate links in the causal chain such that each is contiguous to the next, or  
(alternatively) such that there is a process which is continuous in the mathematical sense'. 37 This postulate, 
which Russell terms 'the postulate of spatio-temporal continuity' allows us 'to believe that physical objects  
exist when unperceived'.38 It also allows us to infer the existence of light-waves and sound-waves in places 
where there are no percipients, even though such processes can never be observed and therefore could never be 
validly inferred using 'induction'. 
35  Ibid, p. 508.
36  Ibid, p. 509.
37  Ibid.
38  Ibid, p. 510.
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These three postulates, then, set out the properties of events whereby they form a physical world. However,  
they are still not sufficient. So far, we have said nothing about the connection of physical objects with percepts.  
We need some postulate to the effect that percepts are frequently the signs of physical objects and furthermore 
that something can be inferred from the percept concerning the physical object. Since Russell is concerned 
with setting out the properties of events in general which science presupposes he does not refer specifically to 
'percepts'. Rather, he refers to those events which can be considered appearances or effects of physical objects. 
The postulate - Russell's fourth - is called simply 'the structural postulate', and it runs as follows: 'When a  
number of structurally similar complex events are ranged about a centre in regions not widely separated, it is  
usually the case that all belong to causal lines having their origin in an event of the same structure at the  
centre.' Concerning the phrase 'grouped around a centre', Russell says that this 'is intentionally vague, but in 
certain cases it is capable of a precise meaning.' He continues:
Suppose a given object to be simultaneously seen by a number of people and photographed by a number  
of cameras. The visual percepts and the photographs can be arranged by the laws of perspective, and by 
the same laws the position of the object seen and photographed can be determined. In this instance the  
sense in which the percepts and photographs are 'grouped about a centre' is precisely definable. When a 
number of people hear the same sound, there is an equally precise definition if there is an accurate 
method of determining when they hear it, for it is found that the times when they hear it differ from a 
given time by amounts proportional to their distance from a certain point; in that case, the point at the  
given time is the space-time centre or origin of the sound. But I wish to employ the phrase also in cases  
(such as smells) where no such precision is possible.39
With  the structural  postulate,  alongside  our previous  three,  we now have a  set  of  postulates  which  seem 
sufficient  to  generate  science.  However,  Russell  thinks  that  one  more  postulate  is  necessary.  This  is  'the  
postulate of analogy', and runs as follows: 'Given two classes of events A and B, and given that, whenever both  
A and B can be observed, there is reason to believe that A causes B, then if, in a given case, A is observed, but  
there is no way of observing whether B occurs or not, it  is probable that B occurs; and similarly if B is  
observed, but the presence or absence of A cannot be observed.'40 In My Philosophical Development, Russell 
writes that the most important function of this postulate 'is to justify the belief in other minds'.41 Thus whenever 
my body is damaged in some way I find that this damage causes me to experience pain and this in turn causes  
me to exhibit certain behavioural dispositions (such as a disposition to go to a doctor, etc.). If someone else's  
39  Ibid, pp. 510-1.
40  Ibid, pp. 511-2.
41  My Philosophical Development, p. 151.
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body is thus damaged and they exhibit the appropriate behavioural signs of pain, it is not physically possible  
for me to verify that they are in pain. However, the postulate of analogy allows me to make this inference.
Furthermore, Russell strengthens this account by referring to other uses of the postulate where we would  
certainly regard the inference as more or less certain. Thus Russell writes 'Suppose, for example that a barking 
dog is running after a rabbit, and for a moment is hidden by a bush. The bush accounts for your not seeing the 
dog, and allows you to infer that the bark, which you still hear, is still associated with what you saw a moment  
ago. When the dog emerges from the bush, you think your belief is confirmed.' 42 One might think that the 
postulate of spatio-temporal continuity would suffice in this case, but this would come into operation only after 
the dog had emerged from behind the bush. Once this had occurred spatio-temporal continuity allows us to 
infer that the dog continued to exist when unobserved, provided there was a physical reason which prevented  
us from observing the dog when it was not observed. However, even if we did not subsequently witness the 
dog emerging from behind the bush (suppose our gaze was distracted by something else), the fact that we 
heard the dog barking would still give us an assurance that the dog continued to exist. Similarly, I have found 
that the visual appearance of a table is associated with a tactual quality of hardness when I touch the table. 
When I merely see the table without touching it I am no longer able to verify that the table is still hard in the 
physical sense of having properties which yield, in the appropriate circumstances,  certain kinds of tactual 
sensations. The postulate of analogy, however, enables me to infer this physical property.
Now Russell's postulate of analogy seems to me to introduce an ingenious twist to the so-called problem of 
other minds. Traditionally, this problem has been dealt with separately by epistemologists as just a further 
problem where the sceptical challenge requires to be met. Thus Ayer, in his book The Problem of Knowledge,  
deals with the problems of perception, our knowledge of the past and our knowledge of other minds in separate  
chapters. Each problem is considered in a manner that makes little references to the others. Russell, on the  
other hand, thinks that if we properly analyse the inferences that we use in science, we shall find that they 
include a postulate which has the additional effect of justifying our claims to knowledge of other minds. Thus, 
the problem of other minds is not treated by Russell as a separate problem to that of our inference to physical  
objects; rather, both are subsumed under the more general problem of non-demonstrative inference. If Russell 
is right about this, then the existence of other minds becomes a scientific proposition. This does not mean that  
it becomes an 'hypothesis', any more than the postulates themselves are hypotheses. Rather, it becomes part of  
the scientific picture of reality on the basis of which we can formulate hypotheses concerning the states of  
other people's minds. On this account, science and knowledge are indeed coextensive. There is no such thing 
as non-scientific knowledge. Russell's account of other minds as something we can know from the general 
42  Human Knowledge, p. 512.
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principles of non-deductive inference that justify science in general is, it seems to me, an original way of 
viewing the problem of other minds. I'm inclined to think that it is true, though I don't think this is something  
we can say for certain until we have a clearer idea of the content of the postulates required by science.
Traditionally, the response to the argument from analogy to other minds is to suggest that the analogy is too 
weak to support the certainty with which we hold our belief in other minds. Suppose, for example, that we 
lived in a society where a certain part of our bodies could never be exposed to the view of others. If I had a  
birthmark on that part of my body, then I would scarcely be warranted in inferring that others had a similar  
birthmark in the same part of their bodies. It is true that we possess a broader body of theory which in fact  
states that individuals are unlikely to have birthmarks in the same places. But if we were not possessed of such  
background knowledge, would we therefore be warranted in inferring the existence of the birthmarks of others 
on the evidence available? Even if the data supplied some reason for believing this hypothesis, it would surely  
be insufficient to justify certainty, such as we possess when it comes to our belief in the existence of other  
minds.
Nevertheless, I think it is possible to furnish a thought-experiment which shows that whatever our ground for  
believing in other minds, it has to be of a nature as would justify various other common sense beliefs. We can,  
in fact, vary our properties to a certain extent. For example, we can alter our geographic location. We find that 
our location has no bearing on whether or not we enjoy conscious states. We can therefore infer that geography  
is irrelevant to consciousness and conclude that people in other parts of the world have conscious states. It may 
be replied that we cannot vary the place where we were born. This is true, but it seems a general scientific  
principle that the only thing relevant to causation is the present state of the universe. Origins are not directly  
relevant. Nevertheless, even taking into account only characteristics which are present states, it might be said 
that I have only a limited capacity to vary them. For example, I cannot vary my eye colour. Why should I not 
suppose that my having this particular eye colour is what makes me conscious so that only human beings with 
the same eye colour as myself have minds? But now, consider the following. Suppose that, at some point in the  
future, it became possible to surgically alter eye colour, so that people routinely changed their eye colour for 
purely cosmetic reasons. I might consider various things when deciding whether to do this myself. I might  
balance the expense of the operation against my desire to have blue eyes. But the one thing that I would not be  
anxious about is the possibility that in changing my eye colour I should become an automaton. This would not 
even enter my head as a possibility. Now, let us suppose that I am right to discount this as a possibility. I  
believe that I am indeed right, though I am not sure what principle is involved in this case. Nevertheless, if I 
am warranted in being certain that changing my eye colour would not result in my becoming an automaton I  
ought to conclude that eye colour is irrelevant to consciousness, and that therefore those with a different eye  
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colour to my own must have minds. So even though I am limited in  the extent  to which I  can vary my 
characteristics, there must be at least one principle which enables me to be quite certain that others have minds.  
And this principle is a general principle of non-demonstrative inference in the sense that it also warrants other  
inferences that have nothing to do with the minds of others. It allows me to be quite certain that my varying my 
characteristics to the extent that I am able will not turn me into a 'philosophical zombie'. If I am right in this,  
then it follows that Russell is quite right to emphasise the connection of the problem of other minds with our  
non-demonstrative knowledge in general.
VI. THE STATUS OF THE POSTULATES
Earlier,  we  saw  that  Russell  specified  four  conditions  for  inferential  knowledge.  Knowledge  involving 
inference always invokes some general proposition, such as that A is always or usually accompanied by B. 
Now the fourth condition for such an inference to yield knowledge was that the relation of A to B must be of  
such a character that those relations which have this character are normally such that A is a sign for B. The  
question that was left unanswered by this account was what this general character of relation is. Russell's  
postulates answer this question. If the character of the regularity comes under one of these postulates then the 
regularity is of a character which in most instances can be relied on. Provided the world has the general  
characteristics  embodied  in  these  postulates,  our  tendency  to  make  inferences  in  accordance  with  these 
postulates yields genuine knowledge, even though we can supply no further justification for the postulates  
themselves.
The above five postulates are claimed by Russell to be sufficient to ground scientific inferences. Russell does 
not, however, wish to maintain that they are all necessary, or that they have been stated in their 'logically 
simplest form'.43 This, then, is a project which can be further pursued and concerning which fruitful results can 
be achieved. However, owing to a total lack of interest or comprehension concerning the project on which  
Russell was engaged, no such subsequent enquiry has ever occurred.
A good example of this lack of comprehension is provided by Grover Maxwell, who is himself a sympathetic  
commentator on Russell. In his essay 'The Later Bertrand Russell: Philosophical Revolutionary', he has the  
following to say about Russell's postulates:
[Russell]  takes  the  untested,  untestable,  and,  in  this  sense,  non-empirical  (though  nevertheless 
43  Ibid, p. 513.
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contingent) assumptions upon which our significant knowledge of the world and ourselves rest to be his 
notorious six 'Postulates of Scientific Inference'. But, in spite of my boundless admiration for Russell's  
later work, I do not think that he ever used these postulates significantly or ever showed how they could  
do much for anyone, be he scientist, philosopher, or man-in-the-street.44
There are several points to be made here. Firstly, I'm not sure why Maxwell describes Russell's postulates as  
'notorious'. It can't really be said that anyone has paid any close attention to them at all (prior to this study), or  
done more than dismiss them without making a serious attempt to understand their purpose. Secondly, there  
are five postulates, not six, a mistake Maxwell would not have made had the Postulates indeed been 'notorious'.
But in any case Grover Maxwell completely misunderstands the purpose of Russell's Postulates. He seems to 
take them as constituting a set of practical 'maxims' to be consciously applied to concrete situations in order to 
yield new knowledge, and rejects them on the ground that they are not fitted to serve this function. But this is 
not what they are at all. Rather, they are what has to be presumed to be true of the world if the inferences we in  
fact make are to be justified. The link here is with Russell's reliabilism. We found that a piece of (inferentially 
established) belief counts as knowledge if the inference on which it is based is such that all inferences of this  
general type are in fact justified, that is, if certain sorts of events really are signs of certain other sorts of  
events. For our knowledge to be genuine, the inferences we are disposed to make must track the way events 
succeed each other in reality. In order for this to be the case, the world must have certain characteristics. These  
characteristics, being presupposed by our non-deductive inferences, cannot be justified empirically; and the  
principles themselves are not analytic. The postulates are designed to capture these aspects of reality; they are 
framed so that  they are  jointly  sufficient  to  ground the  inferences  we all  in  fact  make.  To criticise  such  
principles on the ground that they are no use to the 'man-in-the-street' is besides the point. One might as well  
criticise physics on the ground that the knowledge of the fundamental particles of which matter is composed is 
of no use to ordinary people in their everyday dealings with the material objects they handle. Ordinary people  
can be quite ignorant of the composition of matter, but it doesn't follow that matter is not in fact composed of  
certain types of physical particles, or that such knowledge doesn't constitute a genuine discovery about the 
world. Similarly, it is not to be supposed that we would be any more familiar with the principles that ground  
our inferences than with the types of physical particles that constitute matter - both are equally remote to the  
'man-in-the-street'. Russell's Postulates are only revealed at the end result of a great deal of highly technical  
and analytical enquiry. But they nevertheless represent a very significant and important discovery. They are  
meant to replace such vague notions as the 'uniformity of nature' and such invalid notions as induction by  
simple enumeration, with something that is both valid and more concrete.
44  Grover Maxwell, 'The Later Bertrand Russell: Philosophical Revolutionary', in Bertrand Russell's  
Philosophy, ed. George Nakhnikian, p. 180.
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A different kind of criticism would be that, if the postulates are meant to replace such vague notions as the  
uniformity of nature, then they fail in their object, since they are at least equally vague. Thus the postulate of  
separable causal lines says that it is frequently possible to form series of events such that from one or two  
members of the series something can be inferred about the whole series. Now this 'something', it might be said,  
is too vague to be any better than the principle of induction. Russell, as we have seen, criticised induction on  
the ground that, if taken literally, it would justify all sorts of inferences that we are not in fact inclined to make.  
Does not the same criticism apply to Russell's own postulates?
To some extent, this criticism is justified. Russell could answer that in practice we know how to apply these  
principles, that is, we know instinctively which uniformities are projectable. But the same could be said of the 
principle of the uniformity of nature which Russell criticised. Nevertheless, I think that Russell's Postulates are 
better than the uniformity principle; they seem to give a clearer idea of the principles required by science, even  
if they are not wholly clear.
Furthermore,  it  is  possible  that  total  clarity may not be obtainable.  The postulates are suggested by what 
Russell calls 'animal inference', our innate and instinctive predisposition to take certain events as a sign for  
certain other events. It may be that the inferences we naturally make are so complex and subtle that we can 
never arrive at complete clarity concerning the principles that underlie them. Nevertheless, Russell's postulates 
clearly give a much better notion of what we must assume about the world for science to be possible. I think,  
therefore, that they represent a definite advance in epistemology.
It is, therefore, a pity that no one has really evinced any interest in them or sought to refine them further. It is  
admitted that science rests on certain principles which are 'synthetic', in Kant's sense. It is also recognised that 
such principles as 'induction by simple enumeration' and 'the uniformity of nature' have only a limited utility,  
and  cannot  represent  the  most  accurate  form  of  the  principles  we  need  in  order  to  establish  scientific  
knowledge. There is therefore a need to reveal the principles that underlie science in as exact a form as we can  
manage, bearing in mind that complete clarity is an ideal which may not be wholly realisable. Furthermore, the  
principles selected must embody what we take to be true statements about the world, which means that they 
must embody a metaphysic which we find scientifically and philosophically acceptable. Russell's Postulates 
were an attempt to get to grips with precisely this problem.
Once  the  Postulates  are  admitted  then  we have  a  physical  world  with  sufficient  causal  connectedness  to 
warrant further inferences on the basis of our perceptual experience - and science is launched. The Postulates  
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are not  meant to  be 'applied'  in the sense in  which Mill's  canons of induction were meant by Mill  to be 
applicable, in order to yield specific scientific conclusions. Rather, their purpose is to embody the necessary a 
priori knowledge without which we could never interpret our experience as experience of a physical world 
amenable  to  empirical  investigation.  For  my  part,  I  am  inclined  to  agree  that  something  like  Russell's 
postulates are indeed a precondition for scientific enquiry, and that Russell has made a genuinely important 
discovery. Russell himself thought so, and was disappointed by the muted reception of Human Knowledge. In 
part the lack of interest was due to the fact that when this book was published, the philosophical world had 
ceased to pay any attention to Russell at all,  beholden as it was to the philosophy of Wittgenstein and its  
various linguistic offshoots. But I think that another part of the reason may have been that philosophers were  
not  clear  what  purpose  Russell's  Postulates  were  supposed  to  serve.  I  hope in  the  above  account  I  have  
illuminated this purpose and made the Postulates more intelligible as a result.
VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: THE RENEWAL OF EMPIRICISM
Human Knowledge has the subtitle 'It's Scope and Limits'. In other words, Russell is engaged in a critical  
enterprise in the tradition of Locke, Hume and Kant: he is attempting to define what we can know and also  
what we cannot know. In stark contrast to the scientific positivists and their philosophical descendants amongst  
analytical philosophers in the twentieth century, Russell does not have a boundless faith in our ability to 'grasp 
this sorry scheme of things entire'. Instead, he supposes that we live in a universe which transcends our ability  
to completely grasp it.  This  is  evident in the limitations he places on knowledge.  We can only know the 
abstract structure of things, not their intrinsic nature; our knowledge of causal laws gives us no rational insight  
into any supposed objective 'connection' between events which could somehow ground our inferences. Finally, 
our knowledge of the world is rooted in  general  principles which are  given to  us by nature and must  be 
accepted if knowledge is to be possible at all. We can have a (limited) knowledge of the universe because we 
are the way we are and because nature is the way it is.
But in what sense can we be said to 'know' these general principles on which science is based? This is an issue  
which Russell addresses in the last few paragraphs of Human Knowledge. The upshot of his discussion is that 
his postulates are preconditions for rational enquiry itself. I think that this is the only answer that ultimately  
can be given. I also think that it is perfectly sufficient. If they are preconditions for rational enquiry then reason  
cannot undermine them. Hence, scepticism is avoided. Russell's philosophy, then, places him beyond classical  
empiricism and links him with a tradition of epistemological naturalism. It places him not only with Hume (in 
his more naturalistic moods), but also with such thinkers as Thomas Reid, Sir William Hamilton, and even, in 
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some respects, Kant. This is not always recognised because Russell frequently professed his adherence to  
'empiricism'; and commentators have taken him at his word and assumed that he accepted the epistemological 
premises of philosophers such as Locke, without examining what Russell takes as constituting his empiricism. 
In Human Knowledge,  whilst  he declares his allegiance to  an empiricist tradition, he transforms it  in  the 
direction of epistemological naturalism. Indeed, in the final lines of the volume empiricism is characterised in 
a thoroughly naturalistic way as the thesis that, due to our being creatures within the universe, all  human 
knowledge is 'uncertain, inexact, and partial.'45
Many commentators on Russell have been hostile or dismissive of empiricism, seeing it as bound up with a  
theory of perception which they think leads inevitably to solipsism. It is then claimed that Russell himself 
takes the standpoint of 'epistemological' or 'methodological' solipsism, that is, it is supposed that he thinks that  
our direct or certain knowledge is confined to the contents of our minds. But, as we have seen, far from being a  
methodological solipsist, Russell is consistently dismissive of such a position. He assumes that our knowledge 
is rooted in the fact that we are beings who are already oriented to a world that pre-exists us. Thus he writes:
Evolution and adaptation to environment cause expectations to be more often right than wrong, although 
the expectations go beyond anything logically demonstrable. Nature, we may say, has certain habits.  
The  habits  of  animals  must  have a  certain  adaptation to  the habits  of  nature  if  the  animals are  to  
survive.46
This, it should be noted, is an explanation for our habits, not a justification. After the above quoted passage,  
Russell immediately writes that:
This  would  be a  poor  argument if  employed against  Cartesian scepticism.  But  I  do not  think  it  is 
possible to get anywhere if we start from scepticism. We must start from a broad acceptance of whatever 
seems to be knowledge and is not rejected for some specific reason.47
Russell  regarded  Human Knowledge as  his  magnum opus,  as  the  culmination  of  his  work  in  theoretical 
philosophy. I hope I have said enough to show that Human Knowledge is indeed a very important work which 
has  been  quite  unjustly  neglected.  Indeed  I  am  inclined  to  say  that  it  is  the  single  greatest  work  of 
epistemology of the twentieth century, and, for this reason alone, might be thought to have some claim to be  
regarded as the single greatest philosophical work of the twentieth century. It has a scope and originality which  
45  Human Knowledge, p. 527.
46  My Philosophical Development, p. 148.
47  Ibid.
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is not matched by any comparable work of which I am aware. Whereas other works become more a matter of  
historical interest with the passing decades, Human Knowledge is seen to become more important. Perhaps this 
is precisely because Russell was to some extent an philosophical 'outsider' at the time he wrote it, so that his  
work was not so dependent on passing philosophical fashions.
John Passmore  once  characterised  Russell's  philosophical  development  as  'the  passage  from Descartes  to  
Hume epitomized'.48 I think there is a considerable degree of truth to this description, but I want to add that the  
Hume to which Russell eventually subscribed was Hume the naturalist, not Hume the classical empiricist. H.  
O. Mounce has recently argued that  Hume in some ways went beyond classical  empiricism and partially 
realised a  more naturalistic  standpoint  in  conflict  with his  empiricist  premises. 49 Russell  did  not  start  his 
philosophical career as an empiricist and thus his final view is less burdened by empiricist assumptions, and 
his naturalism is consequently more fully developed. Russell began as an idealist, but most of all as someone 
who believed that the nature of reality could be elucidated by pure reason alone. This is really a pre-critical  
form of rationalism which is reminiscent of Leibniz. By the end of his career he had come to a view much  
closer to Hume, but also a view which placed him with the Scottish naturalists such as Thomas Reid. This may  
seem  a  highly  paradoxical  thing  to  say  on  the  ground  that  the  Scottish  naturalists  are  often  seen  as 
championing 'common sense', whereas Russell was always an ardent opponent of common sense. However, the 
paradox is resolved when one realises that 'common sense' means something quite different in the two cases. 
For Russell, Hume and the Scottish naturalists, the common sense that can be defended does not comprise the 
naïve beliefs of the uneducated. On the contrary, it consists in scientifically educated common sense - common  
sense  corrected  by  empirical  investigation.  The  common  sense  that  Russell  opposed  and  which  was 
championed by his opponents was a view that held that science had nothing to teach us about the world and 
that our ordinary ways of speaking require no revision in the light of scientific discovery. Russell was surely  
right to reject this view as arising from wilful ignorance of science. We have seen in an earlier chapter the very  
great significance that such a theory as relativity has for our conception of the world. It is hopelessly naïve to 
think that one can have an accurate view of the world whilst ignoring the findings of the most  advanced 
sciences.
Russell himself, in the later part of his career, began to realise his affinity with Hume and his writings on  
Hume become more approving. He still thinks of Hume as to some degree an extreme sceptic, and fails to  
notice the naturalistic side of Hume's thinking, but he credits Hume with the discovery that pure empiricism is  
untenable and that if science is to count as genuine knowledge then there must be general principles which are  
a priori.
48  A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 239
49  See H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism.
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In fact, I think that Russell should in some respects be regarded as the natural successor to Hume. Whilst 
identifying with the empiricist tradition, we have seen that Russell transcends it and arrives at epistemological  
naturalism. Furthermore, there isn't really any tension in Russell, as there is in Hume, between naturalism and 
empiricism because, as I have argued above, Russell's 'empiricism' did not involve his accepting the view that 
all knowledge derives from experience. Such a doctrine, indeed, would scarcely have commended itself to a 
mathematician. Thus, in his mature philosophy, Russell argues that our scientific knowledge rests on principles  
that are given to us by nature, not by either 'reason' or 'experience'. At the same time, and in contrast to earlier 
forms of naturalism, Russell substitutes strings of 'events' for substances with varying qualities, and his realism 
is thus more metaphysically sophisticated. He seeks to capture the properties that strings of events must have if  
science is to be possible, and offers a far more nuanced analysis than has been furnished by those analytical  
philosophers who continue to frame the problem of non-deductive inference in terms of 'induction'  or the 
'uniformity of nature'. This is what allows him to anticipate Goodman's criticism of induction by nearly twenty 
years. Hence, Russell is really the next great step from Hume via Scottish naturalism. For Russell, Hume had  
to be reconciled with science and Russell saw that the way to do this was through naturalism in epistemology. 
His reliabilist approach to knowledge presents human knowledge as something that involves our being in the 
world, related to it. Only because we are creatures within the world which have an instinctive tendency to  
respond in suitable ways to external stimuli is knowledge possible. It is not necessary for us to be able to  
justify our claim to knowledge in order to have it, provided that the inferences we habitually make in fact track 
the way reality operates.
All  this,  I  believe,  serves  to  support  my  claim  that  Human  Knowledge  is  one  of  the  most  important  
philosophical works of the twentieth century. Such a claim is sure to strike the average reader as extraordinary.  
After all, I imagine that most professional philosophers haven't bothered reading the work at all. Part of the 
problem was that it was published at the wrong time. In 1948, ordinary language philosophy was at its height,  
and although logical positivism was not popular, it  had left a legacy in its wake of a reluctance to tackle  
philosophical problems on anything other than a very narrow, piecemeal basis. There was also another matter 
which would have alienated philosophers in 1948. Russell opens the volume by announcing that he seeks to 
reclaim an old philosophical tradition by writing for a wide educated audience:
The following pages [he writes] are addressed, not only or primarily to professional philosophers, but to  
that much larger public which is interested in philosophical questions without being willing or able to  
devote more than a limited amount of time to considering them. Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley,  
and Hume wrote for a public of this sort, and I think it is unfortunate that during the last hundred and 
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sixty years or so philosophy has come to be regarded as almost as technical as mathematics.50
In the atmosphere of the time this would have been taken by some philosophers as tantamount to saying that  
they could ignore this book, dismissing it as a merely 'popular' exposition. Of course, this would be a grave  
error. Human Knowledge, whilst written for an educated public, would certainly be extremely difficult for any 
but the most dedicated general reader.
There is another feature which would have put academic philosophers off reading the work and which might 
also have re-enforced their impression of this being a 'popular' work, namely that the first section of the work 
expounds the general state of science of the time. In beginning the volume in this fashion, Russell is pursuing a 
long-standing ambition. In his Autobiography, Russell says that when he was an idealist he dreamed of writing 
two great works, a theoretical work which would start off with the concrete and become increasingly abstract,  
and a work on ethics which would start off abstract and become increasingly concrete. There would then be a 
third work which would be an Hegelian synthesis uniting the concrete and the abstract. He then remarks that he 
has in fact written the first two of these projected works.51 The work on ethics is a good description of Human 
Society in Ethics and Politics. And the work in theoretical philosophy is obviously Human Knowledge. This 
underlies the fact that Russell regarded this volume as his crowning achievement in theoretical philosophy. The 
work thus begins with a description of the actual state of science of his time, and proceeds in the following  
sections  towards  more  and  more  abstract  matters  until  it  ends  by  uncovering  the  postulates  of  non-
demonstrative inference which underlie all of science. The uncovering of these principles is held to be the  
hardest task of all, and the most abstract. But because the discussion of science comes first, this may give a  
false  impression  of  this  work  to  the  unwary.  For  Russell  is  seeking  to  make  a  significant  and  original 
contribution to philosophy, not merely to expound or popularise either science or his own earlier philosophy.
Human  Knowledge therefore,  whilst  retaining  some  fidelity  to  the  empiricist  tradition,  goes  beyond  the 
empiricism of philosophers like Hume to embrace an epistemological naturalism, and in doing so effectively 
redefines and renews empiricism as a tradition. Some of Russell's insights were independently discovered by 
philosophers such as Quine and Goodman in the years after the publication of  Human Knowledge, but the 
volume still, I think, contains substantial material which could be invaluable in present day discussions of 
epistemological issues. In any case, whether or not the reader agrees with the need for something like Russell's  
postulates of non-demonstrative inference, I hope the above exposition and defence has made the purpose of  
these postulates intelligible.
50  Human Knowledge, p. 5.
51  Autobiography, p. 727.
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Conclusion: the ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’
In  this  conclusion,  I  shall  just  make  a  few remarks  designed  to  bring  the  various  topics  we  have  been 
discussing together and to underline the importance of Russell's mature metaphysic for which I have been  
arguing all along.
There are two facets to mind: consciousness, and intentionality. Russell supplied a solution to the first of these  
problems. In essence, his solution consisted in taking a mysterious dualism – that of conscious states on the 
one hand and non-living matter on the other – and showing how it is merely a local manifestation of a wholly  
unmysterious and  ordinary dualism – that of abstract structure and concrete character. In the first half of this  
thesis,  accordingly,  I  have  sought  to  understand  the  nature  of  Russell’s  solution  to  the  problem  of 
consciousness and to show how misunderstandings concerning the course of  Russell’s  development have 
acted as an obstacle to the assimilation of this Russellian solution. As a result of the failure to comprehend the  
nature of Russell’s  metaphysic,  speculation in  the field of  the mind-body problem has tended to run into 
reductionist or eliminativist channels, which, however, represent a theoretical dead end. Only the Russellian 
approach, in my opinion, holds any possibility whatsoever of genuine philosophical progress. For conscious 
states undoubtedly exist. And equally indubitably, the qualities that figure in our sensory experience are not in 
any obvious sense reducible to a purely physicalistic description of the patterns of electrochemical stimulation 
in the brain.
Russell’s neutral monist metaphysic rests upon a certain philosophy of science. It relies crucially on the thesis  
that  there  are  grave  limitations  to  the  knowledge  of  the  external  world  supplied  by physics.  In  order  to  
vindicate Russell’s approach, as well as to delineate the general character of physical reality, we considered  
what knowledge physics supplies us with concerning the external world. We began by defending the thesis that 
the  knowledge  supplied  by physics  is  structural,  or  largely structural.  We  then  considered  what  physical 
science itself might have to say regarding the nature of the reality it describes.
Having accomplished this task we next considered the whole issue of intentionality, and how a Russellian 
might approach this phenomenon. The analysis of intentionality I have advanced, whilst congruent with a  
monist theory, is not a reductionist account. Although any specimen instance of an intentional state can be 
rephrased in terms of a set of conditionals, the 'inputs'  to these conditions will themselves include further  
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intentional states, subject to a similar analysis,  and so on  ad infinitum.  There is therefore, no question of 
reductionism.
And reductionism is surely scarcely a tenable position.  If intentional states were somehow reducible to non-
intentional states, then all that is happening when I am engaging in a philosophical argument with someone 
else can be adequately described by saying that I am uttering certain vocalisations which are causing certain 
neurons to fire in someone else’s brain, and these firings in turn are grounding certain verbal dispositions in the  
person whose brain it is. However, these verbal dispositions must be understood as simply dispositions to emit 
certain sounds, which in turn might cause me to acquire certain dispositions to emit certain sounds, and so on. 
‘Meaning’ does  not  enter  into  the  picture,  since  this  physical  description  is  held  to  be  complete,  on  a  
physicalist view.
But as a matter of fact this is quite untenable. As your eye passes over these words, they are not merely causing 
certain bodily dispositions or neural firings – they have meaning. The way to account for this phenomenon is 
not  to  attempt  to  reduce  intentional  to  non-intentional  states,  but  to  reduce  the  mysterious  dualism  of 
intentional  and non-intentional states  to  an ordinary and unmysterious dualism. In this case,  a dualism of 
descriptions  of  physical  state  which  do  not  involve  conditional  statements,  and  descriptions  in  terms  of  
function which do. What we have done in the second half of this thesis, then, is to extend the Russellian  
approach to consciousness to the realm of intentionality – we have taken a mysterious dualism and rendered it 
unremarkable by revealing it as a local instance of a wholly unmysterious dualism.
At the same time, though this approach is not reductionist, it  is monist. Our percepts are constituents of the 
brain. Our intentional states can only exist insofar as they are realised by brain states. It is, however, because 
the monism is not reductionist that it is a ‘neutral’ monism. Mind is not reducible to matter any more than  
matter is reducible to mind.
The terms ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ can be given a meaning in epistemology. One might define a ‘mental’ event 
as one which is capable of being known without inference; a ‘physical’ event is then one which is capable of 
being known inferentially. It will be seen that this does not exclude the mental being a subset of the physical.  
My own experience can be known non-inferentially  by me, but can only be known inferentially to others. 
Hence, in relation to others, it can be regarded as ‘physical’. Likewise, although items in my own experience 
are capable of being known non-inferentially by me, they can also be inferred; for example, I might infer that I 
must have had at some time in the past a certain experience which I do not in fact presently recall. Hence, even  
my own past experience can to this extent be ‘physical’.
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In the final chapter, indeed, we sought to show how neutral monism can vindicate and support our claims to 
scientific knowledge – to knowledge of physical events – and how the admission of ‘percepts’ in no way acts 
as a barrier to our grasp of the world. We saw how Russell's attempt to show how knowledge was possible led 
him to transform empiricism into naturalism and, in doing so, to supply a definitive answer to the scepticism of 
Hume. One of the aims of this thesis is to show how Russell's  mature theory was more naturalistic and less 
traditionally  'empiricist'  than  is  customarily  supposed,  despite  his  own  stated  allegiance  to  the  empiricist  
tradition.
But the distinction between the mental and the physical which I have outlined above is one in epistemology – it 
is simply based on what we know and is, moreover, a distinction which is relative to a given knower. It is not a 
distinction belonging to metaphysics. In fact, I should say that although we can draw a distinction between the 
‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ at  the level  of  knowledge,  we cannot meaningfully refer  to  the mental  or  the 
physical in metaphysical terms. The distinction between the mental and the physical is quite superficial, and 
not metaphysically fundamental,  for  two reasons.  Firstly,  the distinction is  reducible  to  more fundamental 
distinctions – such as between structure and quality, or between occurrent properties and conditionals. In each  
case the ‘mental’ side of the dichotomy has an analogue in the external ‘physical’ world outside of our bodies – 
but in neither case does this in the least imply panpsychism, and indeed,  pace Chalmers, there is no reason 
whatsoever  to  think  panpsychism true.  Secondly,  these distinctions  are  theoretical;  that  is,  these  dualisms 
cannot be separated in a concrete situation. Qualities and relations must belong to some abstract structure;  
conditionals presuppose the existence of occurrent properties. Thus, there is no ‘physical world’ in contrast to a 
supposed ‘mental world’.
The key to solving the mind-body problem, then, does not lie in reducing either side of this dichotomy to the 
other but in realising that the whole distinction between the mental and the physical is superficial, illusory and  
unreal. It is for this reason that recent attempts to solve the mind-body problem have so evidently failed. In 
contrast to Russell’s sophisticated, non-reductive theory, these ‘physicalist’ theories have generally taken the 
form of supposing that the ‘mental’ is eliminable or reducible to the physical, a task which, I have argued 
above, is quite hopeless. Likewise, the thesis of ‘materialism’ is equally absurd. Properly speaking, materialism 
is the doctrine that only the corporeal exists. But although functional states are realised by physical states, it 
makes no sense to say that they are identical with them. To put the matter in Aristotelian terms, form is not 
reducible to matter.
As with Aristotle, then,  there is  one world; the mental and the physical, though they can be theoretically 
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distinguished, are not separable in concrete actuality, or applicable to separate realms of being. Hence, though  
the distinction between the mental and the physical can be granted some epistemological significance, these  
terms cannot properly be thought of as possessing any fundamental metaphysical significance. 
This really is the conclusion of this entire thesis; and this, I believe, constitutes the correct solution to the 
mind-body problem.
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Appendix:
Causality and the Quantum
In this appendix, I shall briefly discuss the phenomenon of ‘quantum entanglement’. The origin of this notion  
goes back to a 1935 paper jointly written by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and which has come to be known 
as the EPR paper after the initials of its authors. This paper attempted to demonstrate that the state vector was  
an  incomplete  representation  of  physical  reality,  given  certain  plausible  assumptions  concerning  the 
inadmissibility of superluminal signaling. The paper comprised two arguments. The first argument concerned 
the measurement of an observable on one of a pair of particles that were so related that the values of the  
observable for each of the particles had to sum to some definite value. The argument here was that, if the value  
of the observable on one particle is measured, the outcome of a measurement on the same observable for the 
other particle can be predicted with a probability of 1 (unity). Consequently, the value of the observable for  
this  second  particle,  even  prior  to  measurement,  must  be  determinate,  contrary  to  orthodox  quantum 
mechanics. The possibility that a measurement of one particle somehow changes the state of the other can be 
ruled out if the particles are so separated that the measurements on the two particles are separated by a space-
like interval. For then, a causal influence of one particle on another would be contrary to Einstein’s own (by 
that time well-established) theory of relativity.
The second argument within the paper,  which seeks to extend the argument of the first,  was not quite as  
straightforward as the first. Let us take two particles and consider two incompatible observables (say, position  
and momentum). And let us suppose that, as before, the two particles are so related that the values that each 
has  for  a  given  observable  bear  a  certain  determinate  relation  to  each  other,  so  that  if  the  value  of  the 
observable of one is known, then the outcome of measuring the same observable on the other particle can be 
predicted with certainty. Suppose that we measure (say) the position of particle 1, thus determining the position 
of particle 2. The position of particle 2, then, must have been definite independently of the measurement of the  
position of particle 1. Now, we could just as well have measured the incompatible observable of particle 1, say 
momentum, which would have determined the momentum of particle 2. By parity of reasoning with the case of  
position, the momentum of particle 2 must be definite independently of the measurement of the momentum of 
particle 1. But if particle 2 has both a position and momentum quite independently of measurement, then this  
violates orthodox quantum theory. For according to the orthodox interpretation of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle  a particle  is  never in an actual physical  state in which it  has  both a determinate  position and a 
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determinate  momentum. Whenever  a  particle  is  in  an  eigenstate  of  position,  it  is  not  in  an  eigenstate  of  
momentum, and vice versa.
The soundness of  this  argument (which has been ascribed specifically to  Podolsky1)  has been called into 
question by Tim Maudlin in his book Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity. He argues that, from the fact that 
had I measured the momentum of particle 1 instead of its position the momentum of particle 2 would have  
been determinate, it does not follow that particle 2 has a determinate momentum given that I did not in fact 
measure  the  momentum of  particle  1.2 Although  this  is  certainly  the  case,  I  am not  sure  that  it  affects 
Podolsky’s argument. For the point is surely that my  decision as to whether to measure the position or the 
momentum of particle 1 can have no effect on the state of distant particle 2. If either measurement results in 
my being able to predict with certainty the value of the same observable for the other particle, then, given the  
absence of superluminal influences, the values of both observables must already be determinate prior to any 
decision as to which observable to measure. Thus Podolsky’s argument seems to me to be just an extension of  
the first argument.
Replying  to  the  EPR  paper,  Bohr  conceded  that  there  could  be  no  superluminal  causality  and  that  the 
measurement of particle 1 cannot affect the state of particle 2: ‘there is in a case like that just considered no 
question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during the last critical stage of the 
measuring  process’.3 Nevertheless,  Bohr  said  that  the  measurement  of  particle  1  plays  a  conceptual  (as  
opposed to a causal) role in the description of particle 2. Essentially, his argument relies on an appeal to his  
notion  of  complementarity.  When  the  position  of  particle  1  is  measured,  and  the  position  of  particle  2 
determined, it no longer makes sense to talk of the momentum of particle 2 (or particle 1). The properties of  
particle 2 have no reality prior to determining the type of observable that is going to be measured. In the case 
at issue, the measurement of a given observable determines what can meaningfully be said concerning the  
properties of  both particles, even if, in this particular case, the actual physical measurement is performed on 
just one.
Bohr’s reply to the EPR paper was accepted by the majority of physicists at the time, though it is difficult to  
see why. Take, for instance, the first argument of the EPR paper. In the thought experiment described by this  
paper the position of particle 2 will be predictable with certainty once that of particle 1 is measured. Even if we  
accept complementarity, particle 2 must have had a determinate position independently of the measurement of  
1  See A. Fine, The Shaky Game, chapter 3.
2  Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, p. 141.
3  N. Bohr, ‘Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Reality Be Considered Complete?’, Physical Review, 
48, p. 699, quoted in Maudlin, op. cit., p. 142.
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the position of particle 1, if we reject superluminal influences. If we accept complementarity, then we must say  
that neither particle has a position until  a position measurement is performed on particle 1. But, if wave-
function collapse is physically real (and not just epistemic), then this does imply an ‘instantaneous’ change in 
the physical state of particle 2, so that the latter has a definite position once that of particle 1 is measured.  
Hence, Bohr’s argument seems to totally miss the point. As Maudlin says, taking as his example observations  
on incompatible components of photon polarisation, ‘the question is not what role experimental arrangements 
on the left [-hand particle] have in defining quantities on the right but rather how one is to understand the  
change in state on the right which follows the outcome on the left. If no physical change has occurred, then the 
photon on the right which has a definite, well-defined polarization after the left-hand measurement, must also 
have  had  one  before.  So  the  original  quantum  state  was  incomplete.’4 However,  the  authority  of  Bohr, 
combined with the obscurity of his paper, proved persuasive at the time. Maudlin observes that ‘for at least  
thirty years the physics community preferred to rest content with the unintelligible pronouncements of Bohr 
rather than facing the consequences of Einstein’s critique.’5
The whole matter was taken out of the realm of philosophical speculation and into the realm of testable science 
by John Bell in 1964, who demonstrated that the denial of a causal connection between a pair of separated  
particles in EPR-type thought experiments would yield outcomes for the correlation of the measurement of 
observables on each of the particles which would differ slightly from the expected values if orthodox quantum 
theory were correct. The experiments are somewhat tricky to perform, but were successfully carried out by 
Alain Aspect. The results proved to vindicate quantum mechanical predictions completely. It is important to  
note, however, that this does not resolve the paradox presented in the EPR paper. What it in fact implies is that,  
under some circumstances, orthodox quantum theory does indeed imply the existence of causal connections  
between events  separated by space-like intervals.  This  phenomenon is called ‘quantum entanglement’.  No 
transfer of matter or energy is involved, nothing travels ‘faster than light’, and the process cannot be used to 
send signals, so overall there is no violation of relativity. And yet it is a kind of causal connection.
It is important to be clear about the nature of this causal connection. There is, to begin with, no question of 
‘faster  than  light’  causation.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  measurement  of  one  particle  involves  an 
‘instantaneous’ change in another distant particle. If by ‘instantaneous’ one means ‘at the same instant’, then  
the truth is that no two events in separate regions of space-time are ever at the same instant. In fact, it is  
difficult to describe the connection between the two particles in terms of cause and effect at all. The outcome  
of neither measurement can be identified as the ‘cause’ of the outcome of the other. Remember that in the 
Aspect experiment there was a space-like separation between the measurements on the separate particles. Thus, 
4  Maudlin, op. cit., pp. 143-4.
5  Ibid, p. 144.
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in some frames of reference, the measurement of particle 1 would precede that on particle 2, but in others 2  
would precede 1.  Nothing objective corresponds to  these observations.  Thus, neither measurement can be 
identified as the ‘cause’ with the other relegated to the ‘effect’. Likewise, it is at least misleading to speak of 
‘action  at  a  distance’.  For  this  seems  to  imply  an  agent  and  something  acted  upon.  But  again,  no  such 
distinction can be made in the Aspect experiment.
There would seem to be just two options for describing this state of affairs. On the one hand, one can say that  
in those reference frames where the measurement on particle 1 occurs before the measurement on particle 2 the  
measurement on particle 1 is the cause of the outcome of the measurement of particle 2. In frames of reference  
where the measurement of particle 2 occurs first, the measurement on particle 2 will be the cause and that on 
particle  1 the effect.  If  this  is  accepted then it  means that  what  counts  as  a  cause and what an effect  is  
relativised  to  reference  frames and  does  not  represent  any objective  physical  fact.  Furthermore,  it  seems 
inapplicable in a reference frame where the two measurements happen simultaneously.
For this reason I prefer the following description. In the kind of causality involved here, there is no causal  
priority, and thus it is simply incorrect to talk of ‘causes’ and ‘effects’. Rather, what we ought to say is that  
there is a projectible lawlike correlation between the outcome of measurements of the same observable on the 
two particles. We might say that the two particles whose properties are thus correlated are a ‘causal pair’. But  
we need a new language of causality – one not implying causal priority – to describe this situation.
The outcome of Aspect’s experiment is frequently misrepresented. It is all too often described as somehow 
vindicating indeterminacy or overthrowing realism. But in fact it  concerns merely the question of whether  
causation is local. What it in fact shows is that quantum mechanics requires some form of non-local causation. 
This is simply the outcome of quantum mechanics itself, as vindicated by Aspect’s experiments. It has nothing 
to do with hidden variables, and certainly has no bearing on Bohm’s theories. As Maudlin says:
…ironically  Bohm’s  theory,  which  does  away with  instantaneous  wave  collapse  as  a  superluminal 
physical process, has been severely criticized for postulating superluminal influences. This is the price 
of clarity. By being explicit about what exists and how things interact Bohm presents a definite object of 
analysis. One can calculate how changes on one side of the apparatus lead to effects on the other. Most 
other ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics glory in vagueness. The exact status of the wave-function 
and the nature of wave collapse are not made clear. The wave-function is at once both physically real (to 
explain interference effects) and merely epistemic (to avoid wave collapse as a real physical process and 
other embarrassments…). When questions of ontology become acute the wave-function can be robbed 
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of all physical significance, becoming a mere ‘calculational device’.6
Indeed,  my own suggested Ensemble Interpretation is  actually very close to  Bohm. It  differs from Bohm 
primarily in that it sticks to the facts and refrains from explanation. My concern is not to explain anything but 
rather to describe what we already know in an intelligible and logical fashion.
The real implication of quantum mechanics is not where it has been traditionally asserted. It does not imply a  
fundamental metaphysical distinction between the ‘classical’ macroworld and the quantum microworld; it does  
not imply that observer and observed form some sort of unity in a manner which destroys science’s claim to  
objectivity, and it certainly does not imply the existence of many worlds or ‘many minds’ as has sometimes  
been  claimed.  The  change  in  our  common  sense  picture  of  reality  that  quantum  mechanics  necessitates 
concerns  causality.  Firstly,  there is  a degree of  indeterminacy with respect  to  the behaviour of  individual 
particles. Whether this indeterminacy is ultimate, only time will tell. Secondly, and connected with the above, 
the causal laws which govern nature at its most fundamental level concern  ensembles. Finally, it frequently 
happens that there are lawlike correlations between particles which do not admit any causal ‘priority’. In fact, 
the  main  import  of  quantum mechanics  is  holism.  The  behaviour  of  a  particle  is  a  function  of  its  total 
environment, in accordance with the associated wave-function.
As I have researched this whole topic, two things stand out. The history of quantum physics is frequently  
presented as  issuing in  an argument  between Einstein  and Bohr,  in  which  the former,  despite  his  radical  
innovations in physics, was too conservative to accept the new physics of the quantum, and in which he was 
bested in argument by Bohr. The first thing that strikes me is that this picture is wholly mistaken. Einstein was 
largely right in his disputes with Bohr. He simply insisted on a degree of clarity which Bohr disdained. The 
second  observation  I  shall  make  before  leaving  this  topic  is  that  the  theory  of  Bohm  has  been  quite 
unwarrantably dismissed. The Copenhagen interpretation is really a return to the Protagorean formula that man  
is the measure of all things, whilst the relative-state interpretation goes beyond any conceivable empirical 
warrant. Both rely on highly tendentious metaphysical posits which can derive no support from empirical  
science itself. Bohm’s theory at least has the merit of presupposing nothing more than the sort of scientific 
realism that is taken for granted elsewhere within science. (Although I have my doubts about it, on the ground 
that it might not be susceptible to empirical corroboration.)
In  conclusion:  the  Bohr-Heisenberg  philosophy  is  an  evident  fraud;  the  concept  of  ‘complementarity’ is 
scarcely intelligible. The whole notion of the collapse of the state vector is an old wives’ tale. No quantum 
6  Ibid, p. 146.
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object  is  ever  observed in  a  superposition  of  states.  Empirically,  the  state  vector  describes  the  statistical 
frequency distribution of the outcome of observations over a range of possible values. The state vector is thus a  
description of aggregates of similarly prepared objects (‘ensembles’) and not of individual objects. The notion  
of superposition is highly metaphysical. In an attempt to avoid the subjectivism inherent in the Copenhagen 
Interpretation, the relative-state, or Many Worlds, interpretation has sought to interpret this superposition as a 
conjunction. The result has been some rather elaborate metaphysical commitments. This is not surprising since 
the whole notion of superposition is metaphysical. There is no difficulty that a purely statistical interpretation  
of the state vector confronts that does not also confront the relative-state interpretation, whilst this latter clearly 
involves  vast  metaphysical  commitments  which  a  statistical-realist  interpretation  avoids.  There  is  thus  no 
justification for the notion of branching universes or ‘Many Worlds’. What is interesting is that the orthodox  
interpretation of quantum mechanics is often touted as ultra-empirical, when it in fact highly metaphysical. A 
description tailored strictly to  the facts  –  which is  what  I  have sought  to  substitute  for  this  muddle – is  
statistical.  The observed facts  are  that  ensembles of  quanta  approximate the behaviour of  waves,  but  that 
individual quanta behave as particles; furthermore, that the laws governing ensembles of quanta cannot be  
deduced from the properties of individual quanta. Nor can the behaviour of any individual quantum be deduced 
from the laws governing the ensemble to which it belongs. This is odd, but it is at least intelligible.
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